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URBNl INSURRECTIONS: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH TOWARD AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY 
Abstract 
JAMES RUSSELL STEWART 
Under the supervision of Dr. Robert M. Dimit 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility 
and appropriateness of employing a multi-disciplinary approach in 
the study of urban insurrections in an effort to construct a typology 
which would include all of the elements common to each disorder. 
The multi-disciplinary method is necessitated by the biases 
which are inherent in any analysis that is restricted to either a 
psychological, sociological, or politico-historical treatment of 
episodes of collective behavior. All of the disciplines make major 
contributions to any analysis, but it is the contention of this 
writer that the disciplines must be integrated before the most 
accurate depiction is possible. 
Another potential contribution of this dissertation is the 
offering of an integrated multi-disciplinary theoretical body of 
information to bridge the hiatus which appears to exist between 
theories of episodic collective behavior and theories of social 
movements. Urban insurrections have characteristics of both of 
these phenomena, yet they also have a uniqueness about them which 
is not revealed adequately by an interpretation from the existing 
terminals of theoretical explanation. 
The dissertation proposes a hypothetical typology (as defined 
by Howard Becker and John C. McKinney)l based upon a theoretical 
framework composed of the contributions of theorists in psychology, 
sociology, and political science. The typology was subjected to 
empirical testing by a comparison to the narratives of three major 
race riots which occurred during the last decade. The narrative 
data offered supporting evidence to each of the stages of the 
typology. 
The sequential stages of an urban insurrection that were 
supported include: 
1. A Discrepancy Between the Real and Ideal Cultures 
2. The Identification of Underlying, Causative Factors 
3. The Precipitating Incident 
4. The Rioting Stage 
5. The Reaction of Control Agencies 
6. The Return of Normality 
1John c. McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966). 
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Probably no area of human relations is more problematic at 
the present time than the majority-minority relationships in the 
United States. In particular, the black-white racial interaction 
patterns are especially strained. Unendurable conditions which have 
existed for many decades and the frustrations which they have mani-
fested are culminating in the increased polarization of the races 
within this country. Unresolved differences, untreated social 
problems, and failures to rectify intolerable living conditions are 
resulting in many forms of protest from the black communities in 
all parts of the nation. This dissertation is concerned with a 
special and unique form of that protest--the urban insurrection. 
In many respects the relevance of this area of investigation 
and the basic ideas which led to the selection of this topic as a 
dissertation subject are contained in the following quotation: 
The history of America is in large part a story of social 
relations between the races. An account of the experiences 
shared by blacks and whites, of what they learned to believe 
about themselves and each other, of how they came to behave 
toward each other, and of the consequences of their beliefs 
and behaviors--such an account encompasses the major events 
of American history from early exploration of the continent 
through the development of a plantation economy, its disruption 
by the processes of industrialization, and the massive dis­
locations of families and communities as the entire society has 
become urbanized. The constant reweaving of the fabric of 
American society can be understood largely in black and white 
terms. 
The place of America in the larger perspective of human 
history will be defined principally by what Americans do about 
the conflict between their behaviors in the realm of race 
relations and their beliefs about democracy, equality of 
opportunity, and the brotherhood of man.l 
The events described in the above passage are not new to the 
present generation of sociologists in America. Gunnar Myrdal ex­
pressed a similar view in the early 1940's. In his classic work, 
An American Dilemma, he described what he believed to be the basic 
internal dilemma or problem which would confront America in the 
decades following World War II. This situation is created by atti­
tude discrepant behavior patterns. In essence, the American Creed 
can not support the discriminatory practices against minority groups 
that are presently characteristic of the American society. 2 The net 
result of this situation is a shared predicament by Americans who 
attempt to reconcile their "ideal" and "real" cultures. 3 A lessening 
of this collectivized cognitive dissonance between professed beliefs 
and actual behaviors has been attempted by the enactment of legisla­
tion which has been designed to bring overt behaviors more in line 
with the underlying set of attitudes represented in what has been 
termed the "democratic, American ethos. " Unfortunately, efforts 
directed toward this goal have not proven entirely successful. 
1 Raymond W. Mack, ed. , Prejudice and Race Relations, (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 3. 
2Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1944) . 
3Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order, 3rd ed. , (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970) , pp. 170-171. 
2 
The present situation is that of a nation divided. The basic 
conclusion of the Kerner Commission Report was that the United States 
is moving toward the formation of two societies, one black, one 
white--separate and unequal. 4 This division is not an inevitable one 
nor is it the result of irreversible trends and forces. If allowed 
3 
to continue, however, these conditions could result in the destruction 
of the American way of life as it is represented in the basic set of 
values of this democracy. The amelioration of the causes of this 
situation will require an unprecedented commitment toward meaningful 
social action. The recommendations embodied in the Kerner Commission 
Report embrace three principles: 
1. To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of 
the problem. 
2. To aim these programs for high impact in the inu:nediate 
future in order to close the gap between promise and performance. 
3. To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can 
change the system of failure and frustration that now dominates 
the ghetto and weakens our society. 5 
The conditions in the ghetto are obviously at the center of 
the causation of the recent urban insurrections; however, these 
conditions have been present for generations and can not serve alone 
as the necessary and sufficient explanations for the riots. In the 
past decade, black Americans have undergone several significant 
4National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, Report, 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1968) , p. 1. 
S Ibid. , p. 2. 
changes in their collective self-image and in their perceptions of  
the world in which they find themselves. 6 A newly developing pride, 
represented in the current "Black is Beautiful" campaign, will not 
tolerate the prejudice and discrimination that have been passively 
accepted in the past. Compliance and accommodation are rapidly being 
replaced by protest, creative disturbances, and outright rebellion by 
many of  the young blacks in this country. Members of the black­
American communities are increasingly rejecting their present life 
situation as it has been defined for them by the white majority for 
many centuries. 
The changes in the black community are best represented by 
4 
the existence of  a "generation gap" between young blacks and their 
parents. Many factors can be identified for the "rising expectations" 
which characterize the aspirations of young blacks. Increased edu­
cational levels attained by the younger generation lead to markedly 
higher expectations for equality in all areas of social life. Most 
important, of course, is equal access to rewards in the form of 
power, prestige, and wealth. Another factor of equal s ignificance 
is the increased importance and strength of social organizations 
found within the confines of the black community. The organizations 
today are not the fraternal orders and social clubs that used to 
dominate the power structure within the urban black neighborhoods. 
6Jerome Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, (New York: 
Ballantine Books, Inc. , 1969), p. xi. 
The present organizations are more politically aware and concerned 
than were their predecessors. Almost all major organizations whose 
programs strive to achieve equality for blacks have local chapters 
in each of the large urban centers of this country. Moreover, each 
city has its own local organizations which also serve the same ends. 
While these groups use varied tactics and strategies, their goals are 
virtually identical--to further the cause of black equality in this 
country. The civil rights movement of  the past two decades has 
founded a heritage of leadership within the Negro community which is 
redefining its role in the struggle for freedom. The procedures 
which were successfully employed in the past--lobbying for favorable 
civil rights legislation, court cases to test the constitutionality 
of  discriminatory laws, and peaceful demonstrations and protests--
seem to have fallen out of favor with urban blacks in some of the 
large American cities. Conflict would seem to be the best single 
descriptive term to depict the new means which are bei_ng employed by 
the leadership within the urban ghettos. The black protest movement 
of the l960's has compelled sociologists to reexamine the nature of 
social conflict and its relationship to social change. In order to 
understand the recent strategies adopted it is necessary to develop a 
theoretical basis to interpret the positive contributions and func­
tions of social conflict. The best example of this type of  work is. 
Lewis easer's The Functions of Social Confli�t. 7 
7Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (New York: 
The Free Press, 1956). 
5 
Using previous works of this type as an interpretive guide, 
Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick have demonstrated that the black protest 
movement has and is employing four different types o f  conflict in 
their programs. 8 
First is legal conflict, which is an attempt to use the court 
system to attain redress. Secondly, there is the use of political 
conflict. This form involves the mobilization of black political 
activities (primarily in the form of voting for black or sympathetic 
white candidates) to coerce the governmental leaders to act upon the 
needs of the black persons in this country . Nonviolent direct action 
is the third type of  conflict and its popularity reached its peak 
during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The most frequent usage of  
this type of conflict took the form of various sit-ins and peaceful 
demonstrations. This method was popularized by Gandhi in India and 
was extensively used by Martin Luther King with varying success in 
the United States. The fourth and most recent type to be employed by 
blacks in this country is violence . This form is represented by the 
ghetto riots, programs for revolution as advocated by black militant 
organizations, and isolated attacks upon the personnel o f  social 
control agencies primarily in the form of sniping of police officers. 
While the progession from one type of conflict to another is not a 
perfect one it is clear that the present form o f  black protest is 
8John H. Bracey, August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, Conflict 
and Competition: Studies in the Recent Black Protest Movement, 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), p. 1. 
6 
somewhat more aggressive than that which was used in the past. The 
recent urban disorders are without question the most aggressive and 
destructive form of black protest. While responsible leaders on both 
sides decried the violence which characterized the riots there can be 
little doubt in regard to the causative factors behind them. Urban 
insurrections, while not being part of any over-all planned strategy, 
certainly have resulted from the same appalling conditions which have 
spawned the more legitimate forms of social protest. 
The causes of the race riots are many and varied, but the 
Kerner Commission Report has identified three basic conditions which 
when taken together can explain the reasons for the disturbances.9 
At the base of these conditions is pervasive white racism in the form 
of prejudice and discrimination against the black community. Segre­
gation practices have created rigid racial patterns of  residence. 
The increased black migration to the central city coupled with the 
white exodus to the suburbs have created a growing burden on cities 
which are already· suffering from depleted resources. The demographic 
trends have resulted in the creation of teeming racial ghettos 
replete with lack of opportunity, loss of hope, and disruptive social 
forces which manifest themselves in the form of high rates of deviant 
behavior. Forces operating within the ghetto have combined to per­
petuate and entrap persons within its walls--both physically and 
9Kerner Commission Report, op. cit . ,  pp. 203-204. 
7 
psychologically. These processes have resulted in the development 
of what Myrdal has termed an "underclass." This phenomenon repre­
sents a group o f  persons who are not integrated into the rest of  
society. It is composed of the unemployed, the underemployed, and 
the unemployable persons and families at the bottom of  the social 
scale for whom opportunities are becoming more closed while they are 
growing plentiful for the rest of the nation. 10 The urban ghetto 
dwellers are the most representative of this growing problem in the 
United States. Another recent viewpoint describes this situation 
8 
from the standpoint of the formation of a sub-culture of poverty whose 
values and norms are divergent opposites from those of the "white 
middle class culture" in our society. Through the process of social­
ization these defeatist traditions are transmitted to the next gen­
eration and the members find themselves more or less permanently 
locked into a cycle o f  poverty. 
More recently other conditions have begun to catalyze the 
abhorrent conditions described in the preceding passages. Expecta­
tions aroused by the victories of the civil rights movement have led 
to frustrations, hostility, and cynicism in the face of the persistent 
11 gap between promise and performance. The white terrorism tactics 
10celia s. Heller, ed. , Structured Social Inequality: A 
Reader in Comparative Social Stratification, (Toronto: The Macmillan 
Company, 1969), p. 107. 
11 Kerner Commission Report, op. cit. , pp. 203-204. 
directed against the non-violent protests cf the early 1960's have 
also creaLed a climate which approves and encourages the use of 
violence and disrespect for social control agencies. Feelings of 
alienation are extensive in the black urban communities. More and 
more blacks are tending to view themselves as victims of political 
and economic exploitation on the part of the white power structure 
in America. The powerlessness syndrome which affects an increasing 
number of blacks is revealing itself in the direction of increased 
violence. Access to legitirr.ate avenues of redre�s are denied and 
the resulting situation leads to the conviction that violence is the 
only viable method of "rr.oving the system. 1112 
Also important in the search for causes of the riots was the 
incitement and encouragement of violence by leaders in the black 
communities. Appeals to violence were preached and reinforced 
throughout the ghettos by the " •. . inflammatory rhetoric of black 
racists and militants."13 The influence of these persons can not be 
accurately measured; however, it is evident that they provided sparks 
9 
to an already volatile situation. The role of the police must also 
be included as one of the causative factors responsible for the riots. 
The very nature of their job tends to bring them into conflict situ­
ations and most riots were sparked by a routine arrest of some black 
12walt Anderson, ed., The Age of Protest, (Pacific Palisades, 
California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc. , 1969), p. 3 7. 
13Kerner Commission Report, op. cit., p. 205. 
10 
suspect. But more importantly, the police have come to symbolize the 
oppression and discrimination used by the white power structure over 
blacks. They are viewed as the white man's enforcer in the ghettos. 
Actions of the police in the form of encouraging and, in part, creat­
ing a "dual system o f  justice" have also acted in an exacerbating 
manner to widen the division within this country. 
Decades of neglect by socially responsible agencies designed 
to correct these injustices coupled with an increasing impatience 
among blacks have created the circumstances ,;.vhich precipated the 
various race riots that occurred during the late 1960's. Martin 
Luther King, until his assassination the most respected and prestig­
ious leader within the Negro community, had the following to say in 
reference to the recent urban disorders: 
Urban riots must now be recognized as a durable social 
phenomena. They may be deplored, but they are here and should 
be understood. Urban riots are a special form of violence . . • •. 
They are mainly intended to shock the white community. They 
are a form of social protest. 14 
The violence that occurred on both sides during these incidents, 
the damage to property, and the resultant widening of the social 
distance between the races combine to label urban insurrections as 
one of the major social problems confronting the American society 
today. 
1 4Norval D. Glenn and Charles M .  Bonjean, Blacks in the United 
States, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1969), p. 5. 
11 
The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders has done much to explain conditions which precipitated and 
preceded the outbreaks and has also presented a list of recommenda­
tions which are designed to eliminate the causes of the riots. The 
report is very detailed and complete; however, it fails to completely 
examine and study _the processes that were in operation during the 
actual riots. This dissertation seeks to fill this void. In addition 
to providing a base of knowledge in this area, the objective of the 
dissertation will be to provide a new dimension for the analysis of 
collective behavior and the sociology of social movements. 
Specifically, the dissertation proposes to investigate the 
possibility and appropriateness of utilizing a multi-disciplinary 
framework for the analysis of urban insurrections. It is the conten­
tion of this writer that earlier models or typologies derived from 
the analyses of episodic collective behavior or historical treatments 
of full-scale revolutions are inadequate to explain or fully compre­
hend the events that occurred in Watts, Detroit , and Newark. 
Cursory examination of literature seems to indicate that the 
phenomenon under investigation is located between two poles of a 
collective behavior--social movement continuum. One terminal is 
represented by "issueless, irrational" behavior of temporary crowds 
while the other is best exemplified by long-term political movements. 
Present theories of explanation tend to focus on either of the 
extremes while leaving a theoretical vacuum in the center. This 
dissertation is designed to offer an integrated typology in this area. 
12 
Race riots have been researched before and many conclusions 
have been reached. While the Kerner Commission Report is the most 
impressive and extensive piece of investigation thus far attempted, 
other more recent articles still illustrate the timeliness o f  research 
in this area. Among the most recent articles are: "The Causes of 
Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations" by 
Seymour Spilerman in the ASR, vol. 35, August, 1970; "The Causes of 
Racial Disturbances: Tests of an Explanation" also by Seymour 
Spilerman in the ASR, vol. 36, June, 1971; "Some Implications of 
Experimental Social Psychology for the Study of Urban Disorders" by 
Russell G. Geen and "Neighborhood Status Mobility and Riot Behavior: 
An Analysis of the Detroit Disorders of 1967" by Donald I. Warren in 
the Sociological Quarterly, vol. 12, No. 3, Summer, 1971. While these 
investigations answer pertinent questions there remains unanswered 
one fundamental question--What were the sequential stages that 
characterized the developmental and operational phases o f  the race 
riots? Providing an answer to this question will constitute the task 
of this dissertation. 
CHAPTER II 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This research, as is the case with most investigations, rests 
upon the assumption that regularities and patterns do exist among 
seemingly unique events and that these recurrences are discoverable 
with the use of scientific methodology. In other words, the problem 
of this dissertation can be stated thusly--Do discernible sequential 
stages exist in urban insurrections and, if so, what are they and 
how can they be identified? 
The research problems inherent in this dissertation are two­
fold in nature. First, it will be necessary to establish and docu­
ment the usage of the constructed typology as a legitimate research 
tool in this previously unexplored area. It is essential that the 
tool be sanctioned before the investigation can proceed. Constructed 
and ideal types have, of course, a long and fruitful history of 
application in sociological research. However, before it can be 
utilized in the study of urban insurrections it will be necessary 
to substantiate its productive application in phenomena that are 
similar to the present topic of research and thereby increase the 
likelihood of its successful application. Typologies of revolutions 
and collective behavior have been constructed so it appears likely 
that adequate precedents do exist, but this will be more fully 
developed in the theoretical framework and review of literature 
portions of the dissertation. 
274300 
The second problem of the study will be the construction, 
empirical verification, and revision, if deemed necessary, of a 
typology that identifies and establishes regularities and sequences 
that are found to occur in the race riots chosen for analysis. It 
could then be possible to generalize from these findings back to 
population which includes all race riots which have occurred in the 
recent decade. It could also be possible to use the typology as a 
predictive device in the event that this type of phenomenon occurs 
in the future. These operations, however, will be highly tenuous 
14 
and speculative and must be qualified by limitations and restrictions 
to be discussed later in the methodology section of the dissertation. 
The technique to be employed in the examination of this 
phenomenon is probably best described by Kaplan as the "hypothetico­
deductive method.111 According to this procedure, the investigator 
using careful observations, shrewd guesses, and scientific intuition 
arrives at a set of postulates governing the processes involved in a 
certain phenomenon. These postulates take the form of a general 
hypothesis from which he deduces a set of observable consequences in 
the form of working hypotheses which can be confirmed or disconfirrned 
by empirical testing. The actual steps used in the construction of 
the typology will be elaborated upon later in the methodology section, 
but these are the fundamental processes involved. The typology will 
1Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for 
Behavioral Science, (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Company, 
1964), pp. 9-10. 
rest upon and be firmly supported by the body of theory to be 
developed. Using theory as a base, the typology should represent 
an organized image of the phenomenon that will be investigated. The 
typology will not simply be a restatement of specific theories but 
also will incorporate important propositions and perspectives dis­
covered in the review of literature in related areas. 
15 
The constructed type, as a research tool, serves two important 
functions: (1) it gives structure and meaning to raw empirical data; 
and (2) it provides empirical referents for verification of the 
already existing body of theory. It functions in the all-important 
position of serving as a link between theory and empirical reality. 
The constructed typology used in this dissertation will be formulated 
from a theoretical framework and, after being subjected to empirical 
testing, the results will then be re-integrated back into the body of 
theory from which it was derived. This method of employing the 
constructed type is more in line with recent trends which relate it 
more closely to the empirical data. This development came about 
largely because of positivists' objections to the impressionistic 
approaches that were previously used.2 
The empirical testing of the typology will consist of compar­
ing the hypothesized constructed typology to various narratives, 
2Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social 
Research, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 255. 
accounts, and descriptions of a selected few case studies of  race 
riots. Originally the writer had hoped to use a randomly chosen 
sample from the total population of race riots, but this operation 
did not prove feasible because of the paucity of information that 
exists about the race riots which were smaller in scope. Because 
of this Watts (1965), Detroit (1967), and Newark (1967) were chosen 
for intensive analysis. While there are many shortcomings which 
accompany the use of  the "case-study" method, it is particularly 
appropriate in instances where little research has been accomplished 
before and where the purpose of  the research is mainly descriptive 
rather than experimental. It is also a fruitful method for stimu-
lating insights and suggesting hypotheses for further research of a 
more detailed nature. 3 
Another manner of depicting the research techniques of this 
study would be to describe them as "historical-ex post facto". This 
type of investigation is defined as: 
16 
That in which the independent variable or variables have al­
ready occurred and in which the researcher starts with the 
observation of a dependent variable or variables. He then studies 
the independent variables in retrospect for their possible re­
lations to, and effects on, the dependent variable or variables.4 
3claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. 
Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed. , (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), pp. 59-60. 
4Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research: 
Educational and Psychological Inquiry, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, Inc. , 1964), p. 360. 
17 
The labels, independent or dependent variables, are not 
entirely apropos with regard to the testing of  the typology; however, 
the sequential stages of a race riot act as both independent and 
dependent variables during the chain of events occurring in a race 
riot. The main purpose for introducing the ex post facto concept 
lies in the shortcomings or weaknesses that accompany this type of 
research design. The major limitations include the inability to 
manipulate independent variables, the lack of power to randomize the 
sample selected for analysis, and perhaps most importantly, the risk 
of improper interpretation. 5 Despite these restrictions it is felt 
that the study can be successfully executed by careful analysis of 
the data and also by the fact that this study will have a hypothesis 
to serve as a guide in the process of interpretation. 
The documentation for the three selected riots will be primar­
ily of a secondary-source nature. Primary sources or first-hand 
accounts were shown by the Kerner Commission Report to be characterized 
by biases , inaccuracies, and were in many instances mutually contra­
dictory. The secondary sources, while based on primary sources, are 
the results of  a sifting, weighing, and comparing of primary sources 
to arrive at the most accurate accounts possible. Admittedly, a 
certain amount of information will be lost, but it is believed that 
the objectivity of  the secondary-source material will more than 
compensate for this loss. 
5 rbid. , p. 37 1. 
18 
Prime sources of information utilized during this stage of 
the investigation will be the various governmental commission reports . 
In addition , journal articles , newspaper stories, and recent books 
will also be used extensively . The working hypothesis will then be 
evaluated in terms of these sources and necessary revisions will be 
undertaken to insure the typology' s compatibility with reality. 
In summary , the major internal research problems con fronting 
this writer will be the justification of both the area of investiga­
tion and the methodology that will be employed. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRA1'1EWORK AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter will summarize the contributions and findings of 
theorists who, by virtue of their writings, have achieved some 
prominence in the field of collective behavior. Both similarities 
and differences will be noted in an effort to trace the development 
of alternate philosophies o f  interpretation of  crowd behavior. 
Particular attention will be directed toward contrasting opinions of 
the writers in their descriptions of crowds, and causative factors 
involved in episodes of collective behavior. By concentrating on 
these three foci, the "evolution" of thought in this field becomes 
very evident. 
Collective behavior theorists can be categorized into three 
distinct schools o f  thought--the classical, the conventional, and a 
third group, more recent in origin, that will be referred to as the 
new perspectives school for lack of a better term. In addition to 
these three stages there can also be identified certain individuals 
who occupied a transitional position between the different schools. 
The writings of Robert Park, for example, marked a definite change 
from the traditional theoretical position of  the classical school of 
thought and heavily inf luenced the foundation of the next school, 
the conventional. Likewise, the Kerner Commission Report set the 
stage for a new dimension of analysis that superseded the scope of 
the new perspectives school. 
2 0  
The classical school of thought dominated all academic inter­
pretations of collective behavior until well into the 1920 ' s. Almost 
without exception the early theorists from Plato to Le Bon focused 
upon the psychological implications of crowd behavior. The early 
collective behavior theories had their roots in the antidemocratic 
traditions of European academicians. 1 Largely concentrating on the 
"irrational " and "evil " aspects of  the crowd, their work was heavily 
tainted with a conservative bias and tended to discredit c rowd 
behavior by depicting it as animalistic and primitive. 
The conventional school consisted largely of an American 
modification of the classical school 's  findings and interpretations. 
These changes, however, only modified but did not eliminate the bias 
inherent in the classical school. Their attempts to systematize the 
field of collective behavior have often confounded rather than 
clarified. Furthermore, the conceptual organization is based upon 
"undemonstrated assertions about the exaggerated character of unin­
stitutionalized beliefs and behaviors . . . " of the participants. 2 
This school was the p revailing theoretical framework in collective 
behavior from the 1930 ' s  until the publication of the Kerner 
Corro.nission Report in the later portion of the 1960's. 
1Jerome Skolnick and Elliott Currie, "A C ritical Note on 
Conceptions of Collective Behavior, " The Annals of the American 





The new perspectives school owes a great debt to the Kerner 
Commission Report. It was the first maj or document that attempted to 
objectively analyze the actions of  both the agencies of social control 
and the participants in the riots. It has a tendency to legitimize 
some of the actions of the rioters and lays some of the blame for the 
intensity o f  the disorders on the shoulders of  the police. Using 
this document as a benchmark the recent theorists have added the 
important dimension o f  a political interpretation. They conclude 
that the political overtones surrounding an urban disorder must neces­
sarily be included in any form of investigation. Indeed some consider 
it the most important because of the distorted findings that result 
when the political circumstances are excluded from the analysis. 
The general body of the text that follows will be an elabora­
tion on this format. The writers chosen to represent each school 
certainly do not exhaust each school's membership . Other writers 
could also have been included but the selection for this dissertation 
was based upon two criteria: (1 ) their typicality ; and ( 2 )  their 
eminence. 
The summary and conclusions portion at the end of  this section 
will relate the findings o f  this research to the writer's dissertation 
topic and show the relevance that they have for any future analysis 
of collective behavior. 
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THE CLASSICAL SCHOOL 
Gustave Le Bon 
In his definition of a crowd Le Bon differentiates between 
crowd as used in the ordinary sense and from a psychological viewpoint. 
The former is simply a gathering of individuals while the latter is a 
new combination of  ideas and characteristics differing very much from 
those of the individual personalities composing the physical crowd. 3 
The characteristics o f  the crowd are seen as melting into a single 
collective mind. This formation of  a single being is the process and 
end result of  Le Ban's "law o f  the mental unity of crowds . 114 The 
collective mind is not a product or a sum of the individuals that 
compose the crowd , it is rather composed of the characteristics that 
each of  the individuals have in common. Moreover, the common features 
are governed by " unconscious forces " that most normal individuals have 
5 to the same degree. The implication of his descriptions strongly 
suggests that instinctual behavior is largely responsible for the 
various actions o f  crowds. 
Le Bon identified three processes which are found in every 
. . · 1 ·  6 crowd--anonymity, contagion, and suggestibi ity. It is the 
3Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, (New York : Viking Compass Books ,  
1960) , p. 2 3 . 
4rbid. , 
5-b · d  �- , 
6rbid . ,  
p. 24. 
p. 29 . 
p . 3 0 . 
combination of these three processes and their influence upon the 
'individuals that largely explains the conduct of the crowd. The net 
effect of these processes results in leaving the members of a crowd 
23 
in a state that is very similar to hypnosis. This "state" can largely 
ex.plain the special characteristics of a crowd--"impulsiveness, 
irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of j udgment and the 
critical spirit, and the exaggeration of sentiments. 117 These charac­
teristics explain the fact that crowds are not influenced or controlled 
to any degree by laws or institutions. The crowd loses its "civili-
zation" and reverts back to a more primitive state of being. The 
actions of the crowd are similar to what Lombroso identified as the 
"atavistic man. "  Le Bon did attribute both destructiveness and heroism 
to the crowd ; however, in both instances the behavior is a result of 
irrationality and impulsiveness. 
Le Bon identified two basic types of crowds--heterogeneous and 
8 homogeneous. Heterogeneous crowds are defined as " . .. a composition 
of individuals of any description, of any profession, and of any degree 
. 11 · 
9 
of inte 1.gence. "  These are the crowds that are most likely to 
exhibit the "typical crowd characteristics" and include street crowds 
and various formal assemblies. The homogenous crowd is usually more 
7 rbid. , p. 3 6. 
8 Ibid . , p • 15 5 • 
9rbid. , pp. 156-57. 
restrained and reserved, but it depends upon the "quality" of  the 
·individuals who compose them. Examples of this type would include: 
10 sects, castes, and classes. Le Bon also discusses the criminal 
crowd and its characteristics, but this type is more likely to be 
labeled because of unfavorable definitions attached to its actions 
rather than the composition of its membership . 
According to Le Bon the behavior of crowds can be attributed 
to a number of different factors or influences. Paramount in impor-
tance are the controlling instincts that are manifested in a crowd 
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. t ' 11 situa 1.on. The "normal 1 1  behavior of individuals that is controlled 
by laws and mores is placed in a position of secondary importance with 
the formation of the "low-level" collective mind. The ma j or factor 
of influence now becomes subconscious instinctual behavior patterns 
which the crowd participants have in common. 
Other factors are also seen to have some effect on the behav-
ior of particular crowds. These include: race, tradition, time, 
. . . d d 
. 1 2  institutions, an e ucation. However, these factors have only a 
modifying influence upon the more basic instinctual behavior patterns. 
Thus, certain "races" of people exhibit crowd behavior which is more 
irrational and tempermental than others while highly educated persons 
are less li.kely to succumb to the "temptations " of the crowd. 
l0 rbid . 
11rbid. , pp. 162-6 3 . 
12rbid. , p .  81. 
Georg Sirnmel 
While Sirnmel ' s  descriptions of crowds and their resulting 
behavior are remarkably similar to Le Ban ' s, there are a number of 
differences which are worth noting. Simmel characterizes the "mass" 
not as a sum of its individual qualities but an entirely new 
" . . • phenomenon made up of only those fragments of each of them in 
which he coincides with all others. 11 13 He further states that these 
f t f . t th "l t d · · · 1 1 1 4 ragmen s are o necessi y e owes an most prirrutive. Thus, 
the mass is always seen as being inferior to the individual, indeed, 
the mass has a tenclency to "pull down " the individual to its level. 
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The resulting "mass mind" is described as radical, irrational, 
and negative . The "mass mind " always centers on simple , often radical, 
ideas.
15 
It is unable to weigh alternatives, but rather rushes to 
achieve its aims or goals via the shortest, most simple routes . 
Furthermore, the crowd rests upon "emotionalness" rather than 
"intellect. 1 1 16  
Simmel believes that mass behavior is largely negative in 
character. This is a result of the fact that common features of 
individuals which make possible their unification are more likely to 
13 h . 1 f G s ·  1 Kurt H. Wolff , ed. , T e Socio ogy o eorg im."Tie , 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 33. 
14rbid. 
lSrbid. , p. 34 .  
16rbid. , pp. 3 5-36 . 
( Glencoe, 
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center around negative feelings. 17 The negative features o f  the 
unifying bonds are revealed, above all, in its norms. The norms that 
characterize a large group are almost entirely of a prohibitive and 
. . 18 restrictive nature. The main function of these norms is not to 
provide direction for the group but rather to simply allow the mass 
to maintain itself with a minimum of control. As s tated earlier, the 
purpose of  this chapter is largely descriptive and not evaluative ; 
consequently, no attempt will be made to criticize the work of  the 
theorists included in the paper. Surely exceptions to Simrnel's 
analysis can be noted; however, in the context of this paper the 
important contribution of Sirnmel lies in his attributing norms to the 
masses. 
While Simrnel does not formally distinguish between different 
types of crowds, he indirectly finds differences between large crowds 
and small crowds. Generally " . • . as the size of group increases the 
cowman features that fuse its members into a social unit become ever 
fewer. 1 119 From this hypothesis it is apparent that Simmel thought 
large crowds were more likely to exhibit "inferior " characteristics. 
Small gro�ps are likely to retain some of the civilized features of 
human beings ; whereas, these would disappear in large gatherings. 
Simmel gives certain qualifications to this proposition, but consid-
ered it generally valid. 
1 7 rbid. , p. 3 96 . 
18rbid. , pp. 397-9 8. 
19rbid. , p. 367. 
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The basic cause of crowd behavior was identified by Simmel as 
·a "collective nervousness" which is not found in individuals in an 
isolated state. 20 This phenomenon was extremely receptive to stimuli. 
Even casual stimuli could result in incredible behavior. Simmel uses 
as an analogy the spark which precipitates a stampede of a herd of 
cattle. The collective nervousness is a result of a "mutual excita­
tion" that all members of a crowd experience. Therefore, stimuli are 
not met with any form of resistance on the part of the individual. 
Furthermore, the individual himself acts as a stimulus for other 
members. As Sirnmel succinctly states : "The individual, by being 
carried away, carries away. 11 21  
Gabriel Tarde 
While Tarde has written a great deal about collective behavior, 
most of his interest and work concerns the public. In fact, most of 
his views and ideas of a crowd are presented only as a contrast to 
the characteristics of a public. Tarde regarded the public as an 
evolutionary result of the more basic, primitive behavior found in 
crowd situations. A public was an outgrowth of mass communications 
and in most ways was more rational and objective than its older 
counterpart, the crowd. Tarde believed that the ·c�owd was a social 
2 2 group of the past. As man becomes more "civilized and sophisticated" 
20rbid. , p .  3 5. 
21 rbid. 
22Terry Clark, Gariel Tarde: On Communication and Social 
Influences, ( Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969), p .  2 81. 
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his impulses will gradually be directed or channeled in the form of 
public behavior. 
"The crowd has something animal about it . 1 1 23 This one sentence 
from Tarde ' s  writings best sums up his views on the crowd. The crowd 
has a sort of magnetic attraction for the individual, who is drawn to 
it and completely taken over by the mind of the crowd. 24 Crowds are 
always marked by short sightedness and impulsiveness. While an indi­
vidual in a solitary setting may be quite liberal and tolerant p the 
formation of a crowd s ignals an increase in authoritarianism and 
. 1 b h . 25 tyrannica e avior. 
A crowd is also characterized by what Tarde called a "mutual 
contagion of sentiments. 1 1 2 6  A crowd may remain silent or inactive 
for a long period of time, but if one individual starts shouting or 
stamping his feet he is soon followed by the other assembled 
individuals. 
The likelihood that a crowd will form and its accompanying 
characteristics depends upon three factors: the temper of the times, 
. . 2 7  d the season, and the race of the participants. Crow s are more 
likely to arise or occur during difficult, strenuous or stressful 
23rbid. , 
24rbid. , 
25 b " d 
� - 1 
26rbid . , 
2 7rbid. , 
p. 2 7 8 . 
p. 281 
p. 289 . 
p . 291. 
p .  287 . 
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times. The implication in Tarde's use of this variable is that crowd 
behavior may be the result of unfair practices of the rulers or at 
least some crowd behavior may be political in nature. Tarde also 
observes that crowds were more prevalent during the summer and their 
behavior was more hostile and "feverish" than winter crowds. While 
increased occurrence of collective behavior in the summer can be 
explained by factors other than climate, it is interesting to note 
the contemporary view of "the long hot summer" and its relevance re­
garding potential riots. Race or nationality was another factor in 
explaining the occurrence and characteristics of collective behavior. 
However, Tarde ' s  use of the concept does not carry with it the racist 
overtones that were depicted in earlier writings. He believes that 
his own nationality, the French, were most susceptible to participa­
tion in forms of collective behavior. 
Tarde also identified types of crowds or rather " • . .  four 
stages of being which mark the various degrees of their passivity or 
activity. 11 28 The expectant crowd is a gathering of individuals based 
upon the anticipation of some forthcoming event. An example would be 
a theater audience before the opening curtain. The second type is 
called an attentive crowd. Its attention is focused upon some event 
or drama that is taking place and an example would be a church con­
gregation or a lecture audience. Thirdly is the demonstrating crowd, 
28rbid . , p .  290. 
30 
which is characterized by a type of activity usually marching, singing 
or slogan shouting. The last type is the active crowd . The main pre­
occupation for this type o f  crowd is action, which is usually directed 
against some object. A typical example of this final type would be a 
lynch mob. 
The above categories can be viewed in two di f ferent ways. 
First, this classi fication system can be used to categorize different 
crowds and more importantly, it can be used to describe di fferent 
phases of the same crowd from its formation through the final stages 
of activity. 
Robert Park 
While Park's writings and descriptions of collective behavior 
are in many ways similar to those that this writer has termed the 
classicists; however, he is also responsible for many orig inal contri-
butions which can only be appreciated by comparing them to contemporary 
wri tings on the subject . It is for this reason that he is not placed 
in either of the schools o f  thought, but rather is given a transitional 
location between the two. 
Park believes that collective behavior is based upon some form 
of 1 1 social unrest. " 29 This unrest is then transmi tted from one 
individual to another in a process that is similar to the "milling 11 of  
29Robert E. Park and Ernest W.  Burgess, Introduction to the 
Science of  Sociology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 2 1) , 
p. 866 . 
3 1  
a cattle herd. In the introduction textbook which he co-authored, 
Park uses much of Le Ban's work regarding descriptions of the crowd. 
Because of the great deal of overlap in this area, most of this 
paper's text will be concerned with his original contributions in the 
etiology of crowd behavior. 
Park thought that collective behavior was at least to some 
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degree a form of tension release. However, this interpretation was 
restricted to some fonns of "riotous or revelry " crowds. He views 
some aspects of society as tension producing or frustrating for the 
individual and collective behavior was a "quasi-institutionalized" 
form of release. In some cases . this release had become standardized 
in the form of "holiday crowd 1 1  behavior which would be viewed as 
inappropriate at other times . 
The political crowd was the subject of much of the innovative 
thinking that characterized this writer . A political crowd was a 
mechanism for raising social issues, which could be either justified 
or not. 3 1  In this context Park was heavily influenced by Lyford 
Edward ' s  book entitled The Natural History of Revolution. As the 
title implies this work dealt with revolution as a natural phenomenon 
and as a "sometimes legitimate "  tool for social change. In this 
manner, Park ' s  work can be viewed as a reaction against earlier 
30Robert E .  Park, Society, (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 
1955) , Chapter 1. 
31Ibid. , pp. 30- 3 1. 
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writers who described evolution or evolutionary changes as the only 
"'legitimate" ones. P ark ' s writings on this subject seemed to be the 
first that were totally objective in describing revolution as a means 
of social change. To Park, revolution was simply another form of 
social change, granted that is is usually more violent and sudden, 
but it  should be analyzed using the same frame of reference accorded 
other examples of change.32 
Furthermore, collective behavior can be v iewed as a necessary 
first step in the formation of permanent social justifications.33 -
Crowd behavior can sometimes be a prelude to a more generalized social 
movement. A social movement, which becomes popular and pervasive , may 
have its ideals and aims incorporated by society and the final result 
would be a revised or new social institution. Examples that he uses 
to support this claim are the development of the various major 
religious and political ideologies. 
THE CONVENTIONAL SCHOOL 
Turner and Killian 
According to these authors, collective behavior is always in 
sharp contrast to "normal" or institutionalized behavior. 34 While 
32rbi· a., 35 36 pp . - • 
33rbid. , p. 25. 
3 4Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1957), p. 12. 
33 
group norms may develop during the activity , these norms are emergent 
and spontaneous as compared to the formalized norms which accompany 
normal behavior. Usually there is a certain amount of agreement 
between formal norms , but the spontaneous group norms may be mutually 
opposed to these and the result is a form of deviant behavior. Be-
cause of this characteristic , collective behavior always stands in 
opposition to what is considered "routine" group living. Normal 
behavior has tradition, function, and structure , while collective 
behavior does not necessarily have any of these features. 
Another unique characteristic of collective behavior is the 
apparent lack of differentiation in the behavior of the individual 
3 5  
actors. The crowd is dominated by a "uniform mood and uniform 
imagery ". This constitutes the other important reason why collective 
behavior is different from ordinary group behaviors. This common 
mood is largely a result of a process called "milling". Milling is 
defined as the process or activity that is the result of an uncertain 
. t ·  36 situa ion . 
significance . 
In a collective context this "milling" takes on new 
In addition to serving as a release for the individual 
it also serves as a stimulus for other members of the group. Under 
these conditions "milling serves in the development of a common 
definition , providing a new basis for social cohesion and making 
possible collective action. 11 3 7 Specifically , milling is largely 
3 S Ibid . , p . 5 9 . 
36rbid . 
37 rbid. 
responsible for the sensitization of individuals to each other, the 
development of  common mood, and the development of a coromon image. 38 
The authors identify six characteristics which are cormnon to 
3 4  
all crowds: (1) uncertainty; (2) a sense of urgency ; (3) communication 
of mood and imagery ; (4) constraint ; (5 ) selective individual suggest­
ability; and (6) permissiveness. 39 All of these features are present 
to a differing degree in all forms of  activity defined as collective 
behavior. 
An important contribution by Turner and Killian was their 
identification of "differential participation patterns " o f  individuals 
in a crowd setting. While the group develops a certain amount of 
homogeneity through processes already discussed a crowd usually will 
remain quite heterogeneous during a large part of its existence. 40 
All crowds have both leaders and followers and it can be shown that 
leadership elements change frequently during an episode o f  collective 
behavior. Individuals have different motivations for participating 
and this is mainly responsible for the differential participation. 
While descriptions o f  crowds seem to focus upon the homogeneity of  
behavior, Turner and Killian maintain that the most significant find-
ings of  crowd dynamics may very well come from studies that focus 
. . . t 41 upon the differences in the participan s .  





p. 84 . 
p. 112. 
pp. 119-20 . 
From the standpoint of 
the process by which a crowd develops , the authors identify two 
different types: (1) the emergent crowd ; and (2 )  the precipitous 
4 2  crowd. The former is an instance where the crowd forms as a slow, 
gradual process , while the latter would be a situation where much of 
the developmental processes were instantaneous. Examples of the two 
types would be a political movement and a panic mob , respectively. 
While this dichotomy is useful, the authors find it necessary to 
examine different types of crowds from other viewpoints. Crowds may 
also be classified as either solidaristic or individualistic. 43 A 
solidaristic crowd is one that requires the combined and integrated 
efforts of the crowd while an individualistic crowd has a series of 
parallel individualistic objectives. Crowds may also vary in the 
d � ' f ' · t  of thei· r  obJ'ect. 44 egree o� speci 1c1  y A focused crowd has a very 
35 
specific object but a volatile crowd may act upon many objects and 
shift from one to the other. Crowds can also be categorized according 
f . . h . . . t k 45 to the type o obJ ective t at its participan s see . An active 
crowd must result in some action upon an external object ; however, 
an expressive crowd may have as its objective some state of being or 
experience . This objective is internal in nature and an example 
would be a group waiting to see a vision. This three-fold 












classification can also be combined to form other types. A good 
example would be an individualistic-volatile-active crowd whose 
activity would center on vandalism. 
36 
Turner and Killian are also able to distinguish five different 
types of participants based on the degree and type of motivation. 46 
The five types are: ( 1 )  the active participants ; ( 2 )  the passive 
participants ; ( 3 )  the insecure participants; (4 ) the spectators; and 
(5) the uninhibited, including psychopaths and petty criminals. While 
these types will not be discussed in this paper the mention o f  them 
will shed light on the authors' views of collective behavior. 
The cause of any instance of collective behavior is difficult 
to isolate and usually is the result of many factors. Turner and 
K illian have listed five underlying conditions of collective behavior : 
1. Collective behavior is facilitated by absence, breakdown 
or weakness of social control resulting from total lack or 
inadequacy of existing social organization. 
2. Collective behavior is fa cilitated by inadequate normative 
integration. 
3. Another condition that contributes to collective behavior 
is inadequacy of communication. 
4. The sense of complexity , intricacy, and involvement inherent 
in the situation may also facilitate collective behavior. 
S. Finally, the foregoing syndrome of conditions fun ctions to 
frustrate the individual and predispose him to collective behavior. 
In other words, the situation is so ambiguous and unstructured for 
the individual that he turns to collective behavior as an attempt 
. . . 47 to redefine or restructure the situation. 
46rbid. , pp. 103-10. 
47rbid. , Chapter 2. 
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Herbert Blumer 
Blwner ' s major contribution to the area of collective behavior 
is probably his classificatory scheme which he uses to delineate 
different types of collective behavior. According to him there are 
four major types of social phenomena which can be subsumed under the 
heading of collective behavior. First he describes crowdlike behavior.
48 
He considers this type of action to be a rather unimportant type of 
collective behavior . Most of the early theorists seem to have identi-
fied crowd behavior as the only type of collective behavior, but Blumer 
feels this approach resulted in an unnecessarily narrow interpretation. 
Labels of "irrational" and "mindless" were unfortunately attached to 
all forms of collective behavior as a result of this approach. Crowd 
behavior is characterized by simple forms of emotional interplay, lack 
of intricate organization, and strong collective feelings such as 
enthusiasm, courage or glee. 49 This display of collective behavior is 
usually the most disreputable type but despite this, it should not be 
covered by a blanket label of irrationalness. Blumer was the first 
major writer to question this previously accepted idea. Blumer also 
considers mass behavior to be a part of the larger category of collective 
behavior. This phenomenon is similar to what is usually termed the 
48Herbert Blumer , 1 1Collecti ve Behavior, " in Review of Sociology: 
Analysis of a Decade, Joseph Gittler, · ea ., (New York : John Wiley and 
Sons , Inc. , 1957) , p .  131. 
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public. This characteristic has been discussed at length by Riesman 
and termed "other-mindedness . 1150 The processes at work in a crowd 
situation are si�ilar to those that determine the behavior of a mass ; 
the obvious exceptions are of  those factors which depend upon face­
to-face contact, present in a crowd, but absent in a mass. Masses 
are usually characterized by fads, fashions, and crazes. 51 
The third type of  collective behavior discussed by Blumer is 
the public. Processes operating in the formation o f  public opinion 
are similar to those of  a mass ; however, they usually are highly 
influenced by propaganda techniques employed by various interest 
groups. 52 
The fourth type identified by Blumer has the most relevance 
for this particular paper. He was probably the first major theorist 
to consider social movements under the realm of collective behavior. 
Previously writers tended to lump social movements under their 
descriptions o f  crowd behavior, but Blumer rectified this mistake. 
The social movement is one of the chief mechanisms for social change 
in the modern society. 53 He discredits most of the early attempts of 
analyzing this behavior by showing the overemphasis that was placed 
on the psychological character o f  the participants. Instead, he 
5 0oavid Riesrnan, The Lonely Crowd, (New York : Doubleday, 1954 ) . 
51Blumer, op. cit. , p. 137. 
52rbid., pp. 140-43 . 
53rbid. , p. 145. 
proposes a two-fold treatment of social movements: (1) determining 
the factors involved in the construction of  the movement ; and 
( 2) identifying the causative factors operating during the formation 
54 era. In addition to these main areas of concern, other important 
factors include leadership o f  the movement and the recruitment of 
. . t 55 participan s. In general descriptions of collective behavior, 
39 
Blumer follows the typical interpretations popularized by the conven­
tionalists. He maintains that collective behavior is separate and 
distinct from " . . . established or culturally defined behavior . 1 1 5 6  
Usually activity is controlled by established rules and norms ; however, 
collective behavior lies outside of this area of cultural prescription. 57 
In Blumer's theory, collective behavior by its definition must be 
outside of the area of institutionalized behavior and collective be-
havior is found only in situations where cultural norms are inadequate . 
If the norms surrounding a certain situation are adequate, then the 
resulting behavior is culturally controlled. If not , it is termed 
collective behavior . 
Collective behavior is a form of group behavior which emerges 
in undefined and emotional situations . It is always distinct from 
54rbid. , p. 147. 
55rbid., pp. 148-49. 
56rbid., p. 1 28 . 
57 rbid., p. 130. 
40 
. d b  h . 58 organize e avior. The behavior is built or forged in a relatively 
fluid situation. It starts as an unguided or spontaneous expression 
of impulse and feeling. 59 The interaction processes which are at work 
in this type of situation are the main area of concern for Blumer. 
These have not as yet been identified or studied and should be the 
main concern for sociologists at the present time. 
Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
In this writer ' s  opinion the Kerner Commission Report occupies 
a position similar to the writings of Robert Park. In this respect it 
acts as a bridge or a transitional stage upon which later writings are 
based, either directly or indirectly. While the Report has retained 
many of the views of the conventional school of collective behavior, 
it introduces two new interpretations of collective behavior in 
general and "race riots , u specifically. It is probably the first 
major work on collective behavior that justifies or excuses the fact 
that the incidents occur for valid reasons (white racism and its 
concomitant forms of discrimination). Secondly, it is also the first 
widely accepted document that places a major share of the responsibility 
for the disorder in the hands of social control agencies (police, 
national guard and to a lesser extent, the federal troops). These 
58Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior, 11 in A Dictionary of the 
Social Sciences, (New York : The MacMillan Company, 196 4), p .  100. 
59rbid. 
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two findings coupled with the ameliorative proposals set forth 
cbnstitute the major contributions of this selection. The three 
authors chosen for the final portion of this paper are heavily influ­
enced, despite being somewhat critical , by the Kerner Report. 60 
The basic causes of the urban disorder as listed by the Report 
are: ( 1) pervasive discrimination and segregation ; (2) black migration 
to and white exodus from the central cities; ( 3 ) the creation of black 
ghettos ; ( 4.) frustrated hopes; ( 5) legitimation of violence; 
( 6) feeling of pow�rlessness ; ( 7) incitement and encouragement of 
violence ; and (8) the action of police. 61 Many of the causes center 
upon the social environment of the black community and others concen­
trate on the psychological reactions to these conditions by the 
participants in the disorders. The feelings of "rage" which have been 
smoldering for many years finally manifested themselves in the form 
of a race riot. The Report placed great emphas is upon this psycholog-
ical state of the rioter as a major cause of the disorders. 
While the Report agreed that ghetto conditio�s were intolerable 
and to some extent sympathized with the rioters , the commission 
nevertheless condemned violence as a means of achieving the desired 
ends. 62 In this res.pect there is agreement with the conventional 
school regarding the behavior as inappropriate and useless. 
6°For example , see The Politics of Protest, Rights in Conflict , 
and VioleP-ce in America. 
61The Ker:ner Commission , op . cit. , pp. 203-206. 
p . 2 .  
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THE NEW PERSPECT IVES 
James A. Geschwander 
Geschwander is attempting to compare the civil rights movement 
to the urban riots of the recent era and determine the major differences, 
if any, between the two. He points out that liberals have a positive 
image of the civil rights movement and a tendency to view the urban 
disorders with a mixture of fear and disgust.63 He further points out 
that social scientists have a tendency to follow this pos ition and view 
the two types of collective behavior as separate and distinct 
64 phenomena .  
He uses Smelser ' s  work to determine that the only difference 
between a norm-oriented movement (civil rights movement) and the hostile 
outburst (urban r iots) is in the objects of their demonstrations. The 
norm-oriented civil rights movement attacks discrimination practices, 
whereas the race riots are perceived to center upon individuals or 
stores in the ghetto area. However, he points out that the urban riots 
were not merely aimed at individuals or agents but instead were a 
method of attacking practices (exploitation in pricing and rents, poor 
. ) 6 5  housing, etc . .  In this perspective there is actually little 
difference between the objects that both types of movements seek to 
change. 
63James A .  Geschwander, "Civil Rights Protest and Riots : A 
Disappearing Distinction, " Unpublished Manuscr ipt, Michigan State 
University, 1969, p. 1. 
64rbid . 
65rbid.,  p. 3. 
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He states that the tendency to label the disorders as riots 
rather than movements rests upon three characteristics : (1) the large 
amount of looting ; ( 2) the belief that the disorders were spontaneous ,  
unorganized, and leaderless; and ( 3 ) there were no lists of political 
66 
demands to be met. With regard to looting he suggests that looting 
in itself is a form o f  rebellion against the distributive system in a 
society. He also points out that looting was not random in nature. 
Certain stores were looted and others were left untouched. Looting was 
used as a form of  compensation against store-owners that had previously 
been exploiting the ghetto residents. 
While there was found no evidence of that conspiracy, delibrate 
incitement, or organization existed during the disorders, this is no 
basis for concluding that they were not part of an overall social 
movement. 67 A large social movement does not necessarily have an 
organized core providing general direction. The civil rights movement 
contains many diverse groups that are generally agreed upon "ends ; "  
however, there is disagreement regarding the means to achieve their 
goals. " The lack o f  organization does not, ipso facto exclude the 
looter, snipers , and arsonists from the civil rights movement. 1168 
Geschwander believes that the current civil rights movement had 
become bogged-down in a stalemate against the forces of discrimination. 
661b1' d. ,  4 12 pp . - . 
6 7 Ibid. , p .  7 .  
6 8  . d  8 Ibl . , p. . 
The changes or victories they had won were very slow and usually did 
not have much effect upon the ghetto dweller. He hypothesizes that 
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the civi l rights movement has undertaken a change of tactics. The 
change was characterized by a shift from creative disorders to creative 
rioting. 69 The latter form of protest may be an attempt to speed up 
change and bring its benefits to the ghetto. He also points out that 
meetings with leaders of the ghetto communities were held in twenty-
f � d '  70 one o twenty-�our isturbances. During these meetings grievances 
and issues were aired and discussed and this wou1 d seem to indicate 
71  that some form of political demands were present. 
He concludes by stating that the views expressed in the article 
should be interpreted as questions and not answers. His main contri­
bution is a new perspective in the analysis of the recent race riots. 
Morris Janowitz 
The previous portions of this paper have dealt with collective 
behavior as somewhat of an abstraction; however, th�s article by 
Janowitz deals specifically with a single form of col lective behavior 
commonly cal led "race riots. " He purports to "trace the transformation 
in the patterns of collective racial violence in urban areas over the 
69rbid . ,  pp. 10-11. 
70The Kerner. Commission, op. ci t. , pp. 126-127. 
71Geschwander , op. cit . ,  p. 11. 
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last 50 yea!:'s through three different phasP-s . 11 7 2  . The following i s  a 
list of the three distinct phases or different types of collective 
racial violence that have occurred: ( 1) the communal riot (an inter-
racial clash usually at the boundaries of expanding black neighborhoods 
during the twenties and thirties) ; (2 ) the commodity riots (largely 
characterized by only B lack participation and occurred between 1940-
1968) ; and (3) a more "selective terroristic use of force with political 
overtones by small  crganized groups of blacks . 1 17 3  
The main thesis contained in the Janowitz argtunE.nt that is 
germane to this paper is the belief that the commodity riots were 
primarily political in nature . The earlier commun&l type riots were 
"struggles for survival " where groups of different races openly 
battled onE:: another. 'l'he disorders could also be characterized as 
"contested area" riots because they involved territorial struggles in 
newly integrated areas . 7 4  Contributing causes of this type of disorder 
were vast amounts of Negro migration to already overcrowded urban areas 
and the relative lack of concern on the part of the ·authorities for 
the implementation of measures to curb or arrest incidents between 
7 5  the two groups. 
7 2Morris Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence, " 
Hugh D. Graham and Ted R .  Gurr, Violence in America, (New York : 
Signet Books, 19 69), p .  39 3. 
73 rbid . ,  pp. 39 3-94 . 
74rbid . ,  p. 396. 
75rbid. 
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These factors are in contrast to the characteristics o f  cities 
that experienced communal riots during the middle sixties. The 
crucial difference appears to revolve around the amount and extent of 
political participation that the black connnunity had or rather did 
not have. Cities with more racially integrated police forces had 
fewer riots and the same was true of cities with a more representative 
form of local government.76 There was no statistical evidence to show 
that unemployment, low income, or inadequate housing was more 
characteristic of riot-prone cities than the group of cities that had 
. 7 7  fewer or no riots. 
The above evidence lends support to the supposition contained 
in the article that the recent commodity riots " . . . had overtones 
which might be called para-political. 11 7 8  Janowitz also claims that 
"social tension" is vastly over-rated as a cause of the riots. He 
draws upon the work of Allan Grimshaw who concluded that "there is no 
direct relation between the level of social tension and the eruption 
. . l .. 79 of social vio ence. 
This article is included in the final section of this paper 
because it lends support to the new perspective of studying riots or 
76rbid. , p. 396. 
77rbid. 
7 8rbid . ,  p. 407. 
79rbid. , p. 420. 
other forms of collective behavior as a political as well as a 
psychological and soc iological phenomenon. 
Jerome Skolnick 
Skolnick is another of the recent theorists concerned with a 
new approach to the analysis of collective behavior. The previous 
ways of studying " . • • riots have inadequately understood their social 
and political significance and need to be revised. 11 80 In his review 
of previous theories of collective behavior, Skolnick finds them as 
failing on the following counts : 
1. They tend to focus on the destructive behavior of 
disaffected groups while accepting the behavior of authorities 
as normal, instrumental, and rational. 
2 .  They tend to describe collective behavior as i rrational, 
formless, and immoderate. 
3. Finally, it is insufficient to analyze riots in terms of 
"tension" and "frustration . 1 1 81 
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By the time the reader reaches this point in the paper the j ustifica-
tions for the above criticisms are obvious. There are numerous 
examples of evidence which sheds doubts on previous interpretations. 
For example, the Walker Commission's labeling of  the Chicago demon-
stration as a "police riot; " examples of selective looting and riot 
leadership; and also the various fo�.s of political  activities that 
occured during riots. 
SOJerome Skolni ck, The Politi cs of Protest, (New York: 
Ba llantine Books, Inc . ,  1969) , p. 329. 
81rbi' d .  , 335 39 pp. - . 
Skolnick also takes issue with the usual practice (the Kerner 
Commission is the most recent example) of labeling riots as abnormal 
82 and useless. Specifically, there are two fallacies in this 
approach: 
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1 .  This "violence does not pay" argument refers only to the 
domestic violence of disaffected groups, while ignoring the fact 
that systematic official violence for social ends is widely upheld 
in other spheres. 
2. Secondly, whether or not violence is "useless" is a problem 
for historical analysis , not a certainty. 83 
These two criticisms reiterate the theme of his contribution-­
that any analysis of collective disorders must take into account 
political overtones. 
SUMMARY 
It is possible to summarize the most salient characteristics 
of the different schools of thought that have dominated interpretations 
of collective behavior. While the following table constructed by the 
writer contains many oversimplifications, its usefulness lies in its 
brevity . 
82rbid. , p. 340. 
83rbid. , p. 3 4 1 . 
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Typical Major 
School Descriptive Disciplinary Causes 
Term Interpretation 
Classical "irrational" psychological instincts 
Conventional 11uninstitution- sociological breakdowns in 
alized " social control 
lack o f  legiti-
New Perspectives "non-pathological" political mate avenues of 
redress 
The different emphases that have been postulated by the different 
schools should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive explanations 
of collective behavior. There are many areas of overlap and duplica-
tions . This writer does not feel that one school is necessarily more 
correct than any other. The position expressed by this dissertation 
is that a thorough understanding of collective behavior is possible 
only when all three interpretations are employed. For example, the 
psychological explanation of collective behavior, while receiving much 
of the recent criticism, is still necessary for a total understanding 
of the spontaneous eruptions and milling that occurs in crowd 
situations. The psychological factors that were stressed by Le Bon 
and Simmel are also necessary to understand the influence that rumors 
played in the course of the disturbances . The breakdowns of social 
control that were emphasized by Turner and Killian must also be con­
sidered to adequately analyze their role in the causation of the 
riots . However, to restrict the analysis to either of these single 
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dimensions is to lose sight of the forest. The causes must also be 
considered from a political perspective that is advocated by the most 
recent school of thought. A more detailed treatment of the contri­
butions of each of the theorists will be contained in the rationale 
for the hypotheses in a later chapter. 
In summary, a complete understanding of the basic tenents of 
all of the schools is a necessary requisite to any researcher in this 
field. All examinations of collective behavior must be of a multi­
dimensioned nature rather than the unilinear approaches which seem 
to have prevailed in the past. This section attempts to provide a 
framework for the analysis of urban insurrections that follows. 
REV IEW OF LITERATURE 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation must rest upon 
the contributions of two sub-disciplines in sociology. Writings in 
the area of collective behavior, discussed in the previous section, 
are necessary to analyze the processes operating during the actual 
episodes. However, another dimension is required that will account 
for underlying conditions which existed prior to the outbreak of 
violence. Theories of social movements are the best tools available 
for this task. 
Lyford Edwards 
Probably the first attempt at obj ectivity in the analysis of 
episodes of social movements was accomplished by Lyford Edwards in 
5 1  
his classic, The Natural History of Revolution. Prior investigations 
of · this nature were tainted with emo tionalism and subjectivity that 
characterized the classical school of collective behavior. Edward ' s  
major contribution lies i n  his treatment of revolution as a natural 
social phenomenon subject to similar influences and patterns that 
have been used in descriptions of social organizational components. 
His insightful method of analysis is similar to that of Edwin 
Sutherland and his introduction of the concept "differential 
association . 1 1 84 Before Sutherland, most investigations of the etiology 
of criminality sought their causes in socially disorganized elements 
or in the nature of the criminal himself , but the theory of differential 
association views the learning of deviant behavior as arising in 
essentially the same manner as does the learning of non-deviant behavior . 
Rather than criminality being caused by the "bad , undesirable" conditions 
in societies or individuals ; it is seen as simply the result of a normal, 
natural learning process . The factors that produce deviant behavior 
operate in much the same fashion as those that produce conformity . 
Edwards defines a revolution as "a change brought about not 
necessarily by force or violence , whereby one system of legality is 
. . d 11 8 5  terminated and another originate . The major cause for revolution 
84Edwin H .  Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of 
Criminology, 7th ed . ,  (Philadelphia : J . B. Lippincott, 1966) , pp. 80-98. 
85Lyford P .  Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution , (Chicago : 
The University of Chicago Press , 1970) , p. 2 .  
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is seen in the failure o f  existing social institutions to provide 
for the satisfaction of man ' s  four basic wishes. This concept borrowed 
from W .  I .  Thomas consists of: (1) the wish for new experience; 
( 2) the wish for security; (3) the wish for recogni tion; and (4) the 
. h f 86 h . . h wis or response. T e likelihood of revolution decreases to t e 
extent that these needs are met by the organized political institution 
of any society. His use of the biological concept of the "survival 
of the fittest" further attests, to him, the naturalness of revolution 
as a social process. Genetic mutations which eventually prove to be 
beneficial, s urvive whereas those which don't answer a need are 
selectively choosen for extinction . Inefficient governments are sub­
ject to a s imilar process o f  "natural selection, " with · only the able 
ones continuing. 
Another innovation in his analysis stems from his idea that 
revolution is not necessarily characterized by violence. Violence, 
if  it does occur, is a result of the reluctance on the part of the old 
order to accept the desired changes . Those who favor change are forced 
down the paths of  violence because of t..he "conserva tism which makes the 
economically favored classes unwilling to recognize the fact that a 
real and peaceful revolution has already occurred. 11 8 7  
86rbid. , pp. 2-3. 
B? Ibid. , p. 9. 
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Revolution is  also pictured as a very slow, gradual process. 
This is in direct contras t to the commonly held picture of revolutions 
as being "sudden, unpredictable and exceedingly rapid in their 
88 development. " Edwards feels that a revolution has to have at least 
three generations to become fully formed. This period of time is 
necessary for succeeding generations to become fully disillusioned and 
frustrated by social ins titutions, which too completely dominated the 
thinking and actions of their ancestors. 89 
This s tudent ' s  account of his work will not support his typology 
with actual examples ; however, the original work is rich in illustra-
tions. He concentrates on four revolutions in the cons truction and 
reality test of his stages of revolution. The four are--the English 
Puritan, the American, the French and the Russian. He states that these 
in no way cons titute a random sample of all pos sible revolutions , but 
were chosen because of one major consideration--the magnitude of their 
s ubsequent importance.90 The stages of revolution are viewed as those 
steps through which revolutions usually progres s.  However , a revolution 
doesn ' t  neces sarily follow these stages exactly. Some may occur before 
others and often two or more s tages occur simultaneously , but generally 
these are the essential s tages through which the phenomena of revolution 
will pass  in its development. 





p. 210 . 
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The first stage of a revolution is termed the symptoms of 
unrest condition and is in operation before the actual revolution . 
These conditions are· a direct result of the thwarting of the four 
wishes mentioned in the preceding pages. The symptoms of unrest 
manifest themselves in four primary areas: (1 ) a feeling of depriva­
tion, when comparing themselves to other comparable societies; ( 2 ) a 
general increase in forms of deviant behavior; ( 3 )  a feeling of 
"balked dispos ition" whereby legitimate aspirations and ideals are 
being repressed; and (4 ) a marked increase in wealth, intelligence, 
and power in the repressed sector of society.91 This last change 
brings about a change in mental attitudes and conditions which were 
previous.ly considered tolerable and now viewed as intolerable .  This 
is the reason that revolutions are often characterized as "revolutions 
of rising e;xpectations. " 
Another more advanced symptom of unrest is the "transfer of the 
allegiance of the intellectuals. 1192 This occurs when the intellegentsia 
of any society lose faith in the established classes and come to 
sympathize with the repressed classes. Unequal conditions in the 
society are publicized and b lame is focused upon the rulers. Various 
mistakes and blunders of the governing classes are divulged and since 
they, too , look to the intellectuals for guidance , the elites even come 
91Ibi· d . ,  25 33 pp .  - . 
9 2 Ibid . , p . 9 . 
to question themselves and the legitimacy of their position .93 The 
fonnation of the syndrome of "felt insecurity " by the elites marks a 
turning point in the process of revolution. The likelihood of a 
revolution occurring now becomes probable rather than possible. 
The recognition of the economic incentive and the formulation 
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of the social myth is the last of the pre-revolution stages. Edwards 
states that the economic motivation is indispensable and that "no 
great historical revolution has ever succeeded without the assistance 
. . . 1 1 9 4  . . . . of the economic incentive. The economic incentive is manifested in  
two ways: (1 ) the discontent of poverty and ( 2 )  the envy of the rich 
by the poor. 95 This economic reason for revolution is nurtured in its 
final stages by the aforementioned rising expectations which usually 
take place in the form of a concession shortly before the outbreak of 
the revolution. At the heart of the economic incentive is the newly 
created middle class. Their motivation for change is probably greater 
than that of the peasants or the urban poor. Their reasons for revolt 
. ·  center around the restrictions against capital accumulation which are 
imposed upon them by the aristocracy . 
The creation of the social myth is necessary as a rallying point 
for the revolutionaries. It is created by the intellectuals and usually 
93rbid. , p. 59. 
94rbid. , p. 69 . 
95 
Ibid., 70. p. 
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described as a utopian idea of how "things should be" or "a new heaven 
on earth. 11 96  The social myth is essentially non-rational in nature 
and may even be inconsistent and contradictory. Most are incapable of 
verification and may be entirely delusional, but their strength or 
importance lies in the intensity of the faith with which they are 
believed. 97 
The outbreak of revolution is the next stage and usually consists 
of some act which is in and of itself very insignificant. Once the 
outbreak has taken place it marks the point of no return and the revol­
ution now breaks out into fighting and violence as members of the 
society align themselves on different sides. This precipitant incident 
is also exacerbated to a significant degree by mob behavior with its 
irrationality and unreasonableness. The mob, contrary to popular 
opinion, is not composed of riffraff or the scum elements of society. 
Most of the members are "decent, self-respecting common people " or what 
98  could be called working class persons. The immediate cause of the 
outbreak is due to a number of "complicated accumulations of stress, 
to a multiplication of nervous tensions, to a concurrence of provoca-
h . . d  99  tions " any one of which might be enough to spark t e inci ent. 
96rbid. , 
97 Ibid . , 
98 · a  Ibl . , 
99rbid. , 
p. 9 1 .  
p . 9 2 . 
p . 10 2 .  
p. 1 05. 
A 
closely related factor to this is the "helpless incompetence revealed 
h . l . h '  100 by t e  governing c ass in t is emergency. " The total ineffectiveness 
of the control agencies during this crisis actually ensures the success 
of this first venture. 
Following the initial success , a provisional government assumes 
the new leadership role in the society. The members of this government 
are moderate in their political beliefs and this is eventually responsible 
for their demise. These are the persons who are in favor of slow, pro­
gressive reform and actually can satisfy neither the radicals nor the 
conservatives with their conflicting demands. Eventually, the moderate 
government fails and ·the "real revolution " now takes place between the 
. . 101 
l . moderates and the radicals as they vie for power. Some revo utions 
are stopped during the reign of the moderates or they are broken by 
external forces, but those that continue experience the rise of the 
radicals as the next stage. This period of the revolution occurs 
mainly because of the more able leadership qualities of those in positions 
of authority in the radical ' s  camp. Their seizure of power is neces-
sitated by a growing fear that the revolution ' s  success is in doubt . 
The failures of the moderate reformers cause the movement to lose 
popularity and prestige among the masses and a resurgence of activity 
is necessary to regain lost momentum. 
lOOibid. , p . 105. 
lOlrbid. , p . 120 . 
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The tactic which is employed by the radicals is called the 
reign of terror. This stage is necessitated by the threat of three 
factors, any one of which might doom the revolution to failure. These 
three factors are: (1)  the threat of invasion by a foreign army ; 
( 2 )  the threat of an internal insurrection fostered by either the 
conservatives or moderates ; and (3) the inexperience of the radical 
leaders in governmental affairs. 10 2 The primary function of the reign 
of terror is to act as a "safety-valve for the discharge of wrought-
. 1 1 103 f . . . 1 up emotions. Far ram being an unrestrained, bloody, and m ind ess 
series of atrocities, it may be a deliberately planned and executed 
"stage show for purposes of emotional catharsis. 11 104 This portion of 
the revolution is not as bloody and murderous as it is often portrayed. 
Usually only a small percentage of the total victims of a revolution 
lose their lives during this stage. The main purpose of the reign of 
terror is simply to frighten the masses into subjugation. Actual mass 
executions are used sparingly and then only for effect. 
The last stage in the revolutionary process is what Edwards 
terms the return to normality. A revolutionary spirit can only exist 
in a society during the time when emotions are aroused and eventually 
this wrought-up period ends quietly. "A revolution dies out in a 
l02Ibid. , pp. 158-172. 
l03rbid . ,  p. 1 74 . 
l04 rbid. , p. 17 5. 
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curiously insignificant and almost inconsequential way. 11
1 0 5  Popular 
interest which is necessary to sustain a revolution, dies quickly with 
the end of the reign of terror. And an exhausted society returns to 
normality. This is not to imply that the society returns to the status 
quo that existed before the revolution. The new order has similar 
features ; however, the changes that took place are now incorporated 
and become an integrated part of the new society. This period of time 
is usually one of peace and tranquility . The revolutionary society 
requires time for recovery and recuperation. 106 The rebuilding of the 
society centers on integrating the new way of life into the pre-existing 
institutional order with as little stress as possible. 
Crane Brinton 
A similar account of revolution is entitled The Anatomy of 
Revolution by Crane Brinton. While the work contains a great many 
parallels, there are a number of basic differences worth noting. From 
his study of revolution, Brinton states that three �ajar conclusions 
can be drawn : 
. . . .  first, that, in spite of their undeniable and dramatic 
differences, they do present certain simple uniformities of the 
kind we have tried to bring together under one conceptual scheme . . • ; 
second, that they point sharply to tne necessity of studying men's 
deeds and men ' s  words without assuming that there is always a 
lOSibid ., p .  186. 
l06Ibid . , p. 202. 
simple and logical connection between the two, since throughout 
their courses, and especially at their crises, they frequently 
. exhibit men saying one thing and doing another; third .that they 
indica·te that in general many things men do, many human habits, 
sentiments, dispositions, cannot be changed at all rapidly, 
that the attempt made by the extremists to change them by law, 
terror, and exhortation fails, that the convalescence brings 
them back not greatly altered. l07 
Brinton believes it is necessary to reevaluate old misconcep­
tions and traditional stereotypes relating to revolutions, their 
causes, characteristics, and consequences. It is only by debunking 
the previous emotionally-laden treatments of this topic that a 
thoroughly objective analysis can be accomplished. Brinton uses the 
same samp le of revolutions--the English of the 1640's, the American, 
the French, and the Russian--that Edwards used in his study. This 
6 0  
probably accounts for the remarkable, almost plagiaristic, similarities 
between these two works. 
The first stage identified by Brinton can be termed the 
inadequacy of  the old regime. W'nile all societies at all times have 
a certain amount o f  disorder and social unrest, the revolutionary 
prone society is characterized by an inordinate amount o f  intra-conflict. 
The tensions which typify a healthy society have been exceeded and the 
future of the present regime, which is blamed for the troubles, becomes 
doubtful. 
10 7crane Brinton, The Anatomy of  Revolution, (New York : Vintage 
Books , 1965) , p . 262. 
The issue which is of over-riding importance during this 
preliminary period revolves around the economic conditions of the 
society. The economic motives have two main foci for expression.
108 
First, and of lesser importance, is the misery of the lower classes 
in the society. The participation of these groups is important 
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during later stages, but at this period they serve only as manipulated 
tools for the newly arising middle class. The condition of the middle 
class is characterized by frustrations and restraints imposed upon 
109 
them by the nobility class, which fears their growing base of power. 
The economic limitations and hindrances experienced by the middle 
class are of greater importance in the determination of the revolution. 
Economic misery, per se, does not seem to be of crucial importance; 
however, the "gap" between " . . .  what people ·want and what they have . . .  " 
h d . . f 
110 seems to be t e etermining actor. 
Brinton strongly emphasizes the class conflicts which exist in 
the pre-revolutionary society. The three classes--nobility , middle, 
and the lower--have areas of conflict other than those of a simple 
economic base. The ruling class is guilty of inefficiency and in­
competence while performing the normal functions of government. 
lOBrbid . ,  p. 3 2 .  
l09Ibid . ,  p. 33. 
llOrbid . , p .  30. 
Attempts at reforming or modernizing the government usually result 
in failure. This situation is exploited by the revolutionaries in 
their efforts to show the "unfitness " of the present regime. 
6 2  
Another important incident that occurs during this preliminary 
stage is the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals.
111  This 
"fourth class I I  of society acts as a pressure group on the other 
classes, largely through the influence of their ideas for desirable 
changes. The intellectuals first experience a pervasive alienation 
against the existing government. Later this vague negative feeling 
focalizes in support of the proposed reforwE and changes advocated 
by the revolutionaries. 112 The articulation of revolutionary ideas 
by the intellectuals gives a new aura of legitimacy to the cause and 
in some instances results in the ruling class having self-doubts about 
its ability to adequately perform its responsibilities . In essence, 
those persons most competent to rule are not found in the present 
ruling class, but rather in the middle and lower classes. Pareto 
also describes the inevitability of the "circulation of the e lites " 
with old " lions 1 1  being replaced by new "foxes. " Moreover, Brinton 
points out that one of the initial causes of discontent among the 
non-elite groups in society is the condition whereby they are denied 
1 11rbid. , p. 39. 
l l 2rbid . , pp. 46- 47. 
access to the ruling class. 1 13 The most able persons in the middle 
and . lower classes are refused "admittance" to the ruling class and a 
stoppage in the normal absorption process of choosing members of the 
governing class ceases. This results in two conditions : (1 ) an 
unfitness of the ruling class ; and (2 ) serious frustrations of the 
most cornpeten t persons, who are now "frozen " in the lower classes. 
Eventually, the plight of the lower classes worsens and 
culminates in the second of Brinton ' s  stages--the outbreak. This 
event is usually an abrupt and dramatic one, but always is caused by 
conditions which have been smoldering for many years . The outbreak 
can be viewed in one of two ways: ( 1 )  a spontaneous event ; and 
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(2) the calcula ted result of planning by the revolutionaries. Brinton 
attempts a synthesis of these contradictory positions by stating that 
both explanations contain some truth. Citing evidence- with respect 
to the psychology of crowds, he concludes that much of the outbreak 
may be totally unplanned and spontaneous ; however, there is also a 
certain amount of planning which preceded the actual event and the 
revolutionaries, because of previously formulated strategy, act as a 
. . . d . h d .  t t d t 114  Th contributing influence uring t e unpreme i a e even . us, an 
event which probably would have gone unnoticed is blown out of pro­
portion and subsequently becomes the precipitating incident of the 
revolution. 
1 1 3rbid. , pp . 60 -61. 
114Ibid . , p .  83. 
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The outbreak causes the authorities to respond with force, 
but .with a lack of success. This failure to cope with yet another 
disturbance actually marks the death knell of the existing regime. 115 
The military comes to the support of the revolutionaries and they 
replace the existing government with a relatively easy victory. The 
overthrowing of the old government marks the end of the outbreak 
stage. 
The composition of the newly victorious government and its 
supporters stand in opposition to the popular notion of the "riffraff" 
theory. Revolutionaries, at least in this juncture, are " . • . quite 
ordinary men and women, probably a bit superior to their less active 
fellows in energy and willingness to experiment . . . • "116 The partici­
pants in the revolution are more or less a representative cross­
section of society. This finding is remarkably similar to that  of 
the Kerner Commission Report on civil disorders which concluded that 
the typical rioter was not unlike his non-rioting counterpart with 
the exception of minor differences . 
One striking feature that is found among the insurgents centers 
around their differing perceptions of the role of the newly-formed 
government. The "middle of the road" group is the first to achieve 
power and this is called the rule of the moderates stage. The 
llS ibid . ,  p .  86. 
ll6Ibid . ,  p. 119. 
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"honeymoon period" that was enjoyed immedi �tely after their initial 
su ccesses soon ends and the moderates settle down to the task of 
reforming existing· institutions and making a new constitution. 117 
Their efforts are greatly hampered by two groups. First , an increas­
ingly strong group of radicals and extremists feel that the moderates 
have betrayed the revolution and secondly, the moderates usually find 
themselves involved in a war which results from the intervention of 
foreign powers that attempt to restore the recently vanquished 
government . 118 The combination of external and i nternal strife dooms 
the moderates to failure. The almost insurmountable set of problems 
that confronts the moderate government coupled with the impatience 
of its constituents prove to be too much and this government, as did 
its predecessor, quickly falls to the more ex-treme elements in the 
insurgency. 
The accession of the extremists is the fourth stage of Brinton ' s  
typology . The radicals, during the rule of the moderates, find them­
selves in a favored position. They can take credit for the new 
government' s  successes ; however , the failures must be shouldered solely 
by the moderates because they are the ones in the formal positions of 
authority. The extremists are usually few in number but they possess 
almost fanatical dedication to their cause . As revolutions go on, a 
117Ibid . , p. 122. 
118rbid . 
large number of people drop out of the political arena because they 
prefer to attend to the ordinary features of their life rather than 
giving to political affairs the ceaseless dedication and attention 
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1 . . 1 19 revo utions require. After the abdication by the "common people ," 
the extremists are left with a clear field. Actually, the small 
number of followers that the extremists have is one of their strengths. 
The high degree of homogeneity and its resulting unanimity in decision­
making result in a highly organized cadre of professional revolutionaries. 
The actual overthrow of the moderates is usually a very quick 
and easy task, an excellent example of the skill of the extremists' 
. h f . . d . 1 t · 120 leaders in t e areas o organi zation an manipu a ion. 
Af ter they take the reigns of government the insurgents are under 
tremendous pressure to obtain results. The most commonly chosen method 
of action is a process involving the re-centralization of governmental 
authority. Ironically, the revolutions begin because of this condition 
and the oppression that usually accompanies it. The crisis that the 
new government faces also give rise to another phenomenon, the reign of 
terror. 
This fifth stage of revolution is necessitated by a perceived , 
it need not be real, fear of the revolution ' s  failure. This form of 
adjustment to the crisis period is highly religious in nature. The 
1 19rbid. , p .  1 54 . 
120rbid. ,  p. 163. 
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devotion to the revolution supplies most of the psychological satis­
factions that are commonly attributed to religion.
121 In fact, the 
function that revivals perform for religion, the reign of terror 
accomplishes for the revolution . It renews interest in the cause and 
is accompanied by highly virtuous overtones. Crusades against the 
customary vices of the populace usually escort the advent of the reign 
of terror. 
The reign of terror also performs other functions as well. It 
effectively eliminates any opposition that may exist within the society. 
The crisis period which precipitates the reign of terror in many 
instances is very real. Economic depressions, threats of involvement 
in foreign or civil wars, and the inexperience of the extremists with 
the machinery of government combine to produce an emergency situation 
. h . . d '  . 
122 
whic requires imme iate action. The suppression of  individual 
liberties and the removal of opposition are seen as necessities to 
assure the success of this program. 
The reign of terror lasts only a brief period and ·is followed 
by the last stage of revolution, the Thermidorean reaction. This 
period is a convalescence from the furor of revolution . 12 3 Basically, 
this stage marks a return to the pre-revolution way of life. 
121rbid . , p. 183. 
12 21, · d �- , pp. 198-201. 
12 3rbid. , p . 205. 
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Politically, this era is marked by a return to  power of an 
unconstitutional tyrant, whose authority is unchecked. A concomitant 
feature during this period is the granting of amnesty to the prev iously 
exiled political enemies. 124 The leaders of the reign of terror are 
denounced and are now declared "to have been fanatics, villains, 
bloodthirsty tyrants, and scoundrels . 11 1 25  
Economically, the Thermidorean period is marked by widespread 
suffering and poverty, even worse than that which occurred during the 
last years of the old regime. This situation is tolerated because 
the people are tired of the revolutionary activity and there also 
exists the promise of better conditions in the future. 
Socially, the times are characterized by a search for pleasure. 1
26 
This condition is a contrasting reaction to the piety and virtue that 
marked the reign of terror. The loosening of moral restraints continues 
until it reaches a level comparable to that which existed before the 
revolution. 
Both the processes and end result of this stage are similar to 
the return to normality that Edwards described. However, it  is apparent 
that revolutions do effectuate many permanent changes. One ruling class 
i s  replaced by another with a divergent base of power and whose political 
124rbid. , 
125rbid. , 








philosophies are different. It is in the area of social arrangements, 
which most intimately and immediately touch the average man , that the 
actual changes effected by revolutions seem slightest. 127 Probably 
the most lasting aspect of a revolution is that it establishes in that 
society a tradition of successful revolt.
12 8 This situation acts as 
a check on future abuses by governments. The memory of a great revol­
ution is forever enshrined in their cultural heritage and acts as an 
important guiding principle for governmental policies. 
Rex Hopper 
In an attempted synthesis of previous works related to revolu­
tions, Rex Hopper has added a number of useful dimensions. The process 
of revolution is viewed as similar to the process of institutionalization. 
Starting with vague individual unrest, conflict is channeled through a 
number of stages until it becomes a permanent feature of a modified 
society. Social psychological concepts are also used by the author in 
his explanations of the early stages of revolution. Drawing heavily 
upon the work of Herbert Blumer, the author successfully combines 
principles of collective behavior within a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of social movements . 
Hopper employs a five-dimensional approach in constructing the 
four different stages of revolution. These are : dominant characteristic 
127rbid. , p .  243. 
128rbid . ,  p. 249. 
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conditions of the society, typical processes in operation at each 
stage, effective mechanisms for actions, types of leaders which tend 
to prevail during each stage, and the dominant social form or grouping 
129 of each respective stage. By inspecting the differences which tend 
to occur in each of these five dimensions it is possible to delineate 
the stages through which the process of revolution proceeds. Finally, 
before summarizing this article it is necessary to define what the 
author means by the term revolution. A revolutionary change " . . • is 
precisely that kind of social change which occurs when basic institu-
1 30 tional values of a social order are rejected and new values accepted. " 
In short, the change need not be violent - and sudden. The phenomenon 
termed the Industrial Revolution is an excellent example of peaceful 
and gradual social change according to his operational definition. 
During the preliminary stage the social psychological charac-
teristics are most in evidence. Wish repression, thwarted desires , 
increases in deviance are all present to an alarming degree in this 
period. Vague, unspecified feelings of unrest characterize individuals. 
The process of " milling" is responsible for cormnunicating this dis-
. 131 h f parity between the ideal and real state of affairs. T e  type o 
leader which best exploits this type of condition is the agitator. 132 
129Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process : A Frame of 
Reference for the Study of Revolutionary .Movements," American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 28, (1950 ) ,  pp. 271-272. 
130rbid. , p. 271. 
1 31 rbid . 
1 32 Il . d _:e2:_· , p .  272 . 
His main function is challenge and question the present mode of 
living. He creates unrest by raising questions about the abuses, 
discrimination , and inj ustices that characterize the society. The 
1 f h .  t .  . h . 1 3 3  resu t o is  crea ion is  a psyc ologi cal mass. These persons 
find themselves in a marginal position regarding the attitudes and 
values of the present society. The grouping is composed of 
individuals with similar complaints but there is little interaction 
and no organization because of this common feature. 
If the underlying conditions and features of the preliminary 
stage are not corrected a second stage will emerge. The popular 
stage is characterized by the development of collective excitement 
7 1  
and • •  . . .  unrest is no longer covert, endemic, and esoteric; it becomes 
overt, epidemic and exoteric . 1 1 134 The random milling and discontent 
converge on particular 9bjects or persons. This condition is 
communicated throughout the society via the process of social 
contagion.
135 The movement fosters group integration and loyalty 
among its followers. The leadership role at this stage is exericised 
by the reformer or prophet, who adroitly formulates and promulgates 
the social myth. 136 The social myth is largely a hypothetical 
133rbid. 
134rbid. , 
135rbid . , 
1361bid. , 
p. 27 3 .  
p. 274 . 
p. 275. 
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construct of the reformers and advocates the establishment of a 
utopia by correcting contemporary injustices. The dominant social 
form during this period is the crowd , especially an acting crowd that 
confronts the present regime. 
The next period, the formal stage, consists largely of the 
formulation of issues and formation of opposing publics. Struggles 
between opposing factions earmark this stage of the revolution. The 
moderate faction wrests power from the old conservatives only to be 
ousted later by the more radical elements of the movement. Conflict 
relations dominate this stage of action. Opposing factions employ 
techniques that are effeetive in the development of group morale and 
' d  l 137 i eo ogy. The leadership function at this time is the responsibility 
of statesmen. 138 They attempt to formulate policies and gather support 
for their implementation. Because of the discussion and deliberation 
that occurs during this stage, the dominant social form is the public. 
The final stage of revolution is termed the institutional stage. 
The movement has seized power and it is legitimized during this period. 
This stage marks the formation of a new society and the revolution is 
139 consummated. Characteristics of this period are : psychological 
exhaustion of the populace, return to old habits, increased power of 
137rbid. , p. 276. 
138rbid. , p .  27 7. 
139rbid. 
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a centralized government , and a re-accommodation of church and 
140 
state. The attainment of this stage is a final step in the revol-
utionary process : 
. . .  By which mass behavior, originating in unrest and discontent 
generated by the institutional inadequacies and inefficiencies of 
a society, becomes popularized and finds expression in the crowd ; 
begins to acquire form in the public; and finally legalizes a new 
body of sanctioned use and want. This is, a new society emerges, 
its core being a new constellation of institutions. 141 
However, the process of  institutionalization is neither perfect 
nor complete. A compromise is reached between the values o f  the old 
order and those of the new society. The most effective leadership 
type during this stage is the administrator-executive. His main function 
is the enactment o f  the policies patterned during the previous era. 
The dominant socia l form during this final stage is the society itself. 
In fact, " . . .  a revolutionary movement may be thought of as a development 
in the course of  which a mass is transformed into a crowd, a crowd be-
. . . .  14 2 comes a public, and a public evolves into a society. 
Neil Smelser 
Probably the most impressive and inclusive work in the field of  
collective behavior has been completed by Neil Smelser. He has 
developed a highly elaborate conceptual framework for the analysis of 
all forms of  collective behavior and social movements. Borrowing from 
140rbid . 
141 Ibid . , p. 27 8. 
14 2rbid . ,  p. 279. 
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the economist, Samuelson, the author formulates what he refers to as 
the "value-added" theory of collective behavior. 143 Briefly, the 
value-added theory makes use of six tleterminants or necessary condi tions 
which combine to specify the nature and characteristics of any particular 
variety of collective behavior. The six determinants include the 
following : 
1. Structural Conduciveness. This refers to the situation in 
which there exists an absence of institutionalized means of 
resolving social unrest or conflicting interests. 
2. Structural Strain. The presence of disharmony in the social 
sy?tem. 
3. The Growth of a Generalized Belief. This condition marks 
the identification of the cause of the strain and the formulation 
of an ameliorative action program. 
4. Precipitating Factors. A specific incident or a "spark. " 
5. Mobilization of the Participants for Action. Organization 
among the members of the dissatisfied group . 
6. The Operation of Social Control. The various ways and 
means by which agencies of social control discourage or encourage 
episodes of collective behavior. 144 
,, 
These determinants are present in each and every occurrence of 
collective behavior. Moreover, beginning with structural conduciveness 
each determinant is necessary for the one that follows and it also 
145 
establishes the limits within which the next determinate can operate. 
143Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New ¥ork: 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 12-13. 
144rbid. , pp. 15-18. 
145Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds. ) ,  The Handbook of 
Social Psychology, (Reading , Ma.ss. : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1954), Vol. 4, p. 556 . 
Any particular form of collective behavior produced by the 
aforementioned determinants mus t be analyzed in terms of the four 
basic components of social action. According to Parsons (et. al. ) 
these are: 
1. Values. The mos t  general statements of what is desirable 
in a society. 
2. Norms. These are the rules of behavior or guides for the 
realization of the values. 
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3. Mobilization of motivation for organized action. Speci fi­
cation of who will be the agents in pursuit of the valued goals 
and how the action of these agents will be structured into roles. 
4. Situational facilities. Refers to the means gnd obstacles 
that facilitate or hinder the attainment of goals. 14  
There are also seven levels of specificity for each component 
of social action ; however, an explanation of these is not necessary 
at this summary level of interpretation. It is possib;I.e , us ing the 
components of social action, to identify five basic types of collective 
behavior. Each type is explained or identified in terms of the 
particular component of social action upon which the behavior is 
focused. The panic and craze are the first two types and both revolve 
d . . 1 f · 1 · t ·  147 aroun situationa aci i ies. Examples would include bank runs, 
stock-market crashes, and various fads and fashion. The hostile out­
burs t is the third type of collective behavior identified and is 
146rbid. , p. 559 and Smelser, op. cit. , pp . 23-28 . 
1 47 Smelser, op. ci t. ,  Chapters 6 and 7. 
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focused upon specific persons and their respective roles. 148 In this 
type of predicament persons or groups are singled out for attack 
because they are believed to be responsib le for the particular situation 
about which the participants are concerned. Various forms of scape­
goating, lynch mobs, and "red scares" are typical examples. The norm-
oriented movement as the label implies focuses upon rules and procedures 
which are defined by the participants as unjust or illegai. 1 49 Since 
it is this type of collective behavior that is the major concern o f  
this dissertation, the norm-oriented movement will be covered in detail 
later in this chapter. For the present, civil rights movements, union 
strikes and the actions of various pressure groups would be included 
under this category. The last of Smelser ' s  types is the value-oriented 
150 movement. This movement attempts to change, modify or create new 
values to replace the present ones operating in the society or sub-
culture. While the norm-oriented movement focuses upon means, the 
value-oriented movement is concerned with changes in the very core of 
society--its values. Revolutions are typically given as examples of 
the latter. 
The urban insurrections of recent years conform to the criteria 
of a norm-oriented movement. They were a form of protest against 
148rbid. , Chapter 8 .  
149rbid . , Chapter 9 .  
lSOibid . , Chapter 10. 
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abuses present in the system rather than a challenge to the values 
upo� which the system rests . P articipants sought to change practices 
not ideologies. 
A norm-oriented movement " . . .  is an attempt to restore, protect, 
modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief. 11 15 1 The 
American democratic creed serves as the generalized belief upon which 
efforts to attain political, economic, and educational equality are 
based. Actions of a norm-oriented movement may seek to directly 
affect norms or to induce some constituted authority to do so in their 
behalf. 152 While this type of movement may contain similarities to 
those of panics or outbursts (i. e. , irrational acts or unnecessary 
violence) they generally focus upon deliberative actions designed to 
erradicate perceived inequities and injustices. Frequently, norm­
oriented movements employ various organizations to act as pressure 
groups ; however , they may also develop when these groups have failed 
. h . . . . 153 to gain satisfaction for its constituents throug routine activities. 
Structural conduciveness refers to conditions in the society 
that foster or serve as the source of the demands and ; secondly , to 
inadequate procedures for dealing with the grievances. Both of these 
15 1rbid . ,  p .  270. 
152rbid. 
153rbid . ,  p. 277 
154rbid .,  p. 278. 
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conditions must be present or a norm-oriented movement will never 
materialize. In addition to being thwarted, the discontented must 
perceive some degree of access to methods of affecting the normative 
order. Democratic societies are characterized by norm-oriented 
movements , but totalitarian governments are confronted w ith value­
oriented movements (i. e . , revolutions) because of the complete absence 
of avenues for redress . All modes of agitation cannot be closed, 
then , if a norm-oriented movement is to occur. Neither, however, 
155 can these avenues be completely free from obstacles. If  obstruc-
tions were not present, the grievance would be rectified and there 
would be no need for a movement. In summary, structual conduciveness 
for norm-oriented movements " . . .  requires both the accessibility to 
avenues for affecting normative change and the inaccessibility to 
other avenues. 11 156 
Structural strain associated with norm-oriented movements 
usually results from real or perceived losses in wealth, power or 
prestige . In addition to losses , a feeling of being "frozen 1 1  in any 
of these three social stratification dimensions will also produce 
discontent. Another source can be any disharmony between norroative 
standards and actual social conditions. 157 This situation gives 
rise to a movement whose ob jective is to modify the norms. This 
155Tb . d  -=-2:_• I 
156rbid. , 
157rbid . ,  
p. 2 84 . 
p. 286 . 
p. 288 . 
incongruity can be a product of rapidly changing social norms or 
soc.ial condi tions which create a s tate of anomie among societal 
members . Succinctly s ta ted , norm-oriented movements are generated 
by s trains whi ch create demands for change ; however, this s i tuation 
must be combined with appropriate conditions of structual conducive­
ness before the next determinant, the growth of generalized beliefs , 
can come into play. 158 
79 
The generalized belief includes a diagnosis of the forces and 
agents responsible for the failure of normative regulation and also 
a program for its correction. 159 Generalized beliefs may develop 
over decades in literature or they can be the product of a s ingle 
person or group. Dissemination of the idea usually takes the form 
of meetings, pamphleteering, and various other methods of communi cation. 
The growth of the generali zed belief is invariably hastened by the 
occurrence of a precipatating factor (s ) . Mos t importantly, " . . . they 
mark the sudden es tablishment or symbolization of one of the conditions 
d . . .. 160 of con uciveness or strain . They illus trate what has been 
criticized ; they confirm suspicions. The sense of urgency that is 
created by the precipitating factor leads to the final determinant of 
the value-added process, the mobili zation of the participants for 
action . 
158rbid. , p. 292 . 
159rbid. 
160rbid. , p. 29 4. 
Generally, the mobilization phase is the most complex and 
requires most of the movement ' s  energies. The leadership =unction 
during this period is crucial for the success or failure of the 
movement. Strategies and tactics must be carefully planned and 
executed . 'J.1he leader is also given responsibility for revitalizing 
enthusiasm which invariably wanes during this lengthy period. The 
norm-oriented movement is usually terminated when it has achieved 
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its objectives or when it becomes apparent that failure is inevitable. 
Another of the determinants, which isn ' t  included in the chronological 
sequence, is the role that social control agencies play. Authorities 
can either encourage the development of norm-oriented movements 
(e. g. , closing off the avenues of legitimate protest, vacillating in 
the face of pressure from the movement or by openly encouraging 
protest) or discourage their formation (e. g. , permitting grievances to 
be aired or giving a hearing for complaints). 161 
In summary, Smelser states that the determinants don ' t  neces­
sarily follow one another in a temporal sequence. However, each 
phase does act as a limiting factor for the one that follows and, in 
turn, is limited or defined by one that precedes it. 
161rbid. , pp . 306- 308. For a recent application of Smelser ' s  
value-added theory to race riots, see Melvin DeFluer, William D ' Antonio, 
a.nd Lois B. DeFluer, Sociology : Man In Society, (Glencoe, Illinois : 
Scott, Foresman and Company, Inc. , 1971), pp. 363- 373. 
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The Kerner Commission Report 
In addition to providing material for the theoretical framework 
of this dissertation, the Kerner Commission Report has also compiled 
a list of  generalizations based upon their survey of 2 4  disorders. 
This list does not constitute a typology as do the other selections 
in this chapter, but the common features of the riots will be use ful 
in the construction of  the urban insurrection typology. 
1. No civil disorder was "typical" in all respects. Viewed 
in a national framework, the disorders of 1967 varied greatly in 
terms of violence and damage: while a relatively small number 
were major under our criteria and a somewhat larger number were 
serious, most of the disorders would have received little or no 
. national attention as "riots " had the nation not been sensitized 
by the more serious outbreaks. 
2. While the civil disorders of 1967 were racial in character, 
they were not inter-racial . The 1967 disorders, as well as earlier 
disorders of the recent period, involved action within Negro 
neighborhoods against symbols of white American society--authority 
and property--rather than against white persons. 
3 . Despite extremist rhetoric, there was no attempt to subvert 
the social order of  the United States. Instead, most of those who 
attacked white authority and property seemed to be demanding fuller 
participation in the social order and the material benefits enjoyed 
by the vast majority of American citizens. 
4. Disorder did not typically erupt without preexisting causes, 
as a result of  a single "triggering" or "precipitating " incident . 
Instead, it developed out of an increasingly disturbed social 
atmosphere, in which typically a series of tension-heightening 
incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the 
minds of many in the Negro community with a shared network of 
Tu.7.derlying gri·evances. 
5. There was, typically, a complex relationship between the 
series of incidents and the underlying grievances. For example, 
grievances about allegedly abusive police practices, unemployment 
and underemployment, housing and other conditions in the ghetto, 
were often aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by incidents 
involving the police , or the inaction of municipal authorities on 
Negro complaints about police action , unemployment, inadequate 
housing or other conditions. When grievance-related incidents 
recurred and ri sing tensions were not satisfactorily resolved, 
a cumulative proces s  took place in which prior incidents were 
readily recalled and grievances reinforced. At some point in 
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the mounting tension, a further incident--in itself often routine 
or even trivial--became the breaking point, and the tension 
spilled into violence. 
6. Many grievances in the Negro community result from the 
discrimination, prejudice and powerlessness which Negroes often 
experience. They also result from the severely disadvantaged 
social and economic conditions of many Negroes as compared with 
those of whites in the same city and, more particular ly, in the 
predominantly white suburbs. 
7. Characteristically, the typical rioter was not a hoodlum, 
habitual criminal, or riffraf f ;  nor was he a recent migrant, a 
member of an uneducated underclas s, or a person lacking broad 
social and political concerns. Instead, he was a teenager or 
young adult, a high-school drop-out--but somewhat better educated 
than his Negro neighbor--and almost invariab ly underemployed or 
employed in a menial job. He was proud of his race, extremely 
hostile to both whites and middle-class Negroes, and, though 
informed about politics, highly distrustful of the political 
system and of political leaders. 
8 .  Numerous Negro counter-rioters walked the streets urgi ng 
rioter s to "cool it. " The typical counter-rioter resembled in 
many respects the majority of  Negroes, who neither rioted nor 
took action against the rioters, that is, the non-involved. But 
certain differences are crucial : The counter-rioter was better 
educated and had higher income than either the rioter or the 
non-involved. 
9. Negotiations between Negroes and white officials occurred 
during virtually all the disorders surveyed. The negotiations 
often involved young, militant Negroes as well as older, established 
leaders . Despite a setting of  chaos and disorder, negotiations in 
many cases involved discus s ion of underlying grievances as well as 
the handling of the di sorder by control authorities. 
10. The chain ,ve have identified--discrimination ,  prej udice, 
di sadvantaged conditions, intense and pervasive grievances, a 
series o f  tension-heightening incidents, all culminating in t.�e 
eruption of  disorder at the hands of youthful, politically-aware 
activists--must be understood as describing the central trend in 
the disorders, not as an explanation of all aspects of  the riots 
or of all rioters. Some rioters ,  for example, may have shared 
neither the conditions nor the grievances of their Negro neighbors ; 
s ome may have coolly and deliberately exploited the chaos created 
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by others ; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because 
they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Nor do we 
intend to suggest that the majority of rioters, who shared the 
adverse conditions and grievances, necessarily articulated in 
their own minds the connection between the background and their 
actions. 
11. The background of disorder in the riot cities was typically 
characterized by severely disadvantaged conditions for Negroes, 
especially as compared with those for whites; a local government 
often unresponsive to these conditions ; federal programs which 
had not yet reached a significantly large proportion o f  those in 
need; and the resulting reservoir of pervasive and deep grievance 
and frustration in  the ghetto. 
12. In the immediate aftermath of disorder, the status quo o f  
daily life before the disorder generally was quickly restored. 
Yet, despite some notable public and private efforts, little basic 
change took place in the conditions underlying the disorder. In 
some cases, the result was increased distrust between blacks and 
whites, diminished inter-racial communication, and growth of Negro 
and white extremist groups. 162 
Thomas Rose 
The most recent typology o f  a social movement has been advocated 
by Thomas Rose. Basically, his hypothesis is that violence occurs as 
both control and revolt in a continual and recurrent cycle showing 
. h .  1 t ·  163 various peaks and outbursts during t eir esca a ion. Violent revolt 
is seen as a reaction to the violent control of the ruling groups. 
This dualism of  practices of violence is described accordingly : 
Violent control restrains and regulates, and is a method of 
socio-political control . Violent revolt is dissent and strives 
to create change. Both violent revolt and violent control can 
162
The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp. 110-112. 
163Thomas Rose, "How Violence Occurs: A Theory and Review o f  
the Literature, " i n  Thomas Rose (ed . ), Violence i n  America, (New York : 
Random House, 19 70), p. 26. 
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be understood in terms of a continuum: for violent revolt, at 
one end is influence and persuasion, and at the other are revolution 
and overthrow ; for violent control, at one end are regulation and 
defensive action against revolution or threat of revolution, and 
at the other are total control, overpowering totalitarianism, and 
fascism. 164 
Violence used as a control measure has as its main purpose the 
maintenance of the status quo. Control can be used constructively as 
a means of socialization ; however, it may also appear as brute force. 
Violent control is mobilized when the threat of unwanted change is 
present. In fact, the threat , per se, often brings about pre-emptive 
violence on the part of those who are in control. While the violence 
employed by both sides has different causes and methods, one form can 
be as destructive as the other. 165 
Violent revolt is a characteristic of the Amer ican political 
process and should not be considered as outside traditional socio-
1 . .  1 l ' f  166 po 1t1.ca 1. e. Violent revolt is directed against the ruling class 
and has as its basic causes injustice and inequality. The American 
tradition of successful revolt may have been one of the causative 
fac tors in the big-city rebellions of the 1960's. Violence s eeks 
social change and yet it is also, in part, caused by social change . 
Under normal conditions, violence is spasmodic; as abundance rises for 
the majority, violent revolt increases among the less affluent; and 
164 rbi' d .  , 26 2 7  pp. - . 
l65rbid ., p .  27. 
166rbid . ,  p. 3 8 . 
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finally violent revolt is also caused by a� imperfectly coordinated 
system (due to rapid change) of culturally prescribed goals and socially 
structured means for achieving them. 167 Another characteristic of 
violent revolt is its functionality in the maintenance of the society. 
It may serve as a force of re-integration for society or it may serve 
as a danger signal of a serious malfunction. 168 
Unlike the other theorists in this chapter, Rose is specifically 
interested in urban insurrections as contrasted with revolutions or 
collective behavior in general. The cycle of vi�lence that he proposes 
was constructed using data gathered from narratives and other accounts 
of race riots that occurred in the United States during the decade of 
the 60 ' s. 
The basic cause of these disorders is found in the �se of violent 
control. During stage one, violence has become an efficient and 
expedient means of control. 169 The power groups in the society dominate 
the instruments of violence and democratic bargaining processes break 
down because of this centralization. Fear of violent revolt by the 
underprivileged groups produces pre-emptive violence on the part of the 
167rbid. , p. 41. 
168Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York: The Grove 
Press, 1966 ) ; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial 
Society, ( Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960 ) ; and 
Lewis A. Coser , Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, (New York: 
The Free Press, 1967 ) .  
169Rose, �- cit. , p. 47. 
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control ling groups in the society. Also characteristic o f  this stage 
is . a lack of  alternatives (for goal achievement) and of  "participatory 
. . 1 1 170 politics. 
Stage two marks the initial appearance o f  violent revolt. 
Retaliatory measures are used against those who employ violence control. 
Typical examples of  this form of vio lence wou ld include strikes, 
demonstrations, and riots. The instigators, who feel estranged from 
legitimate political processes, see violent revolt as the only alter-
171 native open to them. Most attempts to use violence to counter the 
force o f  the state have ended in a dismal failure because the state 
h d t f . l 17 2 unleas es a stea y s ream o counter-vio ence. 
The resurgence o f  control as counterviolence marks the occurrence 
of  stage three . The revolt is quickly put down and smashed. Further 
measures of control are instituted to guard against the likelihood of 
a future revolt. An excellent example of  this technique is the equip­
ping of various police forces with more sophisticated weapons and 
increased riot-control training courses. These measures were adopted 
in lieu o f  those reconu.�ended by the Kerner Commission Report which 
would a lleviate or attack the under lying causes of the revo lt. 
During stages four and five both sides escalate their respective 
tactics o f  violence. Those in revolt are labeled as outlaws and have 
l ?Oibid. , p . 47. 
171 rbid . , p. 48. 
172rbid. 
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been so labeled, they bring count
erviolence against the state. 1
73 
Re�ellions spread to other cities a
nd increas ingly violent reactions 
characterize control agencies such 
as the National Guard. Nationally, 
we have not reached these stages y
et, but isolated pockets of over­
powering mutual violence can be ide
ntified (e. g. , Newark, Detroit, or 
174 
Orangeburg). If  allowed to cont
inue this spiral of violence will 
eventually culminate in an overwhelmi
ng totalitarian policy o f  control 
on the part of the state. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of  this chapter is to provide direction and guide­
lines in two areas. First, the analysis of the general underlying 
conditions which existed both prior to and during the recent urban 
insurrections. By starting with a general treatment of revolution 
and narrowing the focus to include only one speci fic form of  social 
movement , race riots ; this portion of the dissertation h as hopefully 
accomplished this objec tive. All of the literature cited in this 
chapter contains many s imilar ities and parallels which when distil led 
from the text can provide rather specific directions for the inter­
pretations of the narratives and accounts of urban insurrections. 
For instance, all  investigations of social movements attribute 
a certain amount of rationale and purposefulness to the actions of 
173rbid . ,  pp . 49- 50. 
174Ibid . , p. 50. 
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revolutionaries, demonstrators, or riote�s . All of thei r actions 
cannot be demonstrated as logical, but neither can they be err0neously 
blanketed with a label of irrationality. Another common theme o f 
these theorists lies in their depiction of violence on the part of the 
demonstrators as being a re action to previous forms of viole nce 
instigated by control agenci es in their societies. These views contra­
dict commonly he ld misconceptions that portray the violence of the 
lower classes as spontaneous or "blind-rage " reactions. In general, 
there also exists striking similarities among the typologies. This 
finding is despite the fact that three different types of social 
movements were included in the survey .  The paralle ls are, however, 
far from perfect . For the purpose of this dissertation only the pre­
outbreak stages of a re volution wil l  be of direct relevance. Obviously, 
the urban insurrections cannot be considered revo lutions because they 
did not attai n the stage of over-throwing the existing government. 
In spite of this basic diffe rence, there does exist a remarkable like­
ness between the pre-revolutionary society and the life situation of 
the typical ghetto-dwel ler .  Institutionalized discrimination, and 
its resulting frustrations are both good examples of the preceding 
statement. 
The second major contribution of this section can be found in 
the function it per forms in the formulation of a gP-ner a l  hypothesis 
that will  be tested in the latter portion of this dissertation . The 
guide lines estab lished, when comb ined wi th the principles formed in the 
preceding section , will be used in the construction of a general 
hypothesis in the form of a typology. 
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Another important aspect of this chapter rests with its 
es tablishment of the constructed typology as a legitimate research 
tool for this type of investigation . It shows that social phenomena 
of this nature can be subjected to a scientific analysis. In essence ,  
it sanctions both the area o f  study and the methodology that will be 
uti li zed . 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
HISTORY OF THE METHODOLOGICAL TOOL 
The constructed typology or its classical prototype, the 
ideal or abstract type, has a long history of usage in the social 
sciences in general and sociology in particular. Probably one of 
the earliest examples of an ideal type can be found in the classic 
political science treatise by Plato entitled The Republic. In this 
work the idealized political city-state is described in great detail 
not as a reality but rather as an utopian state of aff airs from 
which reality could be gauged and evaluated. The philosophers of 
the Enlightenment period also made extensive use of this device in 
an effort to advance not only their studies of the nature o f  society 
but also as a method of  furthering their own political beliefs and 
value judgments concerning the respective rights anq freedoms of  
both men and governments. Montequieu ' s  four types of  societies-­
republic, monarchy, despotism, and nonliterate/traditional--are 
excellent examples as are Rousseau ' s "natural man" and the "social 
contract. " While these applications of this analytical tool have 
some merit they are heavily-laden with personal value judgments and 
biases. However, the most serious misuse of these writings was 
committed by later scholars and laymen who fell victim to the fallacy 
of  reification. The early usages of the ideal type had no basis in 
91  
the real world and were solely mental constructs qf each respective 
author . The literal interpretatior ...s of these types by later writers 
were the basis of much confusion and misunderstanding within acad emic 
circles with respect to the nature of the ideal type and its appro­
priate usage in the analysis of society. 
The development and sophistication of the ideal type reac�ed 
its zenith with the writings of the German sociologists during the 
latter porti on of the nineteenth century and early years of the 
twentieth century . Under Max Weber the concept acquired a new 
precision and was re-defined to limit the scope of its application . 
The crux of Weberian methodology was the ideal type . It consists of 
the const1.71ction of certain elements of reality into a logically 
precise conception . 1 Weber felt that only by constructing- an arti­
ficial model and moving from it to empirical reality and then back 
to the constYuct with necessary modifications could an increasingly 
adequate understanding of the phenomenon be achieved . 2 
Accordi ng to Weber, the ideal type, per se, was not to be 
confused as a hypothesis, but could be used for gui dance in the 
3 construction of  future hypotheses. It  was neither an average nor 
1Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated 
and edited by Hans H .  Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New Yorl:: Oxford 
University Press, 1946), p . 59. 
2rrving M .  Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Socio­
logical Theory, (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 
1968) , p. 119 . 
3Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ( Glencoe, 
Illinois� The Free Press, 1949 ) , p. 90 . 
a faithful description of reality. Rather, it was an accentuation 
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of what the investigator regarded as the essential characteristics 
and tendencies of the phenomenon under investigation . 4 Weber l s  ideal 
types were still highly abstract and because of this they had a 
tendency to be highly impressionistic. His major applications of 
the ideal types were probably responsible for this abstractness. His 
main concern was with specific historical problems and the use of 
comparative sociology as a method of analysis. In his studies of 
different societies he employs the ideal type conceptions and uses 
history as a storehouse of empirical examples for these concepts.
5 
The nature of the problems he selected for investigation probably 
necessitated that his methodology be largely abstract in nature. 
This apparent shortcoming, however, should not detract from the 
magnitude or importance of his writings . The ideal type was still 
useful as an analytical tool more than a depiction of reality. Its 
use fulness was primarily as a heuristic device. Concerning the 
evolution of the constructed typology , Weber 1 s main contribution 
revolves around his use of empirical reality. Despite the lack of 
sound empirical referents the ideal types now had their counterparts 
in the real world, something that the earlier versions could not 
claim. Weber made extensive use of newly defined concept. Examples 
4zeitlin, op. cit., p. 120 . 
5weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, op. cit . ,  p. 60. 
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include the following: the Protestant Ethic, the Spirit of Capitalism, 
aµd the characteristics of both bureaucrats and a bureaucracy. 
While his own contributions are noteworthy , Weber's maj or 
contribution to sociology may rest with his influence upon both his 
contemporaries and later scholars . His new legitimization of this 
standard methodological tool probably resulted in the increased nurober 
of applications that followed. Georg Simmel (super-ordination/sub­
ordination and forms-of-sociation), Ferdinand Tonnies (Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft), Emile Durkheim (mechanical and organic types of 
solidarity and egoistic , anomic, and altruistic types of suicide), 
Charles H .  Cooley (primary and secondary groups), Pitirim Sorokin 
(ideational, idealistic, and sensate types of societies), Robert 
Redfield (folk and secular types of societies), and Talcott Parsons 
(the pattern variables of role responsibilities and obligations) are 
but a few of the well-known contributions of men who owe a great 
debt to Weber's work. 
The ideal type as it was conceptualized by Weber and those 
who followed him performs three functions. 6 First, it serves in the 
classification of phenomena. However, the type is more than a mere 
label ; it represents patterns and general concepts which serve to 
identify com.man features of phenomena which might otherwise be 
6Theodore Abel, The Foundation of Sociological Theory, (New 
York: Random House, 1970), pp. 64-66 . 
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viewed as unique events or objects . Secondly, the ideal type can be 
h�lpful in locating the factors that would explain the deviations 
observed in concrete cases from the ideal type. used in this manner 
it enables the researcher to discover differences as well as similar­
ities among the class of objec ts under investigation. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, is i ts use in theoretical analysis. In particular, 
the ideal type can be used as a predictive device within a limited 
range of power. The ideal type should serve as a correcting mechanism 
for the present body of theory . As a constant check on the validity 
of theory it performs the all-important function of self-correction in 
science . 
The functions of an ideal type are basically the same as those 
of the more contemporary constructed type. As it is used at the 
present time, the constructed typology underwent major revisions with 
the work of Howard P .  Becker. For him the word 11ideal" was unacceptable 
with its connotations of "perfectness, " abstractness, or something that 
represented the desired state of being . Becker preferred the term 
"constructed type" or "constructed typology" because it implies and 
is based upon a more sound quantitative, empirical base. Whereas its 
forerunner was largely conceived �n theoretically abstract terms, the 
constructed type is constructed from empirical reality and uses as a 
guide in this process the theoretical contributions that are applicable 
to the phenomenon under scrutiny. The basic differences between the 
ideal type of Weber and the constructed type of Becker are best 
described by McKinney: 
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The role of interpretation is  much greater _in the method 
of ideal typing. The ideal type involves comparison from the 
ideal limits of the cas e, whereas the extracted [constructeq] 
type involves comparison from central tendencies . The extracted 
type is based upon the notions of average, common, and concrete 
rather than upon those of accentuation and abstractness. ? 
Becker ' s  work involved a movement of  what has become the 
constructed type away from the "ideal pole" .  of a continuum and toward 
the "extracted pole. " He accomplished this by placing the emphasis 
of the constnlcted typology on the objective probability of empirical 
occurrence rather than on its mere objective poss ibility. 8 Earlier 
ideal types were not empirically valid, did not represent any concrete 
reality, and served mainly as devised and delimited conceptual tools 
in the analysis of the empirical world. 9 As Becker conceptually 
developed it and as one of his students, John C. McKinney, defined it 
the constructed type: 
. • .  I s  a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, corobination, 
and (sometimes ) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical 
referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical 
cases. 10 
As it wil l  be used in this dissertation, the final Becker-
McKinney synthesis i s  defined as: 
. • • An ideal type shorn of any purely fictional qualities, 
firmly grounded in the particularities of actual situations , 
11 and constituted by attributes that are empirically discoverable. 
7John c .  McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 
(New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966) , PP · 24-25. 
8 Ibid. , 25. p. 
9rbid . ,  p. 23. 
iqibid. , p. 3 .  
11  -b . � -�. , p. 26. 
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CONSTRUCTION O F  THE TYPOLOGY 
The actual steps involved in the construction of a typology 
are not explicitly delineated in either Becker's or McKinney ' s  writings .  
However, the latter cites the work of Alexander von Schelting as the 
most convenient summary of the processes that are involved. Para-
phrasing von Schelting, the writer can identify the following steps : 
1. The analysis of the complex phenomenon (or process} in 
such a way that it is broken down into separate identifiable 
elements (or stages) . 
2. The presupposed existence of general laws (largely in the 
form of theories) to act as guides in the process. 
3. Hypothetical elimination or alteration of one or more 
fa ctors of the elements (or stages) . This step allows the 
resear cher to make modifications to more closely fit the typology 
to the nature of the data. 
4. Hypothetical construction of what would then be the 
expected course of  events. 
5. Comparison of  the hypothetical conception of the possible 
developments with the actual course of events that are observed 
in reality . 
6. On the basis of this comparison, the drawing of conclu­
sions regarding the supporting or refuting of the hypothesized 
sequence of events . 12 
Using this framework as a guideline, the researcher will employ 
the following course of action as the methodological component of 
this dissertation : 
l2Ibid . ,  p .  44 . 
added by this writer. ) 
(Also, the parenthetical phrases have been 
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( 1 ) Analysis of urban insurrections in order to discover the 
possibility o f  the existence of sequential stages of social action. 
This intial attempt at analysis will be of necessity a superficial 
examination. This wi ll be mainly an exploratory venture and will 
not yet enjoy the formal support of a theoretical framework. 
(2) Providing a theoretical framework will be the task o f  
this stage in  the construction. The highly specul�tive conjecture 
of the first step will now be introduced to the existing body of 
theory. it will then be possible to interpret the phenomenon in a 
way that will be consistent with the previous knowledge that exists 
in this particular area . 
(3) Using the theoretical framework and the findings reported 
in the review o f  literature, it will then be possible to modify and 
revise the tentative typology that was proposed in the first step. 
This step in the construction should culminate in the bringing to bear 
on the problem all o f  the necessary information for the actual 
construction of  the typology. 
(4) Formulation of  the actual constructed typology by delin-
eating and identifying the different stages o f  -:1 race riot which 
would be expected to occur on the basis of the procedures performed 
in steps (1) and (2). Rather than actually taking the form o f  a 
constructed typology at this time the "model" will in reality be a 
series of  working hypotheses which will either be supported or refuted 
in t..rie analysis of  data section o f  the dissertation. 
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(5 ) The comparison of  the hypothesized typology to empirical 
reality is the central task of this stage of the construction. The 
tentative constructed type will be compared to actual narratives o f  
the three major urban disorders chosen for examination. In short, 
the model will be subjected to empirical testing . 
(6 )  The drawing of  conclusions in this research will consist 
of an evaluation o f  the "goodness of fit" characteristics that are 
exhibited by the typology during the testing. To be considered as 
valid each of  the sequential stages of  the typology should have 
their respective counterparts in each of the narrative accounts of 
the urban insurrections. If only two of the narratives are found to 
support the typology at any stage the matter will be fully discussed 
in the summary and conclusions section of the dissertation and a 
judgment will be rendered as to its being retained or modified as a 
stage in the typology. I f  only one of the accounts can be discovered 
to support any stage of the proposed type then this stage will be 
deleted from the finalized version of the constructed typology. The 
same procedure will be followed, of course, in the event that no 
support can be found to exist for any stage of the typology in any 
of  the narratives. When any stage of  the hypothesized typology is 
deleted an examination will be undertaken to determine the feasibility 
o f  including a new or revised stage in the typology. The empirical 
testing stage will be used to perform two functions : refutation of 
the presently proposed stages of the typology and the presentation 
of evidence that could support the inclusion of new stages. If 
there is present a consistent pattern of the refuting evidence then 
this unanticipated stage (s) will be included in the revised version 
of the typology. 
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( 7 )  The empirical testing will mark the end of the construction 
of the typology of  urban disorders ; however, there is one more impor­
tant phase of this research .  The relationship that exists between 
theory and re�earch is probably most succinctly depicted by Walter L. 
Wallace in his book, Sociological Theory: An Introduction. The pro­
cess or relationship is essentially circular. 13 Starting with the 
body of theory the researcher logically deduces hypotheses which are 
transformed into obse�vations through the processes of operationali­
zation and instrumentation. The observations or collections of data 
are then transformed into empirical generalizations by the use of 
another class of methods--scaling and measurement. The final step 
in this circular diagram involves the re-integration of these generali­
zations back into the body of theory using the process of  logi cal 
induction. This final stage represents the goal of the last section 
of this dissertation. The finalized version of the constructed 
typology can be viewed simply as a set of empirical genralizations, 
whi ch while represen ting an interesting and useful set of findings , 
cannot contribute fully to the fie ld unless it is couched in terms of 
13walter L. Wal lace, Sociological Theory: An Introduction , 
(Chicago : Aldine Publishing Company, 1969 ) , pp . viii and ix. 
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the existing body o f  theo:ry or unless it adds to the present body of 
theory. An early discovery of this research was the existence of a 
theoretical vacuum in the middle of the collective behavior--social 
movement continuum o f  social action. One of the aims of this research 
is to fill this gap assuming that the findings are determined to be 
significant. The best method o f  pursuing this end will be the 
selection of Talcott Parson's pattern variables as a frame o f  reference 
for the analysis o f  the different types of social action. By comparing 
the three types of  collectivized social behavior--episodic collective 
behaviors, urban insurrections, and revolutions--with respect to 
salient variables both differences and similarities can be discovered 
and the body of  theory will be that much more complete. The completion 
of this portion of the theory-research circular diagram will fulfill 
the primary obligation of every investigation--the enhancement or 
enrichment of the existing body of theory in the respective discipline. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The analysis of data for this study will take the form of  
superimposing the proposed typology on narrative accounts o f  the three 
major urban insurrections--Detroit, Newark, and Watts. Unfortunately, 
there is not enough information available regarding the race riots 
which were smaller in scope . For this reason, the research will  be 
reluctantly limited to the three disorders mentioned above. 
The most important types of information that constitute the 
data for this study will be secondary sources. The distinction 
between primary and secondary sources is somewhat arbitrary. 
Gottschalk defines the two as follows: 
10 1 
A primary source is the testimony of an eyewitness, or of a 
witness by any other of the senses, or of a mechanical device 
like a dictaphone--that is, of one who or that which was present 
at the events of which he or it tells. A secondary source is 
the testimony of anyone who is not an eyewitness--that is, o f  
one who was not present at the events o f  which he tells. 1 4 
By applying this definition to the accounts o f  urban insur­
rections, it becomes clear that primary sources would provide so much 
information that it would exceed the point of diminishing returns as 
far as one researcher's ability to assimilate the data. The primary 
sources rest at the base of all of the secondary sources, but the 
secondary sources have been examined for consistency and objectivity 
by researchers whose sole purpose was to obtain the most accurate 
accounts possible. The primary sources of urban disorders were shown 
by the Kerner Commission Report to be highly biased or distorted and 
at best could only give one person ' s  impressions of a very large and 
complicated social event. Primary sources and their validity rest 
upon and are limited by both the ability and willingness of the 
observers to tell the truth; consequently, even the sum total of all 
14Louis Gottschalk , Understanding History : A Primer o f  
Historical Method, ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950 ) , p. 5 3. 
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personal accounts might not yield an accurate and consistant narrative 
of the race riots . The primary sources had to be examined and re­
examined in an effort to eliminate as many errors and contradictions 
as possible. The resulting secondary source documents are unquestion­
ably the most detailed and accurate accounts of the race riots that 
were possible given the conditions and magnitude o f  the problem. 
Each o f  the race riots will be examined separately in  chapters 
and a determination will be made as to the extent that this data 
supports or refutes part or all of the hypothesized typology. This 
process will be i n  accordance with the procedure outlined earlier in  
this chapter. The various governmental commission reports will 
constitute the central core of the informational data. All o f  these 
documents were based upon extensive primary sources o f  information 
and were compiled by the most authoritative and prominent specialists 
in each of their respective disciplines. Moreover, these accounts 
were written immediately after the occurrence of each of the disorders, 
thus the . ·data loss because of the passage of time was kept to a 
minimum. The McCone Commission Report (Watts) ,  Report for Action 
(Newark) , Report to Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh (Detroit) ,  and the 
Kerner corrcmission Report (coverning all three of the disorders )  are 
the specific works that will be the principal sources o f  data . 
While these documents have been subjected to criticism from some 
academic circles because of the conservative nature of their inter­
pretations and recommendations, their narrative accounts o f  the riots 
remain unquestioned as the most complete and truthful descriptions 
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available. Journal articles and selected chapters from edited books 
will also be considered as supportive data . Obviously these are not 
as complete as the commission reports but they tend to be more detailed 
in their depictions of certain portions of the disorders. These 
sources also have the added feature of more recent information that 
was not available to the commission reports at the time of their 
publication. These governmental reports were usually under some 
publication deadline and could not wait in some instances for the 
additional information. The journal articles also have the benefit 
of a certain amount of both professional and emotional detachment 
from the actual disorders while the commission reports were not 
immune from certain political pressures from both sides of the 
community. 
CHAPTER V 
HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE 
THE TYPOLOGY 
It is the purpose of this chapter to - present the hypotheses 
and give the rationale that was used in their fonnulation. The 
general hypotliesis of this dissertation can be stated as follows: 
Th�t there does exist in the phenomena termed urban 
- insurrections the bas is for a typology composed of dis-
cernible causal, sequential stages that can be identified. 
This hypothesis was suggested by a cursory examination of urban 
disorders and has been supported by contr ibutions from the existing 
body of theory. 
The actual typology will be presented in the form of  five 
working subhypotheses: 
Subhypothes is 1: The existence of a long term discrepancy 
between the ideal and real cultures of  
ghetto dwellers will eventual ly cause them 
to identify the causative factors. 
Subhypothes is 2: The widespread acceptance of the identifica­
tion of the causative factors will eventually 
cause the occurrence of a precipitating 
incident. 
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Subhypothesis 3: The occurrence of a precipitating incident 
wil l  cause e1e succession into the rioting 
stage. 
Subhypothesis 4 :  The advent of the rioting stage will  cause 
a reaction by cont�ol agencies. 
Su.bhypothesis 5 :  The successful intervention by control 
agencies will cause 2 relatively rapid return 
of  normality. 
_ To fully eA-plain and understand the elements of each of the 
stages the typology can be outlined as follows : 
1. Discrepancy between real and ideal cultures 
A. Disproportionate occupation of degrading statures 
B. Rising expectations and unresponsive institution-
alized procedures 
c .  Exacerbating local conditions 
2 .  Identification of  underlying, causative factors 
A .  Diffusion of the generalized belief (proselytizing) 
B .  Consensus among respondents (acceptance) 
3. The precipitating incident 
A .  Existence of a casual crowd 
B. Occurrence of a seemingly innocuous incident 
c .  Violence-counter violence spiral (individualized 
level) 
D. Mood shift accompanied by milling, contagion, and 
se lective perception. 
E. Distortion of the incident and diffusion of rumors 
4. The rioting stage 
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A. Initial col lective action based on rioters' conception 
of the precipitating incident 
B. Perception of the breakdown of officia l control 
c .  Recruitment of additiona l personnel 
D. Selective burning and looting 
E. Identification of the most easily accessible and 
readily identifiable of the causative factors 
5. Reaction by control agencies 
A. Violence-reactive violence spiral (col lectivized 
leve l ) 
B. Suppression of riot 
6. Return to normality 
A. Re latively unchanged conditions 
B. Individualized selective violence against policy 
EXPLANATION 
The sequence of predisposing conditions as wel l  as events of 
the actua l riot include the perception by the soc ia l ly and economical ly 
subordinate group that there exists a discrepancy between the real 
and ideal cultures . This d iscrepancy is manifested in a dispropor­
tionate occupancy of degrading statures and rising expectations which 
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are met by unresponsive institutionalized procedures. A further 
manifestation is the existence of exacerbating local conditions, 
specifically police brutality, usurious interest rates, and higher 
prices charged for goods and services in relation to other areas of 
the city. 
Fixations of  responsibility for the discrepancy between real 
and ideal culture is accomplished through the identification of under­
lying, causative factors . These factors are stated in the form of 
a belief or social myth , and the dif fusion of th ls belief is carried 
out through the various forms of proselytism. If the identification 
of causes for these discrepancies is widespread in the subordinated 
community , then there will be a high degree of consensus and accep-
tance concerning the validity of  the belief. 
Given the predisposing conditions described above, the 
occurrence of a precipitating incident is necessary to ignite an 
urban insurrection. As defined here a precipitating incident is 
predicated upon the exis tence of a casual crowd which witnesses the 
occurrence of a seemingly innocuous incident. This type of even� 
occurs many times every day in the ghetto without any ramifications 
or further incidents; however, this particular one is slightly 
different because of the following reasons. The principal participants 
(usually police and the suspect) in the incident react toward each 
other with increasing hostility and aggression . This violence-
counter violence spiral produces a mood shift in the crowd as awareness 
is heightened that the witnessed scene is symbolic of the generalized 
'h���, .• �=���!l'ifHi!'f;!-�!l;;:•;g,;: : �· -:!'.�§�- -mffl:��R!ffl�������������-�,oi'l":��'ii,c" ."H __�_,_2',! .• ���:;;:: � - :_:,·•�;� 
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belief concerning the existence and causes of social, economic and 
political disparities. Selective perception leads to distortion of 
the inciden t ,  while milling and contagion contribute to the diffusion 
of rumors. 
The circulation of rumors operates on two levels within the 
typical urban insurrection. Rumors are present within the eye-witness 
crowd as a concomitant feature of milling and t.Jey diffuse through 
the crowd through the process of contagion. Rumors also have impact 
during the recruitment phase of the riot. Members of the immediate 
crowd spread their distortions to persons who were not present at the 
actual incident. In the former instance, rumors facili tate the 
transformation of the behavior of the crowd from individual and non-
directed to collective and directed. 
The metamorphosis of the crowd creates the inception of the 
rioting stage . Initial collective action is based upon the rioters' 
conception of the precipitating incident. The resistence of the 
authorities involved in the precipitating incident is overwhelmed 
and the rioters receive greater momentum from their perception of the 
breakdown of offici al control. As the area of the riot expands from 
the location of the precipitating incident, accompanying rumors 
facilitate the recruitment of additional personnel. The generalized 
belief within the subordinated community concerning the attribution 
of causality for their disparate condition induces selective burning 
and looting by the rioters. Destructive acts are associated with 
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the identification of the most easily accessible and readily identified 
of the causative factors which comprise the generalized belief. 
The early successes of the rioters produces a reaction by the 
control agencies. The individualized violence-counter violence spiral 
of the precipitating incidents is repeated in the form of a violence­
reactive violence spiral on a col lectivized level. The reinforcements 
of police and National Guard contingents are accompanied, at least 
initially , by a more intense reaction on the part of the rioters. 
Looting and burning may diminish, but personalized violence becomes 
more widespread and the general level is escalated. In the reaction 
phase however, the control forces eventually prevail and the riot is 
suppressed. 
The return to normality following the suppression of the riot 
is characterized by relatively unchanged conditions from those that 
prevailed before the riot. Hostility is rechannelled from widespread 
violence to individualized selective violence against the police 
forces. 
RATIONALE 
Each of the points described in the proposed typology has its 
antecedents in the writings discussed in Chapter I I I. It is felt 
that comparison of the typology with generalizations found in other 
studies of collective behavior and social movements will  justify its 
use as a descriptive and analytical device. 
llO 
The concept of a discrepancy between the real and ideal cultures 
�s a predisposing factor is general ly supported by Park who found that 
collective behavior is based on some form of social unrest, and also by 
Brinton who stated that a revolutionary outbreak is always the result 
of smoldering conditions. More specifically, Turner and Killian stated 
that conditions of collective behavior were predicated upon a breakdown 
or weakness of soci al control resulting from inadequate social organ­
ization and normative integration. The normative mechanisms of the 
dominant society are the only acceptable means of goal attainment but 
are relatively inaccessible to the subordinated group. This situation 
results in a perceived discrepancy and feelings of relative deprivation. 
This relationship was also described by Edwards who discerned 
the basic cause of revolution to be the inabi lity of existing social 
institutions to satisfy the basic wishes of new experience, security, 
recognition, and response. In Edwards' terms the ideal  culture would 
be defined in terms of wish-fulfi llment, while factors contributing 
to the thwarting of wish-fulfillment represent the real culture. In 
terms of  the typology, the factors directly associated with the 
thwarting of the four basic wishes are the disproportionate occupation 
of degrading statuses, rising expectations and unresponsive institu­
tionalized procedures, and exacerbating local conditions. The effects 
of these factors are the same as those stipulated by Edwards . 
Further support for the predisposing factors presented in the 
typology is derived from Smelser ' s writings. For him the discrepancy 
between the real and ideal would be stated as the conditions in society 
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which serve as a source of demands coupled with inadequate institu­
tionali zed procedures for dealing with these demands. The occupation 
of degrading statuses, rising expectations, and exacerbating conditions 
would be descr ibed by Smelser as the real or perceived loss of wealth, 
status or power, or the feeling of being frozen in one or more of 
these dimensions. 
Perhaps the most significant factor associated with the dis-
crepancy between the real and ideal cultures is the existence of rising 
expectations which are met by unresponsive institutionali zed procedures, 
particularly in the realm of political expression. Smelser saw this 
condition as structurally conducive to revolution as did Rose who 
attributed violent revolt to the estrangement from participation in 
legitimate political processes . In support of this Janowitz observed 
that in the 1960's, the crucial factor separating cities which exper­
ienced riots from those which did not was the amount and extent of 
local political participation on the part of the black community. 
cities with more proportionately integrated police forces and more 
representative forms of government had fewer and less severe riots . 
Stage two of the typology-- the identi fication of vague causative 
factors--is supported by Edwards and Smelser who alluded to the formation 
of a generalized belief (Smelser) or social myth (Edwards) as an 
outgrowth o f  the generali zed belief resulted from a perception by the 
suppressed group that certain forces and agents were responsible for 
the felt conditions of inj ustice . According to Smelser, the di ffusion 
of the generalized belief was accomplished throu
gh various forms of 
proselytizing . 
1 1 2  
Hopper ' s  analysis of social movements also contained a stage 
where vague, unspecified feelings of unrest w
ould result from a 
perception of disparity between the real and 
ideal cultures. Widespread 
consensus or acceptance of the nature of the disp
arity would depend 
upon the skill of agitators who question the 
ideal situation in terms 
of the real. As a preparatory feature to th
e acceptance of the social 
myth, the challenges of the agitators wo
uld be spread throughout the 
subordinated community by means of speech
es, writings, and pamphleteer­
ing. Brinton's study of revolutions also 
involved perceptions of the 
unfitness of the social order, and that t
hese perceptions would achieve 
broad acceptance through the function of
 conversion. 
several studies reviewed by the writer 
contained some mention 
of a precipitating incident in one fo
rm or another as a prelude to 
collective behavior involving violent
 confrontation . The Kerner 
Commission Report and smelser ' s  stud
y argued that, in relation to race 
riots, the precipitating incident ex
empli fies one or more of the 
conditions which has led the subor
dinated community to perceive a 
discrepancy between the real and id
eal cultures. As previously 
mentioned Brinton perceived the rev
olutionary outbreak as a specific
 
incident related to smoldering con
ditions. Edwards also saw revolu
­
tionary outbreak as resulting fro
m some seemingly insignificant 
incident. Finally, Le Bon implied at lea
st, the necessity of some 
incident which would transform a gathering of i
ndividuals into a 
psychological crowd. 
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Among the factors contributing to the precipitating incident 
as a typological stage of an urban insurrecti
on, the existence of a 
casual crowd is presumed to be a definitional 
necessity. That a 
crowd must exist at some point in order that a
ctivities associated 
with collective behavior might occur is sel
f-evident. That the crowd 
is casual at some point implies that colle
ctive behavior is not 
generated individually and spontaneously, b
ut rather at some point an 
aggregate of individuals must be transform
ed into what Le Bon called 
a single being, or to Simmel's concept of 
the mass mind . Prior to 
that change, the aggregate would be defi
ned as a casual crowd for the 
purposes of this paper . 
The occurrence of a seemingly innocuo
us incident has been 
mentioned in various contexts in the p
receding paragraphs . The typology 
describes the transformation o f  a ca
sual crowd into a like-minded group
 
engaging in violent collective beha
vior as being a function of some 
specific incident. The incident it
self might objectively be viewed as
 
innocuous or trivial (Edwards). S
ub jectively, however, the incident
 
will be perceived as highly dramat
ic (Brinton) due to its symboliza
tion 
of long-standing normative inequit
ies (Smelser). 
The concept o f  a violence-counter
 violence spiral has not been 
treated extensively in other writi
ngs on either an individualized or
 
a collective level. It is hypothe
sized, however, that a truly innocu
ous 
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incident will not in itself generate s
ufficient antagonism among 
witnesses to induce violence-oriented coll
ective behavior . The 
initial incident involving some normatively
 deviant act, is perceived 
by witnesses--members of a repressed minori
ty--as a trivial and 
perhaps common encounter between a membe
r of their group and a social 
control agent from the dominant majority. 
Because this incident is 
perceived as trivial , there is a low magnitu
de of hosti lity or even 
interest. 
The incident is transformed when the force emp
loyed by the 
agent of the dominant majority is unaccept
able to the "deviant " member 
of the minority group , inducing him to e
ngage in countering violence. 
The pushing and shoving between the two 
increases in intensity until 
the control agent is forced to employ m
easures wh ich the members of 
the casual crowd view as excessive. 
The escalating spiral of violence 
increases the magnitude of interest a
nd antagonism among the witness­
ing minority group. As violence-coun
ter violence escalates between 
the intia1 participants, the inciden
t is increasingly perceived by 
the witnesses as a symbol of the gene
ralized belief about the nature 
and causes of the repressive conditi
ons. 
The concept of a spiral of viole
nce-counter v io lence, apart 
from the specific context in which
 it is utilized above, is support
ed 
by Rose's study. In his conceptua
lization of violent social behavio
r, 
violent revolt was a considered 
reaction to violent control. The 
relation between Rose ' s  work and
 a violence-counter violence spira
l 
as a collective phenomenon is c lea
rly evident ;  however, it is felt 
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that the principles involved in violence-counter violence can be 
equally applied at an individualized level. At this level the 
perception of the forces of violent control--shared by the entire 
repressed minority as part of the generalized belief--is intensified 
and focalized by them when the deviant individual minority member 
encounters violent control resulting from a specific incident. If as 
Rose stipulated, violent control induces violent revolt, then the 
motivating force for violent revolt would be present when an incident 
of violent control is experienced. 
There is no lack of  support for the position that the trans -
formation or mood shift of the casual crowd is accompanied and 
accelerated by milling, contagion , and selective perception. Park 
stated that collective behavior is based on some form of unres t. 
However, the unrest or antagonism generated among witnesses of a 
specific incident is based essentially on individual percept i ons and 
would remain - such in the absence of some form of communication. In 
o ther words, individual antagonism is translated into group antagonism 
through communication. 
According to Park, communication of unrest within the crowd is 
accomplished through milling and contagion. This communication has 
the effect o f  merging individual perceptions into a commonly-held 
perception of the incident, or what Turner and Killian cal led creating 
uniform mood and imagery. Individual images which reinforce the 
common perception o f the incident are retained; those which produce 
dissonance are rejected. Parallel ing this approach , Tarde included 
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the contagion of sentiments as part of the developmental process in 
collective behavior. That collective behavior is preceded and 
accomplished by a common definition of the situation is supported by 
Le Bon who defined the crowd as a single being composed of the 
characteristics which each of its members possesses in common, and 
by Simrnel for whom the mass mind was made up of only those fragments 
of each member which coincide with all others. 
Distortion of the precipitating incident, and diffusi on of 
rumors are seen as logic al consequences of mi lling, contagion, and 
selective perception. Le Bon mentioned suggestibi lity as being a 
characteristic of a crowd as did Simmel, who emphasized its extreme 
receptiveness to stimuli. To Simrnel the mutual excitation of crowds 
negates individual resistence to stimuli. This receptiveness to 
stimuli is thus seen as facilitating the spread of rumors. Rumor 
diffusion is the process of communicating perceptions of an incident 
by the collectivity to its v arious individual parts. Since individual 
perceptions of the incident are limited and tend to reinforce only 
the collective perception, distortion is inevitable . In this sense, 
individual perceptions and assessments of the objective situation 
are subj ectively defined by the parameters established during the 
collective percep tion. 
The culmination of the processes engendered by the precipitating 
incident is the riot outbreak , or in Blumer ' s  words, a spontaneous 
expression of impulse and feeling. Applying a concept of Rose ' s, 
the outbreak is accompanied by a feeling of total estrangement from 
1 17 
legitimate political processes. The violence-counter violence spiral 
embedded in the precipitating incident is perceived as a symbolic 
representation of the dual system of justice which exists in the 
society. This incident emphasizes the inaccessibility of the ideal 
cultu re by utilizing acceptable (and accessible) norms. 
This emotional closure creating the collective or mass mind is 
manifested in a reactive, collective action based on the rioters ' 
conception of the incident. In Turner and Killian ' s  typology , the 
initial behavior of the crowd would be described as active, focused 
(on the incident) ,  and solidaristic (insofar as it is aimed at 
· incapacitating the agents of control ) .  
According to Brinton the reactive force immediately available 
to the agents of control is inadequate to quell the outbrea�. Edwards 
also stated that control agencies are initially totally ineffective 
in suppressing the riot. The ensuing retreat of the police contributes 
to a general perception on the part of the rioters of the breakdown 
of official control. This perception induces the belief that the 
rioters are beyond the law, or as Le Bon put it, that they are not 
controlled by laws or institutions. 
The retreat of the agents of control and the resultant feeling 
that a situation exists to which the law cannot be applied changes 
the crowd 's  focus from the initial situati?n--the events surrounding 
the precipitating incident--to a wider range of objects and events. 
The expanded focus of the crowd incorporates those objects which 
directly contribute to, or are symbolic of, the felt state of 
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the riot are virtually unlimited. The secrmd factor pres cribing the 
_ reaction by the certainty of riot failure is the inevitab1· 11.· ty of 
control agencies .  Control agencies cannot ignore the s ign
ificant 
disruption of the social organization which is inherent in
 a riot 
and will therefore find it necessary to mobilize th
eir resources for 
suppressi on . 
Specifically the process leading to the termination of the 
riot parallels the process which generated the
 riot. The spi r a l  of 
individualized violence-counter violence which 
0r iginally fused a 
collective mind and crer1ted a riot condition is
, during the course 
of a riot, repeated on co llectivized level
. If as in Rose' s terms, 
violent revolt is a reaction to violent con
trol, theil escalated 
vio lent control must be seen as a reaction 
to the initial violent 
revolt. The difference at the collectiv
e level is that control 
agents can no longer retreat since coll
ective violence threatens the 
very existence of the dominant soci al 
system . As vio lence-counter 
violence spirals upward, the level ev
entually exceeds the resource 
capacity of the insurgents. At this 
point the insurgents perceive 
what Smelser termed the inevitabilit
y of failure, and the riot is 
suppressed. 
The last stage of a riot is terme
d the return to normality. 
The primary characteristic of post
-riot condi tions is the existenc
e 
of unchanged conditions (Brinton, 
Edwards) . The fai lure of the riot
 
is more than a failure to satisfy 
immediate goals . Conditions whi
ch 
were perceived as mitigating agai
nst meaningful participati on in t
he 
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repression and subordination experienced in the rioters' normal l ives. 
As the focus of  the riot expands and fragments, so does the physical 
area of the r iot . The increas ingly dif fuse area of the riot exposes 
greater numbers of  people to the riot s ituation. Explanations and 
justifications for behavior--including distorted accounts of  the 
precipitating incident and the observation that official control has 
broken down--extends the riot mood and encourages the recruitment o f  
additional_ personnel .  
The expansion o f  the riot area and the increase in the number 
of rioters trans forms the c rowd (in Turner and Killian ' s  typology) 
from focused to volatile, and from solidaristic to individualistic. 
For the individual rioter however, acts of violence against specific 
objects tend to reflect his perception of those objects as real or 
symbolic factors o f  repression and subordination. Selective burning 
and looting then, is accompanied by the identification of the most 
easily accessible and readily identified of the caus ative factors. 
Geschwander reported from his study of the Kerner Coromission Report 
that looting was a rebe llion against the distribution system o f  a 
society (economic repression) . Stores were looted as a form of  
compens ation against exp loitative store-owners. 
Regardless of  the size of the area or the number o f  individuals 
affected by the riot, its suppression is inevitable. Two factors 
account for this : whereas the potential resources available to the 
rioters which could s ustain the riot are limited , the potential 
resources avai lable to the agencies of social control for suppressing 
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the riot are virtually unlimited .  The sec0nd factor prescribing the 
certainty of riot failure is the inevitability of reaction by the 
control agencies. Control agencies cannot ignore the significant 
disruption of the social organization which is inherent in a riot 
and will therefore find it necessary to mobilize their r esources for 
suppression. 
Specifically the process leading to the termination of the 
riot parallels the process which generated the riot. The spiral of 
individuaiized violence-counter violence which 0Yiginally fused a 
collective mind and crer.3.ted a riot condition is , during the course 
of a riot, repeated on collectivized level . If as in Rose's terms, 
violent revolt is a reaction to violent control, theil escalated 
violent control must be seen as a reaction to the initial violent 
revolt . The difference at the collective level is that control 
agents can no longer retreat since collective violence threatens the 
very existence of the dominant social system. As violence-counter 
violence spirals upward, the level eventually exceeds the resource 
capacity of the insurgents . At this point the insurgents perceive 
what Smelser termed the inevitability of failure , and the riot is 
suppressed. 
The last stage of a riot is termed the return to normality. 
The primary characteristic of post-riot conditions is the existence 
of unchanged conditions (Brinton , Edwards) .  The failure of the riot 
is more than a failure to satisfy immediate goals . Conditions which 
were perceived as mitigating against meaningful participation in the 
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dominant society are still present, or in some cases , even exaggerated. 
Rose, for instance , explained that the occurrence of a revolt would 
inspire greater measures of control to guard against further revolts. 
Additionally, Rose felt that the violence of greater control 
would promote the counter-violence of greater revolt. On this basis 
it is hypothesized that the tactics of revolt will not only be 
escalated, but changed since the control forces have demonstrated 
their superiority in suppressing riot tactics. It is therefore ex­
pected that post-riot violence will take the form o f  individualized 
selective violence against police (Janowitz). The presumption o f  the 
adoption of this t actic is grounded in the insurgents ' perception 
that violent action against organized and mobilized control is in­
effective ; whereas , violent action against individual agents of 
control is potentially e ffective. 
Besides individualizing the victims of violence for pragmatic 
reasons, it is also presumed that victims will be selectively, 
rather than randomly chosen for symbolic e ffect . Victims will be 
selected on the basis o f  behavior which most closely represents the 
repressive stereotype . 
CHAPTER VI 
WATTS: AUGUST 11-17 , 1965 
The first of the "contemporary" race riots occurred i n  a 
suburb of Los Angeles during the late summer of 1965. During the 
previous year there had been sporadic episodes of violence in both 
the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant sections of New York City; however, 
they were both short-lived and damage was minimal. The Watts 
di_sorder was the first to be characterized by a relatively lengthy 
period of time during which little or no police control was in 
evidence. It was also the first modern urban disorder in which many 
persons lost their lives and property damage was measured in  millions 
of dollars. The importance of the Watts disturbance lies in  its role 
as a symbol. A symbolization of a major change in the nature of 
black reaction to the white discrimination. It marked a change from 
docility to aggressiveness. It restyled protests and ·was undoubtedly 
a major causative factor of the subsequent riots that were to occur 
in the latter half o f  the decade. 
The riot statistics grimly illustrate the magnitude of the six 
day disturbance . There were 34 persons killed and 1, 0 3 2  reported 
inj uries, including 90 police officers, 136 firemen, 10 National 
Guardsmen, 2 3 persons from other governmental agencies, and nearly 
800 civilians --both black and white. One hundred and eighteen of 
the reported injuries resulted from gunshot wounds. Of the 34 killed, 
one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a policeman. 1 
The remainder were looters, innocent bystanders, suspected snipers, 
and arsonists . 
The looting and burning during the disorder caused damage 
which has been estimated to have exceeded 40 million dollars o f  
assessed evaluation. More than six hundred buildings were damaged 
and two hundred o f  these were tota lly destroyed by fire . The 
destruction was centered on food markets, liquor stores, furniture 
1 2 2  
2 stores, clothing stores, department stores , and pawn shops. These 
-
types o f  stores were singled-out by residents for punitive measures 
because o f  the exploitation practices they were accused o f  employing 
in their dealings with the residents . There were virtually no 
residences that were damaged intentionally and damage to schools, 
libraries, churches, and public buildings was minimal. 3 
During the disturbance almost 4,000 persons were arrested. 
Approxi mately 3, 500 adults were arrested and the majority o f  these 
persons had no p revious record or had only a "minor" criminal record 
consisting o f  misdemeanors. Most of the juveniles arrested during 
the riot had also never been arrested before and less than 10 percent 
o f  514 juveniles that were arrested had ever been in "serious " 
1Governor ' s commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in 
the City--An End or  A Beginning, (Colunfuia, Mo. :  Lucas Bro thers, 
1965 ) ,  pp. 23-24 . (This document is commonly called the McCone 
Commission Report. ) 
2 
Ibid .  
12 3  
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trouble before . This was the fi
rst evidence that pointed out the 
inadequacy o f  the previous ly acce
pted 1 1 rif fraff theory" of riot 
participation . 
The Watts riot was the only one of the: rec
ent commodity riots 
that involved a large number of wh
ites as victims. The other large­
sca le race riots during the sixties
 only minimally involved white 
civilians , but during the early stage
s of the WatLs disorder white 
motorists were the victims of viole
nce usually in the form of ass
aults 
by black mobs. As soon as the d
anger to white civilians became mo
re 
apparent , they s tayed out of the
 area and were spared further 
harrassment. 
Unl ike the conditions in Newark 
and De troit, the immediate 
Watts area cannot be readily id
entified as a ghetto. The re are
 no 
l�ge , decayed tenement areas , i
n fact , most of the r esidences
 in 
the Watts area were single fami
ly dwe llings. To the casual ,  
unin­
fonned passerby the area resemb
les a typical lower-middle cl
ass 
residential community. However
, this superficial analysis b
elies 
the dominant theme of the conu
nuni ty--s1nouldering rage as a
 reaction 
to their life situation as it
 had been defined for them b
y the white 
community. This pervasive th
eme of the community has res
ulted in 
many clashes between Negroes 
and the white community ' s  sy
mbol of 
4rbid. , pp. 24-25. 
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dppression--the poli ce. Every year since 1960 had been marked by 
at least one major "flare-up ; "  however, these incidents involved only 
small numbers and were usually extinguished as quickly as they started. 
The incidents grew more intense and have been su.rnmarized in a report 
of the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission in 1964: 
About two years ago , this Commission stated that a situation 
was developi ng in the community in which police-minority group 
conf licts were becoming almost a "self-fulfilling prophecy." 
We feel that the same situation again exists. A signi fi c ant 
and ever-growing number of minor ity-group persons are being led 
to feel that in any contact they have with the police off icers, 
they are going to be treated roughly. On the other hand, a 
growing number of law enfor cement officers feel that in any 
conta ct they have wi th members of minority groups they are likely 
to meet with resistance. These "expectations" on the part of  
both groups are likely to produce what each expects. . .. We bel ieve 
that the climate has deteriorated in the past several weeks 
between law-enforcement agencies and minority-group cornmunities. 5 
With the above described conditions, in which both sides feel 
that their grievances are legitimate ones, prevailing for a number 
of years the occurrence of a major disorder was almost i nevitable. 
In fact the most pertinent question may not be--"Why did it happen? ", 
but rather--"-Why didn't it happen sooner?" 
Dis crepancy Between Real and Ideal Cultures 
The statistics indicate that the residents of Watts are the 
most deprived in all o f Los Angeles County. Watts is a sprawling 
suburban community whose population composition has been radically 
5John Howard and Wil liam McCord, "Watts: The Revolt and After, " 
in Life stvles in the Black Ghetto, William McCord, John Howard, 
Bernard Friedberg, and Edwin Harwood (eds. ) ,  (New York: W. W .  Norton 
and Company, Inc . , 1969 ) , p. 57 . 
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altered in the past few decades. 
From nearly a ll-white the area was 
quickly transformed into a mixture of
 white, Mexican-American and 
Negro. The rapid migration of blac
ks to the West-coast area resulted 
in further change in the populati
on make-up during the last decade 
until at the present time the area
 is virtually a ll-black . 
The median number of school years com
pleted by its res idents 
is 9. 3, while the median number of
 years is 1 2. l for the whole popu­
lation of the county.
6 The same disparity is also present 
in 
differential figures of median fam
i ly income--$3, 4 5 1  for Watts 
residents and $6, 900 for the Angl
o population of the City of Los 
7 
Angeles. The median home value
 in Watts is $ 7, 800 as against 
$17, 300 for the City of Los Ange
les ; however, 22.6 percent of al
l 
housing units in Watts are c las
sified as greatly deteriorated 
or 
di lapidated.
8 The rate of unemployment among 
potentially employab le 
persons in Watts is 30 percent
. During the s umrner months, a
pproxi-
mately 50 percent of the schoo
l age youth are a lso unemploye
d, in 
. . . . 
9 
addition, 30 percent of the p
opulation is receiving AOC mo
ney. 
The extent of underemploymen
t is not known, but a post-ri
ot survey 
indicated that a majority of
 employed males felt that th
ey were 
capable of performing in a 
"better job. " 
6 John Buggs, "Report From L
os Angeles, " in Readings In 
collective Behavior, Robert
 R. Evans (ed. ) , (Chicago : R
and McNal ly 
and Company, 1969), p. 493. 
7rbid. 
8rbid. , p. 494. 
9rbid. 
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The conditions which pervade the slum area of Watts have 
long been known to governmental officials in the city. However, 
only recently has there been any concerted effort to ameliorate the 
conditions. The establishment of agencies designed to change these 
conditions did not appreciably alter the life style of the typical 
ghetto dweller. The new agencies were beset with power struggles 
between city hall  and local residents concerning control o f  the new 
programs. Initial reaction to the efforts of the agencies was highly 
favorable, but it became readily apparent that they were fai ling in 
their efforts to change the conditions. The complaints against the 
agencies have been described : 
1. One hal f  o f  the agencies had provisions for emergency 
service in an area that has high requirements for such services. 
2. The requirements o f  highly specialized agencies governing 
the conditions under which service could be obtained made it 
extremely difficult for those most in need to be eligible. 
3. Most of the new poverty program agencies had no waiting 
lists for services, but the agencies offering highly skilled 
professional services in health, mental health, and f amily 
services did have them. 
4. Only a very small minority of agencies had representatives 
o f  the client population on their po licy-making boards. In 
general, the majority of agencies did not seem to block access 
to their services with excessive intake demands and long waiting 
lists. However, there was limited case finding or reaching out 
for people who could not connect without some additional help. 
I f  the individual or family did not have the strength to get 
there and stay there , he went unserved. The highest level of  
expertise was not frequently available to the low income 
resident of  south central Los Angeles even when the agency 
was located in this area. It was felt that this may lead to 
an increased sense o f  relative deprivation which is so often 
the seed of v iolence . 10 
The net result o f  the agencies and their efforts seems 
to 
have been further disillusionment with the ability
 and sincerity 
1 27 
o f  the white community's actions toward bettering
 the ghetto 
conditions. Efforts did not succeed. Nearly tw
ice as many people 
crowd into homes in Watts than into homes loc
ated in other sections 
of  the city. And according to a survey condu
cted by UCLA minority­
group families not only live in less desira
ble quarters than other 
11  
families with the same income, but they pa
y more. 
Employment programs in the Watts area we
re also ineffective 
in their efforts to achieve equality of
 employment. While the rest 
o f  the country was experiencing econom
ic prosperity, the median 
income o f  Watts decreased by 8 percent
 and the unemployment rate 
increased by 50 percent.
12 
E fforts directed toward a revitaliza
tion o f  the school system 
also have had less than desirable r
esults . Children in the area 
consistently perform below their c
ounterparts in the rest of the 
lONathan E . Cohen, "The Los Angele
s Riot Study," in Violence 
in the Streets, Shalom Endleman (e
d . ) , ( Chicago : Quadrangl e  Books, 
1968), p. 336. (For a more detaile
d account see Prelude to Riot: 
A View o f  Urban America From The Bo
ttom, by Paul Jacobs, (New York : 
Random House , 19 66). 




city and also on a nation-wide comparison level. The schools in the 
area are characterized by less-experienced teachers, double sessions, 
fewer libraries, poorer facilities, and lack of funds. The school 
dropout rate is higher than in surrounding non-ghetto schools and 
even those who finish receive a poorer quality of education. 13 
The proposed revision of the welfare system also fell  con­
siderably short of expectations. Generally, the changes which were 
made tended to reinforce an individual for remaining on welfare 
rather than encouraging them to get off. Frequently voiced complaints 
inc luded inadequate payments, loss of privacy, loss of self-respect, 
and loss of incentive to go to work because of inconsistent requirements 
1 . . lLI. and po icies. -
The grievances of the residents of the Watts area were many and 
varied but they can be summarized as follows: 
1. When asked to state their biggest gripe, 3 3  percent said 
poor neighborhood conditions, 14 percent mistreatment by whites, 
and 1 3  percent economic conditions. Only 21 percent had no 
specific complaints. 
2. When asked specifically about exploitive practices by 
merchants, approximately one-third claim to have encountered 
"frequently" the experience of being overcharged and sold inferior 
goods. 
3. When asked about job discrimination, 54 percent of the 
males and 3 3  percent of the fe�ales mentioned that it happened to 
them persona lly . 
1 3rbid. 
14rb� d. , n 55 57 ..L. P.1: • - • 
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4. M3.les were also more likely to report discrimination in 
housing practices by landlords and in schools. Thirty- four 
percent of the males stated that they had experienced discrimina-
tion in housing. 
5. Police brutality is frequently mentioned as a major factor 
in the Los Angeles riot. An analysis of the data indicates that 
well abave a ma jority of both sexes believe that most forms of 
police malpractice--including the more violent, such as use of 
unnecessary force in arrests, beating up people in custody, and 
searching home unnecessarily--occur in this cormnuni ty _ 1 5  
People who migrated t o  Watts did so i n  a search for a be tter 
life. However, upon arrival they found that new patterns of prejudice 
and discriminatioP had been substituted in place of  the established 
norms of  the South. Economic opportunities were very limited. 
Exploitation by store owners was very pervasive. 16 Unemployment, 
inferior educational facilities, broken homes, high rates of crime . 
and delinquency all characterized the living conditions of Watts. 
In general, the white conununity was apathetic except to make certain 
� · 1  1 ·  d 17 ti1at the area was heavi y po ice . 
Identification of Underlying, Causative Factors 
The exi.stence o f  discriminatory practices and the resulting 
conditions cannot, however, explain the occurrence of the riot. 
15cohen, op. cit. , pp. 336-337. 
16Jerry Cohen and William s. Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn : The 
Los Angeles Race Riot August, 1965, (New York: E. P. Dulton and 
Company, Inc., 1966), p. 205. 
17Melvin L. DeFleur, William v. D'Antonio, and Lois B. DeFleur, 
Sociology: Man In Society, (Glenview, Illinois : Scott, Foresman and 
Company, 197 1 )  , •P. 365. 
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The residents must come to reach a consensus regarding the causation 
of the conditions. During the last two decades, the citizens of 
watts have come to see their problems as a result of inadequacies in 
the white institutional structure rather than the fault of their own 
lack of education or various skills. With increasing consensus the 
residents came to view themselves as unjust victims of  white oppression. 
Specifically, they came to view the police as a symbolic representation 
of this oppression. 
Because of the programs of moderate civil rights group (i.e. , 
NAACP, The Urban League, and the SCLC)  and more recently militant 
protest groups (especially the Black Muslims) the residents of Watts 
became more and more aware of the reasons for their problems. The 
Muslims were especially active during the period of time before the 
occurrence of the riot and also during the riot. They were responsible 
for circulating inflammatory literature and undoubtedly were an active 
force in the creation o f  a tension-laden situation. They cannot be 
held responsible for causing the riot, but their philosophy of life-­
based upon reverse racism--played an important role in the identifica-
. f . f t 18 tion o causative ac ors. 
The extent o f  the acceptance of these efforts at identification 
are clearly revealed in a post-riot survey conducted in the Watts 
area : 
18cohen and Murphy, �- cit. , pp. 247 and 3 0 0 . 
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...  The events of the riot were deplored, and the wish was 
expressed that the authorities had stopped it earlier. Yet the 
authorities tended to be criticized and the rioters defended. 
The causes of the riot were described in terms of genuine 
grievances with those who were attacked ; e. g. , a history of 
friction, discrimination, and economic exploitation with local 
merchants and police. The purpose of the riot was seen as being, 
on the one hand, to call attention of whites to Negro problems, 
and on the other, to express resentment against malefactors. 
The riot was expected to bring help to the Negro population from 
whites, though major improvement in interracial personal 
relationships was not expected. This "riot ideology" seemed to 
justify and defend the riot • . • .  19 
While most residents of the area did not participate in the 
riot, they expressed sympathy and understanding toward those who did. 
Most of the residents thought that the riot targets deserved the 
treatment that they received during the course of the disturbance. 
Most persons viewed the riot as a protest against discrimination, 
not as an irrational exercise in violence. 20 The most frequently 
mentioned cause was police brutality ; however, probably more important 
is the belief that police are representative of the dominating white 
establishment. They are symbols of the white community ' s  efforts to 
simply keep the "lid on tight" rather than e liminate the causes of 
the conditions. There was widespread hostility between police and 
Watts residents and " . • • if a breakdown of social order was to occur, 
it was likely to be precipitated by an incident involving the police."21 
19navid o. Sears and T. M. Tom linson, "Riot Ideology in Los 
Angeles: A Study of Negro Attitudes," in Bracey, (et . a l. ), op. cit. , 
pp. 206-20 7. 
20rbid. , pp. 195-196 . 
21oeFleur, (et. al. ) , op. cit., pp. 365-3 66 .  
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The Precipitating Incident 
Ear ly in the evening of Au��st 11, 1965, two C alifornia State 
Highway P atrolmen stopped a car containing two men for what appeared 
to be reckless driving and speeding. The siren of the mctorcycle 
attracted a small  crowd from nearby houses and apartment units. The 
arrest proceeded without incident and the mood of the gathered 
assemblage was good-natured and amused. 22 The sa1ne mood characterized 
the officer and thG suspect as they exchanged quips during the routine 
arrest procedures. The crowd continued to grow � however, its mood was 
still one of curiosity rather than vindictiveness. The defendent ' s  
mother, who lived a few blocks away , was called to the scene by 
neighbors. The mother proceeded to verbally attack her son for his 
intoxicated condition and this rebuke changed his n1ood from joviality 
to be lligerence. At this point he started to struggl e  with the 
arresting officers, who were attempting to subdue him and place him 
in a police car �  which contained two more patrolmen and had been 
called to take the suspect to jail. The suspect ' s  resistance to 
arrest increased until one of the officers was forced to use his riot 
baton on the defendent. This was the start of a vicious spiral : 
22cohen and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 27 . 
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Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the arrest was 
tense. Belligerence and resistence to arrest called for forceful 
action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs. 
Frye (the suspect.' s mother) and some of the bystanders , which in 
turn caused increased actions by the police. Anger at the scene 
escalated and, as in all such situations, bitter recriminations 
from both sides followea. 23 
The crowd became increasingly hostile as the police attempted 
to arrest both the suspect and his mother; however, they succeeded 
without incident and were in the process of leaving the area when a 
second "spa rk" occurred. One of the officers was spat upon by a 
member of the crowd. The guilty party appeared to be a young women 
who was standing amid the front ranks. The officer chased and 
caught her. She was a beauty operator and was wearing a light colored 
smock, which gave her the appearance of being pregnant. Rumors 
circulated throughout the crowd that the police were beating a preg­
nant women. Large numbers of the crowd interpreted her p light while 
being led away as one more humiliation of the Negro by white police 
and, " . . .  as it turned out, a final insult that they were not prepared 
to accept without retaliating. 11 24 
As the last police car left the area, it was stoned by the now 
irrate mob. Distorted versions of the arrest spread throughout the 
immediate area: 
Many of those on the sidelines embroidered on what they had 
seen--or thought they had seen . . • The particular nature of the 
Frye and Gaines (the beauty operator) encounters with white 
23The McCone commission, op. cit., p. 320. 
24cohen and Murphy, op. cit. ,  p. 56. 
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policemen was an open invitation to the circulation of near­
truth, half-truth , partial-truth and, finally, uncontrolled rumor 
that provoked the outrage soon to follow.25 
The gathered crowd did not disperse after the police had left 
the immediate area, but increased in size, initially, and then broke 
up into smaller groups that roamed the streets throughout the night. 
Window smashing and looting were the primary activities o f  the gangs ; 
however, the most publicized of their actions was the stoning of  cars 
driven by whites and the frequent beatings that they administered 
to the occupants o f  the stopped cars. Other than rescuing the assaulted 
motorists, the pol ice maintained a low-profile as the damage inflicted 
by the crowd remained relatively slight. By 1: 00 a. m. , the outbreak 
seemed to have subsided despite "the sporadic reports of unruly mobs, 
vandalism, and rock throwing. 1 126 
The Rioting Stage 
The next day saw a complete restoration o f  normal every-day 
activity. Busines$ went on as usual in the Watts area and high-level 
governmental offic ials described the previous night's activities as 
the work of juvenile gangs. There was little concern about the riot 
continuing, but to quell rumors and reassure community residents 
there was a community participation meeting scheduled for that 
afternoon. 
2 5rbid. 
26The McCone commission, op. cit. , p. 12. 
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The meeting, which had been an  attempt to  air grievances to 
both black and white leaders present, back-fired. It became evident 
that the people in Watts had no leaders representing them . Commonly 
defined black leaders in the Los Angeles area, at least from the 
white conununi ty 's perspective, were not acknowledged by the residents 
of Watts. The most enthusiastic response by the persons in attendance 
at the Athen's Park meeting was for the young militant who spoke and 
elaborated on the needs of the community and the failures of the 
efforts to solve the problems. The meeting broke up with nothing 
resolved. 
Rumors spread throughout the community all day, and, in 
addition, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared. The activit ies 
intensified the rioting mood and caused it to spread from one district 
to another within the curfew area. 27 
During the early evening another meeting was held between 
black leaders and higher echelon police officials. Instead of re­
ducing tensions the meeting produced ill-feelings on both sides. 28 
The previous night ' s  pattern was repeated. Roaming gangs of 
young men attacked cars driven by white persons. The occupants were 
usually beaten and their cars set afire. However, the actions of 
Thursday night were broadened in scope to include more looting, 
27  · 9 0  Cohen and Murphy , op. C J..  t .  , p • . 
28rbid . ,  p. 9 1 . 
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burning, and a few substantiated episodes of snipers, usually directed 
against firemen and the police. Rather than completely stopping the 
riot, the police strategy was aimed at containing the violence within 
a cordoned area. The police had not yet fired a shot at any of the 
participants despite having been fired on by a sniper during their 
efforts to rescue motorists. The first episode of police shooting 
occurred when a car ran through a roadblock and was stopped by gunfire. 
The number of  police at the scene was increased throughout the evening 
and there was even some discussion concerning the involvement of the 
National Guard, but nothing was finalized. 
The number of participants was now in the thousands and for 
the first time they ranged outside the perimeter area that had been 
established by the police forces: 
Five hundred police officers, deputy sheriffs, and highway 
patrolment used various techniques, including fender-to-fender 
sweeps by police cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By 
4: 00 a. rn .  Friday, the police department felt that the situation 
was at least for the moment under control. 29 
Their optimism, however, proved to be premature. The massive 
loo ting and burning that characterized Thursday night and Friday 
morning subsided during the dawn hours but was quickly resumed during 
daylight. As early as 8: 00 a. m. a large crowd had assembled near the 
site of the original arrest and was continuing the previous night's 
29The McCone Commission , op . cit. , pp. 14-15. 
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activities that had temporarily been halted. Rumors centering on 
supposed incidents of police brutality (later shown by the McCone 
commission to be entirely unfounded) inflamed the already tense 
situation. Recruitment of additional participants increased during 
the morning hours as pamphleteering by Black Mus lims intensified an 
already deteriorating situation. 
The mob attacks concentrated on white-owned businesses, but 
Negro business did not enjoy the special immunity that was to 
characterize some of the later riots in the decade. The rioting was 
quickly spreading to other neighborhoods and crowds now numbering 
many thousands continued the assault on business establishments: 
Block of businesses owned by "whitey" were afire- -drug stores, 
markets, liquor stores, laundries and pawnshops. Before the mobs 
burned the latter , these shops provided the rioters with their 
arsenal. More than 3,000 weapons were stolen from pawnshops and 
sporting goods stores during the rioting, less than a third of 
which were later recovered. Sniper fire soon became widespread, 
but still  no deaths were reportea. 30 
During the Friday daylight hours many arrests were made, but 
the rioting continued unabated. The mayor of Los Angeles, Sam Yorty, 
and the governor of California, Pat Brown, were both appraised of 
the situation but no decisive action regarding a possible National 
Guard call-up was made. At approximately noon the first requests 
were made for National Guard units ; however , the final decision by 
30cohen and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 123. 
the Lt. Governor was delayed pending a personal inspection of the 
area. Follmving his visit to the Los Angeles area he issued orders 
that committed over 1, 000 National Guardsmen to defend the riot's 
perimeter areas. The order was si gned in the afternoon, but the 
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assembled units were not actually deployed until approximately 10: 00  p.m . .  
Part of the blame for this unnecessary delay can be attributed to a 
lack of  communication between the control agencies, but it ·was mostly 
due to the loca l police forces ' feeling that they could handle the 
disturbance themselves. As Friday evening wore on it became increas-
ingly evident that they could not : 
Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts 
area, and burning and looting spread over wide areas of southeast 
Los Angeles several miles apart • . .  Despite the new tactics (sweeps 
on foot) and added personnel, the area was not under control at  
any time on Friday night, as major calls of  looting, burning and 
shooting were reported every two to three minutes. 31 
The Reaction by Control Agencies 
The bulk of the total number of National Guardsmen that were 
going to be used had been deployed to various areas by early Saturday 
morning. Their effect was felt almost immediately. In fact, most of 
the rioting and its level of intensity has been blamed on police 
laxness during the ear ly stages of the riot. Later investigations 
felt that the riot could have been contained and terminated earlier 
i f police would have exerted their authority in the begi nning. The 
3 1The McCone commission, op. cit. , pp. 18-1 9 . 
the writer's . )  
( Italics are 
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level of violence immediately escalated as the tro9ps met with 
resistance on the part of the rioters many of whom were now anned. 
By dawn on Saturday, ten persons had been killed and eight dying as 
a result of gunshot wounds. 
The daylight hours of Saturday were characterized by a main­
tenance of the high level of violence. Ten additional persons were 
ki lled during this period as control forces continued to sweep 
through the beseiged neighborhoods. Slowly the combined forces were 
able to contain the spread of rioting activity and the area not 
under control .  Rumors of impending attacks on the white neighborhoods 
adjoining Watts proved untrue but they caused a panic of weapon 
purchasing among whites and also convinced local authorities to make 
over tures to the Federa l government concerning the possible deployment 
of regular Army units if the attacks did happen. 
Snipers p layed an important part in the Watts riot and were 
general ly responsible for the maintenance of the level of violence 
even after most of the rioting activity had subsized. Their poor 
marksn1anship was the only thing that kept the number of deaths among 
the control agencies at .a re lative ly low number. 32 The role of 
sniping wou ld be untruthful ly exaggerated during later riots, but 
that it was an important feature in this riot there can be little 
doubt. 
32cohen and Murphy, op. cit .,  P ·  188. 
140 
The imposition of a curfew, which called for no unauthorized 
personnel on the streets after 8 : 00 p.m. , was another important factor 
in the attempt to regain control. This allowed the control agencies 
to make blanket arrests of many actual and potential rioters and also 
served as a deterrent to curiosity seekers, who had hampered police 
efforts to re-establish controi. 33 
Saturday night and early Sunday morning was relatively calm 
. compared to the halocaust which had occurred Friday night. The only 
major incident was the burning of two new blocks of stores in a pre­
viously untouched neighborhood . Snipers prevented firemen from 
battling the flames which spread until they had consumed the entire 
two block area. The peak of the sniping activity was reached during 
the early hours of Sunday, but it continued with decreasing frequency 
during the next week. 34 
The major fires were under control by Sunday ; however, there 
were some new ones and some rekindling of old ones. Slowly but 
surely the riot activity dwindled : 
Burning, looting, and sniping. Each continued to exercise 
its own special terror throughout Sunday night, and would con­
tinue to do so Monday, Monday night, Tuesday, and Tuesday night. 
But on each succeeding day, an ebbtide was noticeable . •. .  35 
33Ibid. , p. 194. 
34rbid. , pp. 195-196. 
35rbid. , p. 231. 
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The control agencies continl!ed their sweep,tng operations with 
increasing Sl!ccess. The level of rioting had been all but stopped 
by Tuesday evening when the curfew was lifted. Sporadic incidents 
occurred during the evening-, but the riot was officially listed as 
ended by Tuesday evening and the Natio4al Guard started to withdraw 
on Wednesday. After a week of unprecedented violence, control was 
finally restored. 
The Return to Normality 
The Watts disorder occurred in a period of American history 
during which the country was engaged in a "war on poverty. " The 
Viet Nam War had not yet reached the level of intensity that it 
would during the latter portion of the 1960 ' s. Watts was also the 
only major disturbance at this time and, consequently, received almost 
all of the attention during this time. Yet despite a ll of these 
favorable factors (i. e., availability of funding and virtual ly no 
competition among cities for Federal funds), little was accomplished 
in Watts to alleviate the basic problems. In fact, most of the post­
riot activity centered on attempts to affix responsibility for the 
disorder. Charges and counter-charges were made by both black and 
white communities. Various levels of government blamed one another 
for the bureaucratic blunders that had occurred during the course 
of the riot. Concrete efforts to ameliorate the conditions have 
been minimal: 
Objective measures of the socioeconomic situation in Watts 
confirmed that little .has changed since 1965: unemployement 
apparently has not been reduced. While conflicting reports 
exist, the weight of evidence indicates that joblessness has 
stayed at about the same level as before the 1965 riot. The 
Chamber of Commerce attempted a crash program to produce more 
jobs �ut, according to the County Human Relations Commission, 
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. came up with perhaps 200 to 300 jobs and job-training opportun­
ities when at least 5,000 were needed to make a serious impact 
upon the Watts problem. 36 
The welfare roles remain high in the Watts area and this is 
probably the best indication that things haven ' t  changed. In fact, 
there are indicators that conditions could get worse. An additional 
2,000 Negroes continue to arrive in Los Angeles each month and they 
do not have the skills that are required by the loca l industrial 
complex. 3 7  Hous ing patterns of Los Angeles show no great evidence 
of increased integration. The tax rate ($ 10 per $ 100) has reached 
a level regarded as one of "negative return" by economists and serves 
as a barrier to economic growth: 
The face of Watts has changed little since 1965. The rubble 
has been c leared and littered parking lots have replaced the 
burned out stores. Few businessmen have re-establ ished their 
enterprises F often because they are unable to secure insurance 
for their premises. The businesses which have been rebuilt 
resemble fortresses: mass ive, windowless, concrete structures. 38  
The mood of  people in Watts have also changed l ittle. The 
massive publicity given to the riot and programs des igned to change 
36Howard and McCord, op. cit. , pp. 65-66. 
37rbid. 
38rbid. (For a more personalized account of the post -riot 
conditions in watts , see Watts The Af-terrnath: By The People of Watts, 
ed. by Paul Bullock , (New York: The Grove Press, 1969 ) . ) 
conditions were not perceived as being able to accomplish much. 
There were no frustrated "rising expectations" in the post-riot 
period. But rather a pervasive fatalism and skepticism: 
Since the August rioting, there has been little building 
here, little buying . Lots where buildings were burned off  
them are still waiting vacant and littered with garbage, 
occupied only by a parked car or two, or kids fooling around 
after school, or winos sharing a pint in the early morning.3 9  
The hypothesized change from collectivized violence against 
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. the police to individualized, selective violence with certain police­
men as targets cannot be supported by any reliable evidence. Despite 
the vicious hate campaign waged by certain militant groups they have 
not gathered much support among the majority of community residents. 
In the aftermath of the riot and under pressure from v arious groups 
because of the many documented incidents of police brutality, the 
police attempted to change their image. However, this has also not 
resulted in much of  a perceptive change in their definition o f  their 
role privileges and responsibilities. "So far, the young people 
report little observable change in the day-to-day actions of the 
policeman on the local beat. 1140 There still exists, perhaps to a 
lesser degree, the dual system of justice that was prominent among 
the original causes. The local people strongly believe that Beverly 
39Thomas Pynchon, "A Journey Into the Mind of Watts ,"  in 
William L .  O ' Neil, American Society Since 1945, (Chicago : Quadrangle 
Books, 1969 } ,  p .  2 2 1. 
40Bullock , op. cit. , p. 1 3 3. (For a personalized version of 
the Watts riot see Rivm of Blood , Years of Darkness, by Robert 
Conot, (New York : Bantam Books , Inc. , 1967 ) . 
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Hills ' law enforcement is a completely different '_'ball game" from the 
experience of the Watts' residents . In the six year period following 
the riot there have been fatalities among policemen ; however, these . 
were not attributed to the work of any extremist group within the 
black community. 
CHAPTER VII 
NEWARK: JULY 12-17, 196 7 
The follo, ... ,ing narrative describes the urban insurrection that 
occurred in Newark, New Jersey during July of 1967. The disorder 
continued for a five-day period in which twenty-three persons were 
killed and property damage and losses were in excess of $ 10, 000, 000. 
- Newark is a relatively large city (population of over 400,000) and 
has in common with other urban areas the many problems which 
characterize the modern American urban complex. Demographic trends 
alone can explain many of the problems which are present . In the 
past twenty years the white middle class has been deserting the city 
in favor of the outlying suburbs. This trend has occurred at an 
increasing rate during the period 1960-67, during which the city 
lost 70,000 white residents and switched from 64 percent white to 
52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban. 1 This 
situation results in a great loss of tax revenues and an increasing 
need for more social welfare services which cannot be supported with 
the present tax base . It is only within this context that the 
following events can be completely understood. 
Discrepancy Between Real and Ideal Cultures 
According to a recent .Model Cities Application Report, Newark 
has the nation's highest percentage of bad housing, the most crime 
1The Kerner Commission, op. cit . , P · 57. 
per 100,000 people , the heaviest per capita tax burden, the highest 
rates of venereal disease, maternal mortality and new cases o f  
tuberculosis. Newark is listed as second in infant mortality, 
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second in birth rates, and seventh in the absolute number o f  drug 
addicts. Its unemployment rate, more than 15 percent in the Negro 
community, has been pers istently high enough to qualify the city as 
one of  the five cities singled out to receive special assistance 
under the Economic Development Act.2 Underemployment, as perceived 
by residents, was perhaps a more serious problem. Seventy percent 
of interviewed participants in the riot felt that they occupied a 
"dead-end" occupation which did not have the necess ary income nor 
responsibility they felt they should have. 3 The typical participant 
felt that it was not possible to obtain a desired job in the city 
and the prej udice and discrimination and not lack of  experience was 
the maj or factor responsible for this situation.4 
These conditions, however, have existed for many years and are 
not sufficient to explain the caus ation of the disorder. The 
phenomenon of rising expectations coupled with unresponsive institu­
tional procedures must be included in the analysis. The mayor of  
Newark in 196 7  was Hugh Addonizio. He had come to power in 1960 by 
2Tom Hayden, Rebellion In Newark: Official Vio lence and Ghetto 
Response, (New York: Random House, 1967 ) ,  pp. 5-6. 
3The Kerner commission, op. cit . ,  p. 175. 
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forging an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow the long-time Irish 
domination of city hall . Initially his efforts to provide better 
services for his black constituents had met with success. Negroes 
were brought into governmental positions and the police force was 
integrated. However, progress was slow. As the Negro population 
became more numerous within the city , their proportionate representa­
tion became less and less. While more money was being obtained from 
the federal government for various welfare funding projects, the 
civil rights and anti-poverty activists saw the proper solution in 
terms of  power, rather than money , for the black majority . In the 
spring of 1967 blacks occupied only token positions in the city admin-
istrative and political life and these positions were more dependent 
5 on the Mayor ' s  will than the power support of ghetto voters. 
Despite their decreasing numbers in the city proper , the white 
population retained political control of the city. On both the City 
Council and the powerful Board of Education seven of the nine members 
were white. Black constituents and their white representatives found 
. 1 . 6 themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucia issue. 
Relationships between the community and the police were especially 
strained. Charges of  excessive force and brutality were leveled 
5Hayden, op. cit. , pp. 6-7. 
6The Kerner Commission, op. cit . ,  p. 57. 
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against the almost exclusively white police force. The establishment 
of a police review board temporarily appeased the demands of the 
black community ; however, the review process was cumbersome and 
lengthy and was described as a failure by personnel on both sides. 
In addition, there was not much redress for other complaints. The 
city simply had no money for adequate supervision. 7 The expenditures 
of the city continued to exceed its tax revenues. P roperty taxes 
continued to increase as more and more land which had been cleared 
for urban renewal lay fallow year after year. Most persons refused 
to purchase or renovate property within the city limits. Tenement 
houses deteriorated as rent that was charged to tenents continued to 
rise. Commuters who continued to use many of the services to Newark , 
contributed nothing to its needs. With decreasing tax revenues came 
decreasing services. The area which suffered most acutely was the 
city ' s  educational system. Newark ' s  per capita outlay on s chools was 
considerably less than that of the surrounding communities in the 
suburbs. A large percentage of the students were on double sessions 
and the dropout rate was estimated to be as high as 33 percent. 8 
The vicious cycle of race prejudice and discrimination was present 
with all of its features. Lack of education and adequate training 
7rbid . ,  p. 5 8. (Also see Violence As Protest : A Study of 
Riots and Ghettos, Robert M. Fogelson, (New York : Doubleday and 
Company, Inc. , 1971 ) , pp. 57  and 70. 
8rbid. ,  p. 59. 
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prevented youths and young ndults from attaining suitatle employment. 
Low wage earning power forced them into poor housing and is one of 
the causative factors of family disorganization and the high rates 
of various forms of deviant behavior .  
Identification of Underlying, Causative Factors 
Under the above described conditions a major segment of the 
Negro population became increasingly militant: 
Largely excluded from positions of traditional political power , 
Negroes tutored by a handful of militant soc i �] activists who had 
moyed into the city in the early 1960 ' s  made use of the anti­
poverty program , in which poor people were guaranteed representa­
tion , as a political springboard. This led to friction between 
the United Community Corporation, the agency that administered 
the anti-poverty program, and the city administration. 9 
In the weeks immediately preceding the riot , tensions between 
the municipal government and the Negro leadership were increased. 
Two issues were at the center of the controversey. A vacancy on the 
Board of Education was filled , at least temporarily, by an appointee 
of the mayor rather than a more fully-qualified Negro nominee. Mayor 
Addonizio later withdrew the appointment when the incumbent decided 
to stay in office for another term. However, it was regarded in the 
black community as a glaring example of discriminatory political 
patronage in favor of whites. Another confrontation occurred over 
the proposed condemnation of 150 acres of land within the black 
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community . This land was to be used for the construction of a new 
medical school. However, the blacks interpreted this as another 
example of "Negro rernoval n rather than "urban renewal. " The original 
request had only been for 50 acres and had later been expanded . 
Black leadership and their followers defined this expanded request 
as an attempt to dilute the growing political power by moving out 
' d  10 Negro resi  ents. 
There were charges of mis-appropriation of funds by black 
leaders against the virtually all-white municipal government. They 
blamed the government and their social agencies for both fostering 
and neglecting social problems. They were also accused of using 
federal funds to bolster their patronage rolls rather than attempting 
to attack the major problems that were present in the city. 1 1  
Despite warnings to the contrary the mayor went ahead with 
his two decisions in the above described areas of dispute. Black 
militants used the two is sues as examples of the powerlessness of the 
black community. Warnings and threats of resulting violence were 
issued but were ignored by governmental officials. Even in the eyes 
of middle class Negroes, their situation and that of their lower 
class counterparts had not only not improved it had worsened. This 
llHayden, op. cit. , p. 7. 
angry outlook of the previously moderate element within the black 
community was spreading into the consciousness of the total black 
. 12 population. 
During the early part of July there were 24, 000 unemployed 
blacks in Newark. Moreover, their number was increased by as many 
as 2 0, 0 0 0  teenagers when school was let out . The summer recreation 
programs had no funds for operation; consequently, they had nothing 
to do and no place to go. 13 
The Precipitating Incident 
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In this tension-laden situation there occurred an event which 
is usually given credit as being the spark which ignited the disorder. 
During the evening of July 12, 1967, a cab driver named John Smith was 
arrested for "tail-gating" a police car. During the routine arrest 
procedure a fight broke out between Smith and the arresting officer. 
Police charged that Smith had used abusive language and had struck 
one of the officers. Smith, however, said that he had been unneces-
sarily assaulted by the police and proceeded to file a counter-
charge of brutality against them. Smith was then placed in the police 
car and taken to the 4th Precinct station. Witnesses across the 
stree t in the Hayes Housing Project reported that they saw the cab 
driver being dragged from the police car and into the front door of 
the station house. 
1 2rbid . , p . 8 .  
l3�h£ Kerner Commission, op. cit. , p. 60. 
The following is a description of what happened immediately 
after: 
Within a few minutes at least two civil rights leaders re­
ceived calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was 
being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the 
station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cab drivers 
all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios . 
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A crowd formed on the grounds of the housing project across 
the narrow street from the station. As more and more people 
arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered 
to Smith became more and more exaggerated. The descriptions 
were supported by other complaints of police malpractice that, 
over the years, had been submitted for investigation--but never 
been heard of again. 14 
As the crowd continued to grow in size local civil rights 
leaders were called in to quell the mounting tensions. In an effort 
to satis fy the crowd, the civil rights leaders were reluc"::.antly 
allowed an opportunity to see and interview Smith. A..."1. ambulance ·was 
cal led and Smith was taken to a hospital. The size o f  the crowd 
outside the station now numbered more than one hundred and anti-
poverty program officials (a more militant contingent o f  local leader­
ship) were asked to assist in efforts to calm the angry mood of the 
crowd. These persons attempted to channel the mood of  the crowd 
into a peaceful protest march but their efforts were largely 
unsuccessful. As the second of their speeches, which urged the crowd 
to disperse and go home, had come to an end, several Molotov cocktails 
smashed against the walls of the police station. The firebombs were 
14Hayden, OJ2.· cit_. , p. • 14. 
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thrown across the street from the darkness of the housing project. 
The assembled crowd moved back in anticipation of the police reaction. 
The police came out of the precinct house wearing riot control garb 
and were greeted by a barrage of rocks, bricks, and bottles . People 
started to retreat even further as the street became a battle zone. 15 
As the police charged they caused the crowd, which now exceeded 500 
persons, to retreat across the street to the relative safety of the 
housing project. However, the participants did not return home, 
instead they broke up into smaller groups and continued to roam the 
streets. 
The P�oting _ Stage 
In less than one hour the first looting began. The first 
stores chosen included liquor and furniture stores which were located 
close to the housing projects. Initially, the looting participants 
were exclusively young males, but they were soon joined by a cross­
section of the population of the housi?g project when it became 
evident that the police were no longer in control of the situation : 
The po lice now began patrolling on foot in small teams. It 
was clear that they were both outnumbered and uncertain of them­
selves in the streets. Police violence began . . • But in the first 
hours the police could not control the streets in spite of 
nearly a hundred arrests and numerous attacks on people . . .  More 
police tried in vain to regain control of 17th Avenue and Belmont 
(the site of the initial looting) but were trapped in a pattern 
of frustrating advance-and-retreat. 16 
15 rbid. 
16rbid . ,  pp. 1 8- 19. 
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This pattern continued throughout most of the night into the 
early hours of July 13th. The number of rioters gradually decreased 
and the police were finally able to regain control at approximately 
4:00 a. m . .  The riot did not spread beyond the immediate geographical 
area and it was described the next afternoon as an isolated incident 
by the mayor. 
City officials met with civil rights leaders during the day 
and various concessions were made to the spokesmen of  the black 
community . However, it became obvious that the participants in the 
previous night ' s  melee had no spokesman and that the riot ' s  continuance 
was not going to be averted by meetings . Regardless of what the Mayor 
did, regardless of what the civil rights leaders did, regardless of 
what the p lanners of the demonstration did, the riot was going to 
happen . The authorities had been indifferent to the community ' s  d�mand 
fer j ustice ; now the community was going to be indifferent to the 
authorities ' demand for order. 17 
Rumors of police brutality (concerning previous nights ' 
actions) spread throughout the black community . One story that was 
being circulated described how the cab driver, Smith, had died in the 
hospital. While most of these rumors had no bases in fact the people 
interpreted them as real and the tension continued to mount during the 
afternoon and on into the early evening. Inflammatory leaflets were 
17rbid., p. 26. 
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distributed throughout the neighborhood and they called for a "Police 
Brutality Protest Rally " in front of the 4th Precinct Station. The 
rally was peaceful until the crowd was addressed by the director of 
the Human Rights Commission in Newark. He promised a full investiga­
tion of the Smith incident and the promotion of a black policeman to 
the rank of police captain. Instead of dispersing the crowd the 
response to the speech was derisive. The audience interpreted the 
concessions as hollow and meaningless. The speaker was insulted by 
verbal taunts from the assembled group. Rocks were also thrown at 
him and the barrage of rocks and bottles that followed placed the 
. . d t f · 1 8  police stati on un e r  a temporary sta e o siege. 
The police came out of the station to disperse the crowd. The 
level of violence escalated as there was little restraint of language 
or action by either side. 19 A number of police officers and blacks 
were injured in the scuffle. The crowd was broken up, but the rioting 
followed a pattern that had been established during the p revious 
night. Looting began as soon as the mass of demonstrators was dis­
persed. Without enough men to adequately patrol the total area the 
police . were forced to cordon off a section of the area to protect; 
however, the roaming bands of looters were free to plunder and 
pillage the rest of the neighborhood : 
1 8The Kerner Commission, op. cit. , p. 64. 
19rbid. 
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• • •  Bands of youth roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery 
and liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drug stores and 
cleaners, appliance stores, and pawnshops were the principal 
targets. Periodically police officers would appear and fire their 
weapons over the heads of the looters and rioters. Laden with 
stolen goods, people began returning to the housing projects . • •  
As news of the disturbance had spread, however, people had flocked 
into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with 
impunity, many bowed to temptation and joined the looting. 20 
The stores were not looted on a rarndom basis. There was a 
selection process based upon the perception of previously exploitative 
practices of the different establishments. The gouging merchants bore 
the brunt of the looting. For the most part the '. rioting was relatively 
controlled and focused. The damage was aimed almost exclusively at 
white owned stores. While the participants realized that other insti­
tutions in the area had also been responsible for oppression (i. e. , 
banks) there was little contained in these buildings that could be 
carried off. To this extent the rioting was concrete rather than 
symbolic, even though the riot in general was more symbolic than a 
concrete attempt to overthrow the government . Also, there were no 
attacks upon "soul brother" stores. 21 
The contagion that occurred also brought middle class blacks 
into the neighborhood to participate in the looting. The disaffection 
of the black middle class was based upon different causes but was 
nonetheless as real. These participants were acting upon an assumption, 
20rbid. 
21Hayden, �- cit. , p. · 33. 
later confirmed by police attacks upon black owned businesses, that 
racism ul timately makes no distinction between "proper" and "lowly " 
22 blacks. 
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As the nwnber of participants grew and the riot expanded in 
scope, the frustrations of the police became greater. They were given 
orders that called for the use of great restraint in their actions to 
quell the rioting. These handicaps plus the relatively small size of 
. the i r force combined to make the task of containing the riot an 
impossible one. The police were firing blanks until midnight of  Thurs­
day when they were given orders to use all necessary measures to defend 
themselves from snipers (real or imaginery). No one had been killed 
up to this point despite the fact that hundreds had been arrested. 
However, now with no restraints police were free to use any means at 
their disposal to stop the disorder. 
The firing o f  stores also played an important part in the riot. 
Many times rioters would set fire to a particular building in an effort 
to distract police and firemen from a newly chosen target for looting . 
Police, firemen, and ambulance attendents were somewhat hampered in 
their ef forts by snipers. Although these reports were vastly over­
dramatized and in most instances were entirely unsubs tantiated, they 
were us ed as justification for the rather brutal over-reaction on the 
part of control agents which followed .  Reports reached the police 
22rbid. , pp. 31-32. 
15 8 
headquarters that sniping was endangering the lives of  their personnel. 
About the same time guns were reported to have been stolen from an 
area department store. The looting, setting of fires, and shooting 
now had expanded to a much larger area and it was at this point that 
the Governor of  New Jersey, Richard J. Hughes, decided to declare a 
state of emergency and send the state police and National Guard troops 
to suppress the disorder. 2 3  
The Reaction by Control Agencies 
The initial impact of the rein forcement of  3000 National Guards­
men and 500 State Policemen had unintended results. The intensity of 
the disorder actually increased because of rumors of  police brutality 
. ' 
mb f l . t 24 against innocent me ers o t 1e communi y. The disorder continued 
largely unabated during the early hours of Friday and on into the day­
time hours. The control agencies began to occupy more territory 
and as they did the level of rioting and looting began to subside. 
Reports of  looting and fire alarms became less and less f requent. 
However, as the violence of the rioters decreased in intensity the 
violence displayed by control agency personnel actually increased. 
The reasons for the "over-reaction" on the part of the police and 
related agencies are many and varied. One of the major factors of the 
23The Kerner commission, op. cit. , P ·  64. 
2 4rbid. , pp . 640-64 1. 
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trigger-happiness was because of fear , confusion , and exhaustion. 25 
Many of the troops were ass igned to around-the-clock duty under 
conditions of severe tension. They were usually unfamiliar with the 
area and in many instances could not tell the direction o f  the pur­
ported sniper fire. Because o f  a poor network of  communication 
Guardsmen and police were o ften shooting at themselves and mistaking 
one another for the reported sniper firings . Several problems 
contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers : poor communica­
tions , the fact that one shot might be reported many times because of  
echos , the fact that the National Guard lacked riot training and 
finally simply because of the fact that they (the National Guardsmen) 
. . . h 26 were young, scared, and had had little previous contact wit Negroes. 
Another factor given for the high level of violence exhibited 
revolves around the charge that there was "general and deliberate 
violence employed against the whole comrnunity. 112 7 People were more 
or less indiscriminately stopped, beaten, and in some ins tances shot. 28 
The contagion and milling that had characterized the crowd participants 
earlier in the disorder now were also in operation among the control 
25Hayden, op. cit. , pp . 46-47. 
26The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp. 66-67. (Also, see 
" Social Control of Escalated Riots," by Morris Janowitz in Racial 
Violence in the United States, Allen D. Grimshaw, (ed. ) ,  (Chicago : 
Aldine Publishing Company , 1969 ) , p. 506 . 
27Hayden, op. cit. , pp. 47-48. 
28The . Kerner Commission, op. cit., pp. 66-68. 
agency forces. They fired freely and wildly up streets and into 
buildings at real or imaginery looters or snipers. r t  was during 
this phase of the insurrection that most of the innocent victims 
were killed during the five-day disorder , six were women and two 
were children. Moreover , most of the males that were killed were 
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not involved in the riots , but were simply victims of an inadequately 
prepared contingents of police and National Guardsmen. 
By Friday evening , most of the burning and looting had ceased; 
however, reports of snipers were still coming into headquarters from 
various police or National Guard personnel in the area. The reports 
of sniper fire were " • . . according to New Jersey National Guard reports , 
deliberately or otherwise inaccurate. 11 29 It is entirely possible that 
the riot would have run its course by Friday if the troops had not 
entered the community. The snipers were used by officials to commit 
retaliatory violence against the whole Negro community. 30 While violence 
on the part of the rioters and looters was subsiding, violence on the 
part of control agency personnel was just beginning. 
Probably the most blatant act of retaliation against the 
community occurred in the early hours of Saturday. Witnesses testi­
fying before the Kerner Commission reported that troops carried on a 
30 · �l Hayden, op. cit. , p. - • 
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wholesale attack against Negro-owned businesses in the area. The 
stores marked with "Soul Brother" signs remained more or less untouched 
during the riot. However, the troops carried out a systematic  pattern 
of destruction against them for reasons unknown. The stores were 
either shot into or had their windows broken with the butts of rifles 
or both. One of the spokesmen for the black community in Newark 
repoited that '' • • . the non-rioting Negroes are more afraid of the police 
than the rioters because police were retaliating instead of 
protecting. 1131 
While the following declaration from the American Civil Liberties 
Union is probably an overstatement of the case, it does raise inter­
esting and pointed arguments regarding the role of policing forces in 
the riot: 
• . •  �he police (and other control agencies ) were the instrument 
of a conspiracy to engage in a pattern of systematic violence, 
terror , abuse, intimidation, and humiliation to keep Negroes 
second-cla.ss citizens. The police seized on the initial disorders 
as an opportunity and pretext to perpetrate the most horrendous 
and widespread killing, violence, torture, and intimidation, not 
in response to any crime or civilian disorder, but as a violent 
demonstration of the powerlessness of the plaintiffs and their 
class 
. Thus it seems to many that the military, especially the Newark 
police, not only triggered the riot by beating a cab driver but 
then created a climate of opinion that supported the use of all 
necessary force to suppress the riot. The force used by police 
was not in response to snipers, looting, and burning , but in 
retaliation against the successful uprising of Wednesday and 
Thursday nights . 32 
31rbid. , pp. 49-50. 
32 b ' d 53 .!...2:__• I p • • 
16 2 
Throughout Friday, Saturday, and Sunday nights sporadic 
episodes of looting and burning continued but these incidents were 
greatly overshadowed by the continuing actions of police against real 
or imaginery rioters, snipers, or looters. It was during this period 
of time that most of the deaths in the disorder occurred. It was 
during this period that a white police detective was killed by sniper 
fire and a white fireman was the victim of a gunshot, but the source 
of which was not determined by subsequent investigations. The kill­
ings of these two persons probably served as a rallying point for 
the further brutality in flicted upon the community by the control 
agents. The purpose of this dissertation is not to place blame or 
praise upon the participants of either side, but rather to show that 
the forces of collective behavior (i. e. ,  contagion , rumors, and 
irrational, reactive behavior ) were operating among the personnel in 
both camps. 
By Sunday the disorder was on the verge of entering a new 
stage of intensity . 33 There was a generalized feeling among the 
community that the actions of the police and troops during the pre­
vious two nights should not go unanswered. The conditions which 
originally precipitated the riot, largely complaints against police 
brutality among others, now were being repeated on a much more 
pervasive level. Moreover, these acts were in full accordance with 
33rbid. , p. 60. 
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and had the approval of the higher echelon governmental officials. 
There is evidence that a counter-attack from the community would have 
taken place. The general atmosphere that existed seems to be swnmed 
up in the following fatalistic statement-- "Why should we quit when 
they got twenty-five of us and only two of them are dead? 1 134 
Fortunately, this counter-attack never occurred. After two 
nights of relative calm , except for the aforementioned acts of the 
control agents, the state police and National Guard units were with­
drawn on the afternoon of Monday, July 17. The suppression of  the 
riot had been complete. 
Return to Normality 
The normal pace of life that had existed during the pre-riot 
era was quickly restored . Mopping-up operations were begun immedi­
ately after the withdrawal of the troops and the restoration of order. 
Bus inesses, partially damaged during the disorder, were re-opened ; 
others which had suffered fire damage and extensive looting were 
35 never re-opened. Many of the razed tenement houses were completely 
torn down ; others were repaired or re-built. 
Despite the many lofty promises and recommendations of various 
investigating committees , little has been done in Newark since the 
disorder. The most common expression w�ong the black community is 
. h h h d 1 1 36 that " . . .  nothing muc as c ange . In fact, the Kerner Commission 
35The Kerner Commission , op . cit. , P ·  157. 
36rbid. , p. 151. 
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has specifically cited Newark as an example of a city which has done 
the least in proposi ng steps to ameloriate the causes of the disorders. 
Officials continued to pursue the medical center project , which would 
result in the displacement of thousands of Negro families. A list of 
recommendations was given to the Newark government officials; however , 
little has been done to implement them. The lack of funds , which no 
doubt is an important reason , is invariably given as the reason for 
the inaction. The federal government has also cut-back in its support 
to urban areas because of the growing costs of the Viet Nam war and 
also {ts efforts to fight inflation. 
Rather than serving as a starting point for a massive reintegration 
of society , the race riots have apparently resulted in a further 
polarization of the two races. Both black and white extremist groups 
are gaining support within their respective communities. 37 Despite 
the establishment of the Committee of Concern , an inter-racial group 
of prominent citizens , and the appointment of a black policeman to 
commanding officer of the 4th Precinct (the original site of the riot ) ,  
blacks have grown increasingly distrustful of whites. The same con-
dition exists within the white community. Under pressures from whit� 
extremist organizations the Newark City Council authorized the purchase 
of $2QO , OOO worth of armored cars , riot guns, helmets and other riot 
1 . t 38 contra equipmen . Efforts in Newark seem to be focused upon methods 
37rbid. , p. 153. 
38rbid. , p. 191. 
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of preventing and controlling future riots rather than upon attacking 
conditions which caused the riots in the first place. Evidence 
regarding a changing tactic of violence against selected members of 
the white establishment cannot be supported. Although grave pre­
dictions about the possibilities of future guerrilla warfare have 
been made by many authorities it has not ha.ppened. On a nationwide 
scale there does appear to be an increase in the murders of police 
officers in the line of duty, but there is no evidence that this 
campaign is occurring in Newark. 
CHAPTER VII I 
DETROIT : JULY 22-AUGUST 1, 1967 
The urban disorder that occurred in the city of Detroit 
differed slightly from others that occurred during the same era. 
First, it was the largest in scope. It lasted longer than any of the 
others ; it resulted in more deaths than any ot.½er riot; it resulted 
in more injured persons and more arrests; and finally the property 
damage resulting from the burning and looting was also greater than 
that which occurred in any other city. Forty-three deaths can be 
attributed to the disorder. The total property damage exceeded 50 
million dollars. The total number of inj ured persons on both sides 
was approximately 1, 000 and lnore than 7,200 persons were arrested 
during the near week-long insurrection. 
The Detroit race riot was also different from the perspective 
of inter-racial participation. 1 The other disorders dur ing this 
period were almost without exception a black phenomenon. While the 
number and percentages cf white looters was still relatively small, 
it is significant enough to make the Detroit race riot unique in 
this respect. 
1Jerome R. Corsi, "Detroit 1967: Racial Violence or Class 
Warfare, " in R; ots in the Citi es: An Analytical Symposium on the 
causes and Ef fects, Richard A. Chikota and Michael C. Moran (eds. ) ,  
(Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses , 1968) ,  PP · 
168- 172. 
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Also present in Detroit, but absent in most other riot cities 
was the existence of a "riot tradition. 1 1 2 In 194 3 Det roit experienced 
an inter-racial riot in which 34 persons were killed and property 
damage was extensive even though this was not a commodi ty-type riot . 
Blacks had experienced absolute economic gains as a result o f  the 
war-time shortage of labor. The white population felt resentment 
because of  these gains and attempted to thwart further advances. 
Police , with their strong anti-Negro sentiment, were especially 
responsible for the series of events that eventually resulted in the 
two-day riot. 3 Obviously, nothing was settled by the riot . The 
conditions and policies which caused the riot remained . The police 
brutality that infuriated the black community continued. The atmos­
phere that was both reflective of and created by the earlier riot 
kept alive the fires of racial hatred in Detroit and culminated in 
the urban disorder of  1967. 
Discrepancy Between Real and Ideal Cultures 
The site of  the disorder, the 12th Street Area, was in many 
ways typical of  other black communities in Detroit and probably any 
large urban center . Urban renewal projects (called by the residents 
of the black community, "Negro removal 1 1 ) has displaced many thousands 
2Fogelson, op . cit. , PP · 5-8. 
3s ee for example, "The Gestapo in Detroit," by Thurgood Marshall 
and "Race Riot, " by Alfred Mcclung Lee and Norman Daymond Humphrey in 
Racial violence in the United States , A llan Grimshaw, (Chicago : Aldine 
Pub lishing Company, 1969). 
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of black persons and had changed the 12th Street Area from a relatively 
neat, integrated neighborhood into a virtually all-black residential 
ghetto. The 12th Street Area consists mainly of over-crowded apartment 
houses. The density was more than 21, 000 persons per square mile and 
only 1 8  percent of the residents were homeowners. Twenty-five percent 
of the housing units were considered so substandard that they had been 
condemned for clearance; moreover, an additional 19 percent were listed 
as having major deficiencies. 4 
In a 1966 survey conducted under the auspices of the Psychology 
Department of the University of Michigan, researchers found it to be 
an area of high stress and tension. Residents indicated great dis-
satisfaction with their environment : 
Of those interviewed, 93 percent said they wanted to move out 
of the neighborhood; 73 percent felt that the streets were not 
safe ; 91  percent believed that a person was likely to be robbed 
or beaten at night; 58 percent knew of a fight within the last 
12 months in which a weapon had been employed; 32 percent stated 
that they themselves owned a weapon ; and 57 percent were worried 
about fires . 
A significant proportion believed municipal services to be 
inferior: 36 percent were dissatisfied with the schools ; 4 3  
percent with the city ' s  contribution to the neighborhood ; 77 
percent with the recreational facilities; and 7 8 percent believed 
police did not respond promptly when they were summoned for 
help. 5 
The partially responsible demographic trends were also in 
evidence in Detroit. Middle class whites within the central city 
were being replaced by under-skil led or unskilled blacks. The black 
4The Kerner commission, op . cit. , pp. 86-87. 
5rbid . ,  p. 88. 
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population of Detroit increased from 30 percent to over 4 0  percent 
between the years 1960-67 . 6 Over 50 percent of Detroit's schools 
were classified as overcrowded and the black enrollment in the school 
system was 57 percent. In the inner city schools, more than ha lf of 
the pupils who entered high school failed to graduate. The dropouts 
were overwhelmingly black chi ldren. The per capita educational 
eA-penditures for inner city pupils was $500 less than for those 
located in the suburban fringe. 7 
Unequal employment opportunities were very much present in the 
city. High school diplomas from the inner city schools were regarded 
by company personnel directors as less valuable than those from the 
suburban areas. Unions , ihich have long been an avenue of upward 
socia l mobility for minority groups, were largely closed to blacks. 
In July of 1967 the unemployment rate reached a five-year peak. 
Between 12 and 15 percent of the Negro men in the 12th Street Area 
were unemp loyed and the percentage was over 30 for those under 25 
8 years of age. 
Opportunities open to blacks seemed even more limi ted as their 
educationa l level became higher. The median income of white h igh 
school graduates was approximately $ 1, 6 0 0  higher than their black 
counterparts. The discrepancy for college graduates was even greater 
6rbid . ,  pp. 89-90 . 
7rbid. , p .  90 . 
8rbid . 
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9 ($2,600) . The rising expectations of the educated black population 
was stifled by an unresponsive white institutional structure. 
The black population was also under-represented in the local 
government. Although many blacks had been appointed under the recent 
administration, only one of the nine city councilmen was a Negr? · 
They were also greatly under-represented on the locally important 
city school board (only two of seven were black) • lO 
Detroit was also suffering from a decreasing tax base which 
meant that services would have to be maintained at the present level 
of funding. Complaints about sporadic garbage collections and poor 
lighting in the 12th Street Area went unheard . Federal monies, 
usually under the Model Cities Program, often did not have an immediate 
effect on the grass roots level where the need for increased services 
was greatest. 11 
An essential feature of the ideal-real culture discrepancy is 
the role of the police and its effect on the residents of the black 
community . The Detroit Police Department in many ways symbolized the 
practices of the white comraunity in its relationship to the blacks : 
. . • Although local police forces generally regard themselves 
as public servants with the responsibility of maintaining law 
and order, they tend to minimize this attitude when they are 
lO ibid . , p. 91 . 
11�. ,  pp. 9 1-92 . 
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patrolling areas that are heavily populated with Negro citizens. 
Th�r�, they tend to view each person on the street as a potential 
criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is recipro­
cated. Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities in our 
large cities and the police departments, is the major problem in 
law enforcement in this decade. It has been a major cause of all 
recent race riots . 12  
There had existed a long history of hostility between blacks 
and the city ' s  policemen . Findings of the Commission designated to 
investigate the causes of the 1943 riot indicated that there existed 
a state of open warfare between Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police 
Department. 13 The seriousness of this situation has not abated in the 
two decades since then. A Citizen's Complaint Committee was established 
to deal with this problem; however, it was largely ineffectual. 
These conditions have been termed the "blocked-opportunity" 
explanation of riot behavior . 14 The continued exclusion of Negroes 
from full participation in American social and economic life is the 
basic cause of riots. This exclusion is a result of arbitrary racial 
barriers rather than lack of ability, motivation or aspirations on the 
part of blacks. Bl acks ·who rioted did so because their conception of 
their lives and their potential had changed without any commensurate 
improvement in thei r chances for a better life. A major change 
occurred when b lacks switched from self-deprecation and self-incrimination 
1 2 rbid. , p. 85. 
1 3rbid . 
14Nathan s. Caplan and Jeffery M. Paige , 1 1A Study of Ghetto 
Rioters,"  in scientific American , Vo l .  219, August ,  1968 , pp . 15-21. 
to the identification of causes within the white power structure. 
This change resulted, at least in part, in the Detroit race riot. 
Identification of Underlving, Causative Factors 
In an attitudinal survey conduc ted by the Detroi t  chapter of 
the Urban League immediately after the disturbance the following 
conditions were considered by the black community as having a great 
deal to do with causing the riot : 
1 7 2  
The following is a list of specific causes, and the percent­
ages of Negroes interviewed who felt that these factors contributed 
greatly to causation : police brutality, 57 percent; overcrowded 
living conditions, 55 percent ; poor housing, 54 percent ; lack of 
jobs , 45 percent; poverty, 44 percent ; dirty neighborhoods, 44 
percent ; anger with local business people, 43 percent ; . . • broken 
political promises, 39 percent .. • .  These conditions indicate both 
mental anger and a real situation 0£ social and economic 
deprivation . 1 5 
This survey was not limited to riot participants nor was it 
confined to persons who were arrested. This was a general community 
survey in which most of the respondents indicated that they had not 
participated in the riot. This document does show, _however, the 
pervasive nature of this commonly held belief system and the degree 
of consensus that was present in the black community. 
15The Detroit Urban League, A Survey of Attitudes of Detroit 
Negroes After the Riot of 196(, (Detroit : Detroit Urban League, 
1967). 
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Knowledge of conditions and political awareness are even 
better illustrated by those who did take an active role in the rioting. 
The "riffraff theory " si· mply 1.· s not 1 · abl t th · · app 1.c e o is social phenomena. 
In general, the rioter was better educated than his non-rioting counter-
part. The rioter was more active in community organizations and affairs 
than the typical non-rioter. In addition, the rioters were not the 
"poorest of the poor. " They were not the newly arrived migrants from 
the South, but rather life-long residents of Detroit. There is nothing 
in the evidence that was gathered that would tend to label him as a 
personal failure or an irresponsible person. On the contrary, many of 
the indices of adjustment, such as education and occupational aspira-
. h h . th · 16  tions, s ow that t e rioter surpasses e non-rioter. 
The efforts to bring about a revitalization of black culture 
and black awareness were highly successful in Detroit. The combined 
efforts of black organizations and newspapers in the city brought 
forth new hope and programs to deal with the present situation. Self­
reported rioters were more likely to belong to Negro Rights groups 
and participate in periodic discussions regarding strategies . Rioters 
expressed great anger with unresponsive politicians and police 
practices. seventy-five percent of the interviewed rioters felt that 
16caplan and Paige, op. cit. , pp. 19-2 0. 
unkept political promises contributed greatly to the riot and 90 
percent felt that police brutality contributed directly to causing 
the riot. 17 
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The mayor of Detroit had originally come to power because of 
his popularity with the Negro voters . However, his popularity quickly 
waned as it became evident that his efforts to fulfill campaign 
promises were largely futile. 18 The police department was symbolically 
chosen or selected as an example of the mayor ' s  inability to cope with 
his administration's laggard efforts to ameliorate the problems of the 
black community. The mayor ' s  difficulties with the Detroit Police 
Department were a constant source of embarrassment and finally culmin-
ated in a massive "Blue Flu" attack in which most policemen refused to 
report for duty. This episode, at least to the residents of the Black 
community, demonstrated the autonomy of the police force with the 
municipal government. 
Police brutality was a recurrent theme in the 1 2th Street Area. 
The crime rate was nearly twice that of  the city as a whole and the 
police were often less than diplomatic in their efforts to control 
crime in the area. In the month preceeding the outbreak of the riot, 
17The Kerner commission, op. cit. , pp. 176-178. 
18Richard Komisaruk and Carol E .  Pearson , "Children of the 
Detroit Riots : A Study of  Their Participation and Their Mental 
Health, " in chikota and Moran , op . cit . , pp . 113-ll4. 
tensions reaching a breaking point with the murder of a recently 
returned black Viet Nam war veteran by a gang of white youths . The 
police arrested only one member of the gang and the city ' s  white­
owned newspapers played down the incident in an attempt to ease 
tensions. The intent backfired and black leaders inte�preted it as 
a flagrant example of a double standard of reporting : playing up 
crimes by Negroes and playing down crimes cormnitted by whites. 19 
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· Largely unresolved, this issue was immediately responsible for the 
strained atmosphere which was present during the evening of July 22, 
1967. 
The Precipitating Incident 
On that particular data the Detroit Police Department raided 
five "blind pigs. " These blind pigs were private social c lubs which 
had originated during the Prohibition era and had survived as after­
hour drinking and gambling places. These establishments were often 
the targets for the vice squad and the first four raids were carried 
out without incident. In the course of the fifth raid of the evening 
the police were surprised to find over eighty patrons when they had 
expected only a few dozen. The place was the scene of a party for 
returning Viet Nam veterans and many of the customers voiced resent-
. . . 20 ment at the police intrus ion. 
19The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp . 85-86. 
ZOibid. , pp . 84-85. 
It took the police an unexpectedly long time to arrest all 
of the patrons and during the hour-long procedure a crowd of over 
two-hundred persons gathered in the s treets outside. During the 
course of the arrest procedure there occurred pushing and shoving 
incidents on both sides, but no one incident can be s aid to have 
precipitated the riot. The police were the objects of verbal abuse 
1 76 
from the crowq, but again there was no single episode which can be 
said to have been the spark for the rest of the riot. Tension between 
the crowd and the arresting officers mounted and finally culrniLated 
in an empty bottle being thrown through a rear window of one of the 
police cars. About the same time the first window of a sto re was 
smashed. Both incidents occurred without any form of retaliation 
from the assembled policemen. Rumors were circulated that police 
had used excessive force during the raid and the number of persons 
in the crowd increasea. 21 More vandalism occurred when it became 
evident to the crowd that the police could not a dequately enforce 
their duties. Reinforc�ments were ordered ; however, after their 
arrival the total number was still only forty-three. At the same 
time the crowd now nu.rnbered in the thousands. Looting and vandalis� 
became more widespread and at approximately 8: 00 a . m . ,  a 17-man 
21Ibi�. ,  p. 86. 
police commando unit was dispatched to disperse the crowd. rt was 
unsuccessful in the face of a crowd now estimated to be more than 
3, 000 persons. 22 
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By m id-morning the police detail in the 12th Street Area had 
grown to over 500, but rather than inter fere with the looting and the 
burning they concentrated on establishing a cordon to contain the 
growing riot : 
According to witnesses, police at some roadblocks made little 
effort to stop people from going in and out of the area. Banter­
ing took place between police officers and the populace , some 
still in their pajamas. To some observers, there seemed at this 
point to be an atmosphere of apathy. On. the one hand, 
police failed to interfere with the looting. On the other, a 
nUi.7lber o f  older, more stable residents, who had seen the street 
deteriorate from a prospeious commercial thoroughfare to one 
ridden by vice, remained aloof. 23 
The Rioting Stage 
The hesitancy of  the police to conu.�it themselves to decisive 
action was undoubtedly the initial impetus that transformed a small 
disturbance into a full-blown disorder . The inaction of the police 
was based upon the assumption that the 12th Street incident was a 
diversion and many officers were sent to other areas of the city, 
especially those that were the site of  the 1943 riot. 24 
22Ibid. ,  p. 87. 
23rbid. 
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The carefree nihilistic atmosphere prevailed dur ing the rest 
of the morning as the riot grew both in area and the number of parti-
cipants: 
Numerous eyewitnesses interviewed by Commission investigators 
tell of the carefree mood with which people ran in and out of 
stores, loo ting and laughing, and joking with the police officers. 
Stores with "Soul Brothers" signs appeared no more immune than 
others ( it was later shown that they did enjoy a certain amount 
of immunity) . Looters paid no attention to residents who shouted 
at them and called their actions senseless. An epidemic of 
excitement had swept over the persons on the street. 25 
Shortly before noon Congressman John Conyers attempted to 
address the crowd in an effort to disperse them ; however, he was 
unsuccessful. Poor "change-of-command" communication among the 
assembled policemen caused them to retain their inactive status as 
the riot became larger and more destructive : 
By that time a rumor was threading through the crowd that a 
man had been bayoneted by the police. Influenced by such stories, 
the crowd became belligerent. Numerous of ficers reported injuries 
from rocks, bottles, and other objects thrown at them . Smoke 
billowed upward from four fires, the first since the one at the 
shoe store early in the morning . When firemen answered the alarms, 
they became the targets for rocks and bottles. 26 
Community leaders met with Mayor Cavanagh not to present a list 
of demands but rather simply to discuss the total extent of the rioting. 
Looting and burning were spreading out from the 12th Street Area when 
the Mayor requested that 300 state policemen be sent to the area. 
They were deployed in the immediate area but were unable to stem the 
25rbid. , p. 88. 
26�- , p .  92. 
tide of disorder. Fires also became an increasing hazard as winds 
up to 25 miles per hour whipped the flames to adjacent buildings. 
This was coupled with the fact that firemen were being pelted by 
rocks and bottles when they attempted to fight the fires. As the 
afternoon wore on the firemen were forced with increasing frequency 
to abandon their efforts to contain the burning because they were 
not being adequately protected by the limited number of police in 
the area. The fire chief of Detroit estimated that two-thirds of  the 
buildings were destroyed by spreading fires rather than fires set 
at the scene. Of the 68 3 structures which were damaged, approximately 
one-third were residential, and in few, if any, of these was the fire 
set originally. 27 
As it became evident that the present contingent of police was 
not large enough to contain the spreading riot, Mayor Cavanagh request­
ed that National Guard troops be assigned to Detroit. The request 
was made late in the afternoon of Sunday and the first troops were on 
28 the streets by 7: 00 p. m . .  
During the evening the first deaths were reported. Most of 
the slain persons were looters who had not heeded warnings. Despite 
the rather sizable numbers o f  both state police and National Guard 
troops (8 00 and 1, 200 respectively, with an additional 8, 0 0 0  Guardsmen 
27rbid. , p .  9 2. 
28rbid . ,  p. 93 . 
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on the way )  the riot showed no signs of abating. Early Monday morning 
the Mayor first contacted the federal government officials regarding 
the possibility of dispatching federal troops to the area. The final 
decision was delayed, but shortly before noon President Johnson 
authorized the sending of paratroopers to a nearby Air Force b ase. 
The daylight hours of Monday brought a temporary waning to the riot 
and the decision to employ federal troops was delayed. As darkness 
settled Monday, the number of incidents of deaths , looting , and fires 
increased. Several of the incidents involved injuries to police 
officers, National Guardsmen, and civilians by "gunshots of undeter­
mined origin. " By midnight the situation had deteriorated sufficiently 
enough and President Johnson signed a proclamation federalizing the 
29 Michigan N ational Guard and authorizing the use of the p aratroopers. 
The Reaction by Control Agencies 
The reaction of  the control, as was also demonstrated in the 
other urban disorders cited in the dissertation, was less than 
effective. In fact, their performance borders upon blatant incom­
petence . Many factors combined to produce the appalling situ ation 
that was p resent in the city: 
At this time there were nearly 5, 000 Guardmen in the city , 
but fatigue, lack of training , and the haste with which they 
had had to be dep loyed reduced their effectiveness. Some of 
29rbid. , pp. 95-96. 
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the Guardsmen traveled 200 miles and then were on duty for 30 
hours straight. Some had never received riot training and were 
given on-the-spot instructions on mob control--only to discover 
that there were no mobs, and that the situation they faced on 
the darkened streets was one for which they were unprepared . . • •  
Lessons learned by the California National Guard two years 
earlier in Watts regarding the danger of overreaction and the 
necessity of great restraint in using weapons had not, apparently, 
been passed on to the Michigan National Guard. The younger 
troopers could not be expected to know what a danger they were 
creating by the lack of fire discipline, not only to the 
civilian population but to themselves. 30 
There were numerous episodes of troops accidently firing upon 
· one another. There were also nany instances where accidental dis­
charges of weapons would result in return fire from other Guardsmen 
in the area. Many of the supposed sniping reports turned out to be 
false ; however, many times the troops would fire upon suspected 
positions without waiting f9r verification. At best this lack of 
restraint would unnecessarily damage property and at its worst it 
resulted in the accidental slaying of innocent bystanders. As the 
number of instances of  shootings increased it was decided that the 
National Guard would be replaced by regular Army in the areas where 
the greatest amount of heavy firing was occurring .  The shortcomings 
of the Guardsmen were most apparent to the commanders of the regular 
Army units: 
According to Lt. Gen . Throckmorton and Colonel Bolling, the 
city, at this time, was saturated with fear. The National Guards­
men were afraid, the residents were afraid, and the police were 
30rbid. , p. 97. 
afraid. Numerous persons, the majority of them Negroes were 
being
_
injured by gunshots of undetermined origin. The general 
and his staff felt that the major task of the troops was to 
reduce fear and restore the air of normalcy. 31  
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In order to accomplish this task, regular Army personnel were 
asked to establish rapport with the local residents. They helped 
clean the streets, locate missing persons and general ly assisted the 
neighborhood to re-establish order. Within hours after arriving, 
the area was enjoying a calmness unknown since the start of the riot. 
The deliberateness and professionalism that were shown by the Army 
units were a great contrast to the chaos that was exhibited by the 
National Guard units. The National Guardsmen seemed to operate at 
cross-purposes to those of the Army. The commanding general of the 
paratroopers had requested the city to relight the streets, but at 
the same time National Guardsmen continued to shoot-out street lights 
because of fear of sniping. When the weapons of all military personnel 
were ordered unloaded, it failed to reach all National Guard personnel 
or else they chose to ignore it. At a time when Army troopers ,;·1ere 
attempting to establish communication with residents and break down 
the street barricades, the National Guardsmen were ordering people off 
the streets and away from the windows. 32 
The mass confusion and chaos that resulted from the over-reaction 
of the National Guard contingents had damaging results for almost 
3 1rbid . , p. 99. 
32rbid. ,  p. 100. 
183 
everyone involved in the riot: 
With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns 
being fired accidentally or on the vaguest pretext all over the 
city, it became more and more impossible to tell  who was shooting 
at whom. Some firemen began carrying guns . One accidentally 
shot and wounded a fellow fireman. Another injured himself. 33 
Most of the 43 deaths that marked the riot occurred during this 
period of  anomie and great fear. Very few of  the deaths were the 
result of looting or sniping, but instead were innocent persons who 
were accidently slain by firing bullets or who were mistaken for riot 
participants. The level of violence by control agents remained 
extremely high despite the very abrupt drop in the number o f  looting 
and fire-bombing incidents. By Tuesday evening the riot violence 
appeared to have been almost completely one-sided. 34 Whereas, the 
Army units were occupied with the restoration of order, the police 
and National Guard personnel continued to answer the increased number 
o f  sniping reports, the vast majority of which were actually precipi­
tated by the police and Guardsmen themselves. During the daylight 
and evening hours o f  Wednesday there were over 700 reports of  sniping: 
As they pro liferated, the pressure on law enforcement o fficers 
to uncover the snipers became intense. Homes were broken into . 
Searches were made on the flimsiest of tips . A Detroit newspaper 
aptly proclaimed: "Everyone's Suspect in No Man's Land. 1 1 35 
33rbid. , p. 101 . 
34rbid . , p. 106. 
35rbid. 
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The hysteria wh ich accompanied the search for snipers was 
almost entirely futile. The Kerner Commission demonstrated that the 
vast majority of reported snipings were l.ies or honest mista1<.es. 
Only in a very few instances were any arrests made. Of the 27 persons 
arrested for sniping only two were even brought to trial. •r;1.e rest 
were dismissed for lack of evidence. 36 The indiscriminate search 
for snipers and the resulting violence had a highly negative 8ffect 
upon area residents. The very practices which had caused the riot 
were fully in evidence in t.he attempts to quell +-.he rioting . 
Anger and indignation were expressed by both elements (black and 
white) of the community. Under public pressures, more restraints 
were place<l upon the actions of both police and National Guardsmen. 
This policy change was instituted at approximately the same time as 
the rioting itself was largely dying out in intensity. By Thursday 
most of the rioting, except for isolated incidents, had ceased . The 
federal paratroopers were withdrawn on Saturday and the riot was 
officially designated as over when the National Guard uni ts ·were 
withdrawn on Tuesday, August 1, 1967. 
The Return to Normality 
The return of the pace of pre-riot life was quickly achieved 
during the immediate aftermath of the disorder. However, Detroit 
has experienced many positive gains in its efforts to better achieve 
3 6rbid. 
inter-racial understanding. After the riot many efforts were made 
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to hear and discuss the grievances of ghetto residents but the success 
of these programs has been mixed. 37 And more recently extremist 
groups of both the white and black communities appear to be gaining 
in membership and influence over their respective groups. 38 
Immediate successes undertaken included the hiring of an 
additional 55, 000 persons by some of the major employers in the area.  
These new jobs were largely fi lled by individuals from the ghetto. 
More blacks have been hired by the Detroit school system in super­
visory positions . These successes are, however, greatly overshadowed 
and offset by the increasing distrust: shown by both communities. 
Despite the impressive and massive plans and proposed programs toward 
betterment, little has been done . 39 In fact, in some areas relations 
appear to have deteriorated : 
There appears to be a growing division between the black and 
white communities as well as within the black community itself . 
Some pawnshops and gun stores have been robbed o f  firearms , and 
gun s ales reportedly have tripled since the riot. In late 1967 
there was a rent strike, reports of some fire bombing , and a new 
junior high school was seriously damaged by its predomin antly 
Negro student body. Many Negroes interviewed rejected the theory 
that the 1967 riot immunized Detroit against further disorders . 
Some believed that a new disturbance may well be high ly organized 
and therefore much more serious. 40 
37rbid. , p .  152. 
38 rbid . 
39Mayor ' s  Development Team , Report to Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh , 
(Detroit: Mayor's Office, October, 1967). 
40The Kerner CoITLmission, op. ci�. ,  P · 153 . 
It seems as though the major impetus of post-riot activity 
centers on the preven tion of possible future riots not through the 
elimination of discrimination, but rather by increasing the amount 
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of social control in the city, especially the ghetto areas. New and 
more sophisticated riot control weapons were ordered by the poli ce 
department. New courses in crowd control were instituted as a part 
of on-going police education. There were also plans to improve the 
administration of justice in the event of future riots by identifi­
cation of potential detention facilities and the assigning of ·­
experienced clerks to process those persons who might be arrested 
in the next disturbance. 4 1  With these "reforms " occupying most of 
the curative efforts , it seems as if public officials have accepted 
with fatalistic resignation the likelihood of future riots occurring. 
They concentrate on improving the control of riot behavior rather 
than the elimination of the underlying causes. Unfortunately, this 
type of thinking may result in a "self-fulfilling prophecy. " 
As was true in the other cities selected for analysis in this 
dissertation, there does not appear to have been a change toward 
selective inter-racial violence. The failure of the riot to bring 
forth positive action designed to eliminate discrimination has 
brought more frustration to the black community, but this has not 
resulted in direct aggression against members of the police force in 
excess of that which was present during the pre-riot period. 
4 1rbid. , p. 157 · 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMJ:1.ARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
SUMMARY 
In general, the typology received supporting evidence from 
each of the narrative accounts of the three selected disorders. 
All of the stages that were hypothesized have been supported by the 
evidence with a few minor exceptions which will be noted as each 
stage is discussed. 
The existence of a discrepancy between the real and ideal 
cultures is almost a foregone conclusion for the occurrence of a 
demonstration of any magnitude. This "gap" has been well documented 
in each of the three cities prior to the occurrence of the riot. 
Perhaps more important than simply the existence of this "gap, " is 
the perception among minor ity group members that the "gap " may be 
increasing in size. Whether this is true or false is irrelevant ; 
the ghetto residents believe that it is true and their actions are 
based accordingly. Equally important to the phenomenon of rising 
expectations is the existence of exacerbating local conditions, 
especially in relations with the police. In the eyes of the local 
residents, the treatment they receive on the part of the police 
focalizes and symbolizes this perceived gap between the real and 
ideal cultures. If police-community relationships are strained 
(this has been documented to have been present in all three cities) 
the likelihood of experiencing a riot is greatly increased. l 
The discrepancy between the real and ideal cultures will 
rem ain in the back of the minds of community residents until  it is 
brought to the surf ace by the concerted efforts of civil rights 
groups and more militant organizations within the black community. 
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The extremist groups {especially the Black Muslims) were qui te active 
in each of the three cities during the period of time that preceded 
the outbreak of hostilities. Their efforts to bring about a " new 
black awareness " were very successful among the younger b la ck males 
in each of the cities. They succeeded in shifting the blame for 
their misery and life conditions from the " collective black self " to 
the oppressive white community power structure. The previous feelings 
of lost dignity and self-respect were subl imated into a c ampaign of 
reverse racism which was designed to affix bla�e for the ghetto 
conditions on the white community and their symbols of oppression--
the poli ce. 
The occurrence of a precipitating incident was present in 
each of the cities; moreover, it always involved the pol ice and a 
loc al community resident. This portion of the typology is best 
expl ained with the use of psychologic al rather than sociologi c al or 
1stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants 
and underlying conditions of Race Riots, " Ameri can Sociological Review 
Vol. 30, December, 1965 � pp. 887- 898. 
political explanations. This type of incident unc;loubtedly occurs 
many times throu�hout the normal day ' s  activities in each cf thes e 
cities, but yet only one of these served as an ignition spark for 
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the riot that was to follow. Each of these incidents was almost a 
mirror-image of one another. A casual crowd was present to originally 
witness the event and after the occurrence of the individualized 
violence spiral it changed to an action crowd . This change was 
facilitated by the dif fusion of rumors largely as a result of selec­
tively perceiving the actions of each of the paLticipants in the 
precipitating event. The police were successful in their efforts to 
apprehend the suspects in each of the events, but as they left the 
scene tLere was the feeling among mern.bers of the crowd that the police 
were retreating because of fear. 
Probably the most crucial determinant of the riot occurred 
early in the rioting stage. This involved the perception that there 
existed a breakdown in the power of the control agencies. The 
commissions which studied the riots in each of the cities singled 
out this factor as being the most important feature in contributing 
to the riot. Initial police permissiveness toward looting was a 
great factor in the recruitment of additional riot personnel. The 
enlargement of the original number changed a crowd scene into a full­
fledged riot involving many thousands of persons. In all three 
cities, the burning and looting went largely unchecked during the 
early phases of the riot and by the time the police attempted to 
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re-gain con trol of the situation they were so greatly out-numbered 
that it was now an impossible task. This necessitated the recruitment 
of  additional re-inforcements in the form of National Guardsmen and . 
in one instance, Federal troops. 
The reaction by control agencies introduced a new escalatj on 
in personal violence. This is only natural in view of their mission 
to quell the riots. However, there is evidence ..... lted in the nar ratives 
of all three insurrections that these control agencies over- reacted 
to the violence of the rioters and were in turn a causative factor in 
the maintenance and continuance of a new level of violence. The 
deliberate and indiscriminate use of unnecessary violence has been 
documented in all th�ee cities. The attacks on alleged snipers seem 
to have been mistakes in most instances, with the possible exception 
of Watts where evidence indicates that there was a siz able number of 
actual snipings throughout the course of the riot. Ever!t.ually the 
riots in all three cities were suppressed and the routine of pre-riot 
life was quickly restored. 
The return to normality occurred in all three cities with fe� , 
if any, meaningful C:1ange:s to eliminate the original causative factors. 
Most of  the changes centered around police retraining programs in 
crowd control and the purchasing of more sophisticated riot control 
equipment by local municipal governments. Rather than serving as a 
new bas is for the improvement of race relations the riots seem to have 
resulted in a further polarization of the races . One hypothesized 
feature of the typology--that of a change fro:n colle ctivized violence 
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to personal selective violence against control agency personnel-­
cannot be supported by any evidence in the aftermath conditi ons of 
each of the three cities. On a national scale there has been pre­
sented evidence that poli ce are becoming selected victims of certain 
extremist groups within the black community , but there is no evidence 
that can attr ibute this phenomenon to post-riot conditions within 
the selected cities. 
In conclusion the revised version of the constructed typology 
of an urban insurrection would be as follows: 
1 .  Discrepance between real and ideal cultures 
A. Disproportionate occupation o f degrading statuses 
B. Rising expectations and unresponsive institutionalized 
procedures 
c. Exacerbating lo cal conditions 
2 .  Identification o f vague, causative factors 
A. Diffusion of the generalized belief (proselytizing) 
B. consensus among respondents (acceptance) 
3. The precipitating incident 
A. Existence of a casual crowd 
B. Occurrence o f a seemingly innocuous incident 
c. violence-counter violence spiral (individualized 
D. 
E. 
level )  
Mood shift accompanied by milling, contagion, and 
selective perception 
Distortion o f the incident and diffusion of rumors 
1 9 2  
4. The rioting stage 
A. Initial collective action based on rioters ' conception 
B. 
c .  
D. 
E. 
of the precipitating incident 
Perception of the breakdown of official control 
Recruitment of additional personnel 
Selective burning and looting 
Identification of the most easily accessible and 
readily identifiable of the causative factors 
5. Reaction by control agencies 
A. Violence-reactive violence spiral (collectivized 
level) 
B. Suppression of riot 
6. Return to normality 
A. Relatively unchanged conditions 
CONCLUSIONS 
One of the important features of a constructed typology lies 
in its " •. . attempt to advance concept formation in the social sciences 
from the stage of description and empirical generalization to the 
construction of theoretical systerns. 112 Because of this responsibility 
of all research and particularly that of constructed typologies, an 
attempt wil l  be undertaken to re-integrate the findings back into the 
2
McKinney, op. cit . ,  p. 39. 
theoretical hiatus described earlier in the dissertation. It seems 
plausible that these findings should be able to fill in some of the 
gaps that exist at the present time between theories of collective 
behavior and social movements. 
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One possible method of pursuing this goal could be a comparison 
of the three types of s ocial action by examining differences which 
exist according to a selected fr ame of reference for the analysis of 
social action. One of the most widely accepted models in sociology 
at the present time is Talcott Parsons ' list of pattern variables. 3 
These pattern variables represent a " • • . series of major di lemmas of  
orientation, a series of choices that the actor must make before the 
situation has a determinate meaning for him. 114 These pattern variables 
represent choices that are available to the actor with respect to a 
situation, object, or another actor. 
When the three types of collective social behaviors mentioned 
in this dissertation are compared to one another by using the list o f  
pattern variables as comparison points , the bas ic differences between 
them become evident. Each of the pattern variables has three dimensions 
of explanation: the cultural aspect, the personality aspect, and the 
social system aspect. While each of these three dimensions is not 
3Talcott Parsons and Edward A .  Shi ls, "Categor ies of  the 
Orientation and Organization of Action," in Toward a General Theory of 
Action , Talcott Parsons and Edward A .  Shils, (eds. ) ,  (New York: Harper 
and Row, 195 1), pp. 76-84. 
4rbid . , p. 76. 
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applicable to each of the examples of collPctive social behavior, 
a general definition of each pattern variable will suffice to illustrate 
the differences between episodic collective behaviors (e . g. , lynch mobs 
and panic scenes) ,  urban insurrections, and revolutions. 
The pattern variables in the Parsonsian model are as follows: 
1. Affectivi ty---Affecti ve Neutrality. This choice re.presents 
the dilemma of gratification of impulse versus discipline. 
I t  represents emotional feelings toward others and whether 
there is control over t.hos8 feelings . 
A. Episodic collective behaviors--Affectivity is almost 
always prese.nt and so is a loss of control over those 
feelings. Hatred characterizes the lynch mob and great 
fear is present in panic situations. 
B. Urban Insurrections ·--Heightened effect is present 
agains t the police and shop owners and in some st-3.ges 
there may be a temporary loss of control over these 
feelings. However, some aspects of the riot included 
deliberate , planned, and rational behaviors which 
can ' t  be explained by the "blind rage" e:x-planation. 
c .  Revolutions--Strong emotional feelings toward the ruling 
class are present, but these are very minor as a 
motivating factor for the total revolution ' s  activity 
centers upon deliberately planned and executed activity , 
whi ch implies that emotions are under control. 
2 .  
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Self-o rientation--·Collcct i vi ty 0rienta.tion. This repre­
sents the dilem.1.tta o f  private versus collective interes ts . 
A. Epi sodic collective behaviors--need dispositions of  
the actors are the primary concern. The need to scape­
�oat in a lynch mo!:, or achieving safety in a panic 
scene. 
B. Urban Insurrections- -need disposi tim1S of  the actors 
may serve as motivating factors for looting, but there 
was also present a ger.eralizea. be.1 ief in the worth o f  
this behavior a s  an avenue fer social redress from the 
white community. Ri ot behavior was also designed to 
shock the white community and educate them of the 
conditi ons present in the ghetto. 
C. Revolutions--need dispositions of the individual actors 
a re usually of  secondary importance to the needs of  the 
entire revolutionary movement. The welfare o f  the 
entire society is viewed as a cause that is well worth 
the sacrifice of the individual actors ' needs. 
3. Universalism--Particularism. This represents the dilemma 
o f  transcendence versus immanence. The actors in this 
situation are judged according to universal standards or 
rather because of  their particular qualities. 
A. Episodic collective behaviors--actors are judged almost 
exclusively in · ternIB of universally_ applicable ·standards ; 
there is li ttle, if any , division of labor. 
B. 
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Urban insurrections--actors on both sides are j udged 
somewhat universalistically (i . e. ,  all blacks are 
looters, and all police are pigs), but there is some 
di fferentiation of judgment on both sides. There is 
a lso present a rudimentary form of division of labor. 
C. Revolutions--actors are more likely to be j udged in 
terms of particularistic qualities, especially in the 
later stages of the movement when a well-defined 
division of labor has arisen. 
4 .  Ascription--Achievement. The dilemma of object modalities. 
The actor is faced with the di lemma of treating an object, 
situation, or another actor in terms of what he is or in 
terms of past performances and outcomes o f  the behaviors. 
A. Episodic Col lective Behaviors--actors responses are 
usually instantaneous and based upon the specifics of 
the situation. For excu�ple, fleeing a burning build­
ing or having no regard for the consequences o f  a 
lynching. 
B. Urban Insurrections--looting and burning may be 
immediate response situations simply because the 
buildings happened to be present or it  may have been 
because of the past exploitation habits and practices 
of the stores ' owners. 
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C .  Revolutions--responses to the others (the ruling class) 
are almost exclus ively based upon their past or present 
performances which were perceived as being oppressive 
in nature. 
5. Speci ficity--Diffusness. The di lemma of the scope of 
significance of the object. The dilemma cons ists in 
whether the actor should respond for a specific purpose 
or general purposes . 
A .  Episodic collective behaviors--the actor ' s  purposes 
are very specific in this type of behavior. For 
example, to get clear of a burning bui lding. 
B. Urban Insurrections--the actor ' s  purposes may be some­
what specific in the form of looting for monetary 
reasons but there also exists a general diffuse purpose 
in the form of a protest against discrimination . 
c .  Revolutions--the purposes and activities are very 
diffuse--to change the basic value structure of the 
present society using many diverse strategies. 
6. Short-lived--Long- livea. 5 This represents the dilemma of 
pursuing short range , emotional goals or long range, usef ul 
goals for the sake of the entire collectivity. 
5This pattern variable was added in later writings of Talcott 
Parsons , but was not included in the orig inal list. 
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A. Episodic collective behavior--primary emphasis is on 
short range emotional gratification without taking 
into consideration the long range goals of the 
col lectivity. 
B. Urban Insurrections--there is some short range emotional 
gratification in the form of looting and burning, but 
most participants also have in mind the long range goal 
of equality. 
C. Revolutions--the activities of the actors are almost 
exclusively directed toward long range intrumental 
goals of  the collectivity. 
It is the contention of  the writer that the use of the pattern 
variables model has accomplished the final task of this dissertation-­
re-integration of the findings back into the body of theory from which 
it was origina lly derived. This procedure does point out that the 
phenomenon, urban insurrections, does fall somewhere in the middle o f  
theoretical explanations of collective behavior incidents and that o f  
social movements. While the findings contained in this dissertation 
cannot be held as final, they can at least be useful in future 
explorations in this area. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The major limitation of this study lies with its possible lack 
of generalizability from the three selected case studies. This group 
of disorders in no way constitutes a randomly selected sample from 
the total population of race riots which occurred during the last 
decade. In fact , these three race riots could be regarded as con­
stituting a population in and of themselves. This interpretation 
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is based upon the fact that the sheer magnitude of these disorders 
is much greater than the others that occurred during approximately 
the same period of time. The lack of information about the 
disturbances that occurred in either Atlanta, Tampa, Cleveland, or 
Plainfield, New Jersey makes it impossible to determine with any 
degree of certainty whether the differences between these two types 
are quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both. Previous 
works on revolutions suggest that typologies developed from the 
study of large revolutions (Russian, French, English, and American) 
are also applicable to the analyses of smaller-scale revolutions. 6 
With this acting as a precedent, it appears likely that the findings 
of this investigation might be generalized to include the other 
urban insurrections that occurred during the 1960 ' s  and about which 
not enough information is available . In fact, it might be possible 
to generalize from this typology to some of the major communal race 
riots which occurred in this country during the last century . This 
procedure, however, would be even more tenuous and unsubstantiated 
and is probably best considered as a topic for further research 
which could employ the findings of this study as a benchmark. 
6For example, see Bernard J. Garrow, "The Mexican Social 
Upheaval of 1910 : A Comparative Study of Theories of Revolution," 
an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 
1951. 
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The very nature of the data also points to another limitation 
that is inherent with this type of investigation. In field studies 
or in ex post facto historical research there always exists a 
discrepancy between what actually happened and what was described as 
actually happening. This discrepancy may be large or small depending 
upon the care that was exercised by the researcher . This situation 
is beyond the control of this student, but as stated earlier the 
documentation used in this dissertation represents the most accurate 
that was available. The major factor responsible for this gap was 
simply the loss of data that occurs between the actual event and the 
time when the narratives of the event were written. Once again this 
has been minimized by the prompt investigation and publication of 
the findings of the different commissions. 
Another factor that could compound the difficulties in this 
type of research results from the peculiarities exhibited by each of 
the cities that has been selected for study. Each city has its own 
particular ethos or life style and this tends to complicate and 
obfuscate any efforts to extract some general patterns of any social 
phenomena which occurred in all of them. The attempt to find common 
themes may also cause the investigator to become oblivious to 
important and unique features of each of the respective cities . This 
process of selective perception could result in the publication of 
invalid findings if caution was not exercised in the interpretation 
of the data . 
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Other factors which are actually beyond the control of the 
researcher but which nonetheless play an important role in this 
dissertation revolve around the dual processes of modeling and 
labeling as a result of the first major disorder that occurred in 
Watts. Rather than measuring patterns which happened "spontaneously" 
in three different cities at three different times, what the 
researcher might actually have measured was the degree to which the 
Watts disorder served as a model for the disturbances that followed 
in either Detroit or Newark. Instead of establishing the existence 
of independent sequential patterns or stages the research could have 
measured simply the degree of conformity that characterized both the 
riot participants and social control agency personnel in their efforts 
to model themselves after the social behaviors of their respective 
counterparts in the earlier Watts disturbance. 
Another form of contamination from the Watts episode could 
have been the extent to which ghetto residents in other urban centers 
labeled themselves and were in turn labeled by control agencies as 
potential rioters. The other racial disorders could in this fashion 
be seen as the results of self-fulfilling prophecies rather than 
distinct and spontaneous episodes. If this was partially true, then 
the Watts disorder or rather simply the fact that it happened could 
be considered as one of the major causative factors for the riots 
that occurred afterward. This could invalidate a part of the typology 
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because the first stage was assumed to have been the major causative 
factor and no consideration is given to the fact that other riots had 
occurred before. 
Unfortunately there is no way of measuring the influence of  
these compounding factors on the interpretations contained in this 
dissertation. The inability to control and measure extraneous 
variables is one of the major drawbacks of this type of research; 
however, this situation does not preclude the possibility of  discov­
ering valid findings. The researcher was aware of these complicating 
factors and they were taken into consideration during the analysis. 
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